

PSIHOLOGIE ȘI ȘTIINȚELE EDUCAȚIEI

EMOTION REGULATION GOALS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH MORAL COMPETENCE, MORAL ORIENTATION, AND THE TYPE OF MOTIVATION FOR HIDING THE TRUTH

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Abstract. *Little is known about the relationship between one's moral life and her/his emotion regulation, especially her/his emotion regulation goals. The present study aimed to bring new data regarding this relationship, by investigating the association of one's emotion regulation goals (measured with an instrument elaborated by Faiciuc in 2018, The Questionnaire for the Emotion Regulation Goals: QERG), with one's moral competence and orientation (measured with Moral Competence Test: MCT, elaborated by Lind, 1978), and the type of motivation to hide the truth (measured with the C5 Questionnaire, elaborated by Faiciuc in 2016). Based on a common structure of goals and processes for one's moral judgment, moral behavior and emotion regulation, several hypotheses were formulated regarding this association, but the study had also an exploratory character. Although at the research participated 144 students in the second year at the University of Fine Arts and Design from Cluj-Napoca (mean age: 20,22 years, 101 female, 39 males, and 4 without a specified gender) who completed at least one of the instruments used in the research, because few completed two or more of the administered instruments, most of the computation were done for much smaller samples (around 30). That is why, the results were checked through their corroboration with the results obtained in a previous research, and through their convergence. The initial hypotheses were only partially supported by data. The following main results were obtained, which were in agreement with them. Those with a higher moral competence index stood out through their preference for the goals through which emotions are downregulated and adjusted to the context, a result indicating the emotion regulation component in the moral competence assessment with the MCT. The shared preferred goal of those with higher moral competence and moral orientation with those preferring altruistic and, respectively, avoidance reasons for hiding the truth was to adjust the expression of their emotions so that to not disturb the people around. Those preferring relatively the moral arguments of a lower level that are focused on the reciprocal personal interest, and those preferring the reasons of hiding the truth focused also on the reciprocal personal interest, i.e., the egocentric and, respectively, approach reasons for hiding the truth, shared the preference for the self-reported regulative goal to let their negative emotions the way they are, and the reluctance to prefer the goal to adjust the expression of their negative emotions so that to not disturb the people around. Such shared emotion regulation goals or the emotion regulation profiles associated with certain moral behaviors, values, and judgments could*

be useful from a psychotherapeutic point of view (e.g., to adjust the therapeutic goals regarding emotion regulation to one's moral profile), and also from a psychometric point of view: the preferred emotion regulation goals could be used to assess indirectly one's moral life. Future research is needed in order to clarify and check the obtained results.

Keywords: moral competence, moral judgment stages, lying, avoidance motivational focus, approach motivational focus, altruism, egocentrism, emotion regulation goals, emotional dysregulation.

The relationship between emotion regulation and the various aspects of moral life is an issue that, in spite of the recent research efforts, needs a more intensive and complex investigation. Theoretically, a causal reciprocity between the way a person regulates her/his emotional states and the way she/he behaves morally can be envisioned. This causal reciprocity should be important from a pragmatic point of view, as emotion regulation difficulties may influence one's moral life, and one's moral issues may lead to emotion regulation difficulties and a lower well-being. Until now, the existing research regarding the link between emotion regulation and moral life has been focused on the relationship of emotions and their regulation with the deontological (or driven by intuition) or utilitarian (or driven by deliberate reasoning) decisions or judgments regarding moral dilemmas (see for a review Helion & Ochsner, 2018; Szekely & Miu, 2015), which both could be viewed as representing moral answers. In contrast, for the relationship between emotion regulation and the level of one's moral judgment, moral competence, moral virtue, or moral behavior, extremely little research has been done, especially through a direct and systematic investigation. This research was concentrated mainly on the examination of the association of malevolent personality traits (e.g., Donahue, McClure & Moon, 2014), empathy measures (e.g., Pohling, Bzdok, Eigenstetter, Stumpf & Strobel, 2015), or the reaction to empathy-inducing situations to affective traits (e.g., Eisenberg et al., 1994) with direct or indirect (e.g., emotional intelligence, negative affectivity, maladaptive emotion regulation strategies) emotion regulation measures. Only one study investigated directly the relationship between emotional dysregulation and the morality judgment for several scenarios with moral content (Zhang, Kong & Li, 2017). Another study (Mestvirishvili, Mestvirishvili, Kvitsiani & Kamushadze, 2020) investigated the relationship of emotional intelligence with moral competence, as measured with Lennick and Kiel's (2005, apud Mestvirishvili et al., 2020) Moral Competency Index (MCI), moral identity, and consequential moral reasoning in moral dilemmas.

In the above-mentioned relationship, a particular aspect that may play a significant role in its status should be that of one's emotion regulation goals. One's moral values, decisions, judgments, or behaviors may lead to certain emotion regulation goals, and the preference for certain emotion regulation goals may lead to certain moral issues. This possible link was suggested also by Charland (2011),

who notes that “stipulating the ends of emotion regulation requires normative assumptions that ultimately derive from values and morals” (p. 83), and by Helion et al. (2018), who mentions that “individuals may up- or down- regulate their automatic emotional responses to moral stimuli in a way that encourages goal-consistent behavior”. The association between emotion regulation goals and one’s moral life has been studied to an even lesser extent than the association between emotion regulation in general and the moral facet of a person. To my knowledge, no studies have investigated the relationship between emotion regulation goals and aspects of moral life. The only existing study regards a research of the association between emotion goals, i.e., the desire to experience three given negative emotions and one positive emotion, and nonclinical psychopathy (Spantidaki Kyriazi, Bogaerts, Tamir, Denissen & Garofalo, 2021). A first step for examining the relationship between emotion regulation goals and moral life was made in Faiciuc (2020a). In that study, the association between several aspects of emotion regulation and one’s tendency and reasons to hide the truth, measured with C5 Questionnaire (Faiciuc, 2016a) was investigated. The emotion regulation aspects that were included in the correlational research from Faiciuc (2020a) were the preferred emotion regulation cognitive strategies, metaemotions, the level, or types of emotional dysregulation, but also the preference for performance or learning, or, respectively, approach or avoidance performance regulation goals for the negative emotions, using two instruments for assessing these kinds of emotion regulation goals, elaborated by Rusk, Tamir, and Rothbaum (2011). In the same study, there were presented also some few data from a correlational research regarding the association of one’s reasons or tendency to hide the truth with the answers to a questionnaire (Questionnaire for the Emotion Regulation Goals: QERG) elaborated by Faiciuc in 2018, in order to assess in detail one’s emotion regulation goals. Those few data were selected and presented only in order to support the results obtained with the other emotion regulation instruments used in Faiciuc (2020a). In the present study, the results of the above-mentioned correlational research between the answers to the QERG items and one’s reasons or tendency to hide the truth will be presented in their entirety, in detail, adding to them also the results obtained from a correlational study regarding the link of the answers to the QERG items with moral competence and orientation, as defined by Lind (1985), so that to find out if some common pattern of results emerges.

In comparison with other existing instruments with which emotion regulation goals have been investigated, QERG questionnaire offers a more detailed picture of the possible goals for emotion regulation. It takes into account, for the first time, the distinct cases of 1) the regulation goals for positive emotions vs. negative emotions vs. desire to not label the emotions as positive or negative, and 2) of the regulation goals for emotions vs. emotion expression, and 3) the case in which one does not want to regulate her/his emotions, or their expression. QERG questionnaire has also items that assess emotion regulation efficiency:

- *the level of satisfaction* with one's own positive and negative emotions;
- *the self-perception regarding one's emotion regulation efficiency*;
- *one's belief that emotion regulation is possible, i.e., that emotions are controllable*.

QERG items regarding one's own goals for regulation of emotions and their expression take into consideration:

- several dimensions on which emotions and their expression may be changed: valence, intensity, frequency, duration, modality, context adequacy, and visibility;
- several dimensions of the process of changing emotions: prevention, elimination, upregulation or downregulation, adequacy to context, and reversing emotional valence;
- several dimensions of the personal and social context in which one is willing to change her/his emotion or their expression: a) having in mind the goals of close persons, of unfamiliar persons, of one's group, the competition or cooperation with other persons, or b) having in mind only one's own personal goals regarding one's self-image, the accomplishment of other goals than that of emotion regulation, including the desire to understand better one's own emotions; so, in other words, in accordance with these kinds of goals, a person may change her/his emotions or their expression:
 - because of the nature of the context as perceived by that person;
 - because of the perceived expectancies of close persons, or of one's own reference group, or because of the perceived social norms for emotions, and their expression in the reference group (which can be *performance or heteronomous goals*);
 - because of the desire to live up to one's self-image, or to secure the accomplishment of the personal goals, inclusively the one referring to a better understanding of one's own emotions (as *instrumental or cognitive autonomous goals*).

Hypotheses

Relationship between C5 scores (tendency to hide the truth and types of reasons to hide of truth) and QERG items

1. *The relationship of the preference for performance and cognitive goals in the regulation of one's own emotions and their expression with the general tendency to hide the truth*

The answers for the items assessing the preference for performance (items 17, 18, 20 for emotion, and 28, 29, 31 for emotion expression¹) and cognitive (items 23, 24) emotion regulation goals of QERG should have the same relationships with the

¹ The content of all the mentioned items from QERG can be read in the Results section.

C5 scores as the ones predicted or obtained (Faiciuc, 2020a) for the relationships between the results for the Measure **A** and **B** for the performance and learning emotion regulation goals (elaborated by Rusk et al., in 2011) and C5 scores. A correspondence between the learning goals from Measures **A** and **B** and the cognitive goals from QERG was assumed. In other words, *the preference for the cognitive goals for emotion regulation should correlate negatively with the general tendency to hide the truth* (obtained as a tendency in Faiciuc, 2020a), because a person who wants to understand one's own feelings, who is not afraid to be cognizant of one's own emotions, may be a person less prone to self-deception. But, if that person is less prone to self-deception, she/he may be also less prone to deceive others, because she/he values the truth in general. In the same time, *the preference for performance emotion regulation goals should correlate positively with the general tendency to hide the truth* (obtained as a tendency in Faiciuc, 2020a). The reason is that a person for whom her/his image in the other persons' eyes has a higher value than the truth about her/his own person, i.e., a person preferring performance emotion regulation goals, may tend not to value the truth in general. Moreover, as Mazar, Amir, and Ariely (2008) note, people lie because they want to maintain their self-concept. Empirical data obtained by Kashy and DePaulo (1996) are in agreement with their comment. They showed that "the people who told more lies were more manipulative, more concerned with self-presentation, and more sociable" (p. 1037). But, for the maintenance of self-concept, the projected social image is important. Emotion regulation goals may play a role in promoting the desired social image. Tamir (2016) supports this idea, mentioning that people "want to experience emotions that shed positive light on their sense of self" (p. 8). In the case of emotion expression regulation, too, *the preference for performance goals in regulating the expression of one's own emotions should correlate positively with the general tendency to hide the truth*, because that preference may indicate a lack of authenticity as a result of not valuing the truth in general. These predictions are supported by the data obtained by Rusk et al. (2011), which indicate a positive correlation between the preference for performance emotion regulation goals and suppression as an emotion regulation strategy, and a negative correlation between the preference for learning emotion regulation goals and the same emotion regulation strategy. Suppression, as an emotion regulation strategy, may be positively linked with the tendency to hide the truth, as indicating the desire to ignore or to hide the truth of one's own emotional life. In fact, such a link may be supported by the data obtained in Faiciuc (2020a): suppression as a metaemotion tended to correlated positively with the tendency to hide the truth. That correlation may not have been significant because the scale for assessing suppression had a low internal consistency, and because suppression was not measured as an emotion regulation strategy, but as a metaemotion.

Because in Faiciuc (2020a) an unexpected positive correlation between the emotion regulation learning goals assessed with Measure **A** and the egocentric reasons for hiding the truth occurred, it will be checked also in this study, too:

cognitive goals from QERG (items 23, 24) should correlate positively with egocentric reasons for hiding the truth. In Faiciuc (2020a), a positive correlation occurred between the preference for egocentric reasons of level 3 for hiding the truth and the performance emotion regulation goals assessed with Measure **B**. So, in this study, *a positive correlation between the preference for egocentric reasons of level 3 for hiding the truth and the performance goals from QERG* should occur, too. The relative preference for another type of egocentric reasons of hiding the truth, those of level 1, correlated negatively with the relative preference for performance emotion regulation goals of Measure **A** in Faiciuc (2020a). Therefore, in the present study, *the relative preference for the egocentric reasons of hiding the truth of level 1 was expected also to correlate negatively with the performance goals of QERG.* The relative preference for the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth of level 5 correlated negatively, in Faiciuc (2020a), with the preference for performance emotion regulation assessed with Measure **B**. Based on that result, in the present research, too, *a negative correlation should occur between the relative preference for the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth of level 5 and the performance goals from QERG.* Finally, because in Faiciuc (2020a), the preference for the learning emotion regulation goals correlated negatively with the relative preference for the altruistic reasons of hiding the truth of level 4, but positively with the relative preference for the altruistic reasons of hiding the truth of level 5, *cognitive goals from QERG should correlate negatively with the relative preference for the altruistic reasons of hiding the truth of level 4, but positively with the relative preference for the altruistic reasons of hiding the truth of level 5.*

2. The relationship of the preference for performance and cognitive goals in the regulation of one's own emotions and their expression with the preference for the performance reasons of hiding the truth

Performance goals in the regulation of one's own emotions and their expression should be positively linked with the performance reasons in hiding the truth (items 18, 21-24 o²). In contrast, *cognitive goals in the regulation of one's own emotions and their expression should be negatively linked with the performance goals in hiding the truth (items 18, 21-24 of C5).* These predictions were made based on the assumption of a common structure of goals for emotion

² 18. I preferred / would prefer to hide the truth if, in the community I am part of, hiding the truth is something common, easily accepted, or tolerated.

21. I gave in / would give in to the temptation to hide the truth because of the shame I would have had / would have if I had said it / I said it.

22. I have decided / would decide to hide the truth out of fear that I will not be understood by those around me if I told it, and that they might ridicule me.

23. I gave in / would give in to the temptation to hide the truth in order to gain, or keep a good reputation or image in the eyes of others.

24. I decided / would decide to hide the truth because the reputation of being an honest person, who tells the truth, is not that important to me.

regulation and for hiding the truth, and taking into consideration that Rusk et al. (2011) obtained a negative correlation between the preference for performance emotion regulation goals and the one for learning emotion regulation goals. It is true that this negative correlation was obtained by the cited authors only in a single case: for their first measure of the emotion regulation goals, and only on the sample of their first study. For the second measure used by them and for the sample from their second study that correlation was statistically insignificant.

3. The relationship of avoidance and approach goals for regulation of one's own emotions and their expression with avoidance and approach reasons of hiding the truth

The avoidance and approach reasons in hiding the truth should be linked with the similar goals in the regulation of emotions and their expression, based on the assumption of a common structure of goals, with the same approach or avoidance motivational focus. Theoretically, the items from QERG that might be linked directly or indirectly positively with avoidance goals (and negatively with the approach goals), mainly in the case of negative emotions, are: 1, 3, 5, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 (as items that may mean avoidance of emotional experience), 17, 18, 20, 26, 28, 29, 31 (as items that may mean avoidance of failure, of a negative social image, a prevention intention). The items from QERG linked, directly or indirectly and positively, with approach goals (and negatively with the avoidance goals) mainly in the case of negative emotions may be the following: 2, 4, 6, 8 (as items that may suggest that negative emotions are not avoided at all costs) 9, 15, 16, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 30, 32, 34, 35 (as items that indicate the orientation toward a personal goal chosen autonomously and the promotion of its achievement). It may be that in the case of positive emotions, this categorization of the above-mentioned items into avoidance and approach items is reversed regarding their membership to one of the two categories.

4. The relationship of the QERG items indicating the emotion regulation efficiency with the tendency to hide the truth and with the preference for altruistic and egocentric reasons of hiding the truth

The predicted correlations between the scores for the measure Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale: DERS, elaborated by Gratz and Roemer, in 2004, used in Faiciuc (2020a), and the scores for C5 should be similar with the predicted correlations between the C5 scores and the correspondent items from QERG that assess directly or indirectly aspects of the emotion regulation efficiency. The QERG items that assess it directly are the items 1-9, 36-37, and, indirectly, the items 10-14, 26, 27, because they indicate or not a focus on emotional coping, 25 and 35, as indicating the motivation for emotion regulation, and 38, as one's belief in the possibility of emotion regulation should influence positively her/his efficiency in emotion regulation, as suggested by Bigman, Mauss, Gross and Tamir (2016).

Several studies (Anderson, Chen & Ayduk, 2019; Azizli et al., 2016; Cheshure, Zeigler-Hill, Sauls, Vrabel & Lehtman, 2020; DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer & Epstein, 1996; Donahue et al., 2014; Gillath, Sesko, Shaver & Chun, 2010; Grandey & Sayre, 2019; Kelly & Yip, 2006; King, Emmons & Woodley, 1992; Loeffler, Huebner, Radke, Habel & Derntl, 2020; Maftai, Bostan & Zaharia, 2021; Makowski, Pham, Lau, Leow, Raine and Chen, 2021; Malterer, Glass & Newman, 2008; Panasiti, Pavone, Merla & Aglioti, 2011; Porter, ten Brinke, Baker & Wallace, 2011; Preuter, 2021; Rogier & Velotti, 2018; Sackeim & Gur, 1979; Spantidaki Kyriazi et al., 2021; Visser, Bay, Cook & Myburgh, 2010; Wismeijer, 2011; Zvi & Elaad, 2018; see also Faiciuc, 2020a) support the ideas that faking emotions, i.e., emotional self-deception, may lead to emotional dysregulation in the long run, and that emotional dysregulation can be associated with antisocial behavior and psychopathic traits. Consequently, it may be associated also to other-deception (Lu & Chang, 2014), to the tendency of hiding the truth, given the association between lying and antisocial and psychopathic behavior (e.g. Dobrow, 2016; Halevy, Shalvi & Verschuere, 2013; Spidel, Herve, Greaves & Yuille, 2011; Makowski et al., 2021). A direct positive relationship between emotion dysregulation and lie acceptability was found also by Buta, Visu-Petra, Opre, Koller and Visu-Petra (2021) for middle school children, when emotional dysregulation was indicated by social anxiety, by Butean, Mone, Visu-Petra and Opre (2020), for adolescents, when emotional dysregulation was indicated by callous-unemotional traits, by Faiciuc (2020a), for young adults (undergraduates), using the DERS measure, and by Dobrow (2016), for undergraduates, who showed that less emotionally stable persons are more likely to lie to avoid disclosing pertinent information, and for Self-Gain/Impression Management. Reversely, as shown by Preuter (2021), lying others leads to negative emotions, no matter the reason of deception, i.e., if it was self-centered or other-oriented, and no matter how the acceptability of lying was assessed in general. The explanation given by the cited author was that lying is linked with lowering one's self-esteem, even though the liar may be also satisfied with the effectiveness of a lie or with her/his lying performance. These data can be put in correspondence with the Gozma, Vrij and Bull's (2001) findings that indicated that people who feel guilty and manipulative when lying have higher levels of anxiousness.

Stichter (2020) notes also that "emotion regulation is important for virtue acquisition" (p. 1), because moral failures are part of anyone's life, being a type of failure more distressing than other kinds of failure, leading to emotions like anger, avoidance, shame, or defensiveness. In the cited author's view, emotion regulation should be important to manage this emotional distress, so that a person to learn something from moral failures, developing the virtues as any skill that implies learning from mistakes. The same idea is supported also by Lewis (2015). On the other hand, Nyklíček, Vingerhoets and Zeelenberg (2011) observe that sometimes "moral emotions are regulated by means of amoral behaviors". So,

lying may be used as a means for regulating unpleasant emotions, as the moral emotions are, because “people want to experience emotions that shed positive light on their sense of self” (Tamir, 2016, p. 8), as noted also above. In another line of argumentation, if emotion regulation is linked with the executive function (e.g., Debey, Verschuere & Crombez, 2012; Gyurak, Goodkind, Kramer, Miller & Levenson, 2012; Lantrip, Isquith, Koven, Welsh & Roth, 2016; Makowski et al., 2021; Zelazo & Cunningham, 2007), then the data presented by Makowski et al. (2021, p. 27) are important. They showed that “individuals with difficulties in cognitive control tend to have a higher lying frequency, indicating the involvement of executive functions (e.g., inhibition and flexibility) in the controlled delivery of lies and manipulation of reality” (Makowski et al., 2021, p. 27), an idea supported also by Mead, Baumeister, Gino, Schweitzer and Ariely (2009), and Baumeister and Juola Exline (1999).

So, given the presented results regarding the relationship between one’s emotional dysregulation and tendency to hide the truth, in the case of the QERG items, it is expected also that *one’s general tendency to hide the truth to correlate positively with her/his emotional dissatisfaction (items 1-9), and negatively with the self-reported efficiency in emotional regulation (items 36, 37), with the motivation to change one’s own emotions and their expression (items 25, 35, 10-16, 26), and with belief in the controllability of emotions (item 38)*. This prediction should hold especially for the dissatisfaction with and self-perceived efficiency in the regulation of the negative emotions, as DERS is an instrument in which the focus is on the negative emotion regulation. As a tentative hypothesis, the prediction was extended also for the positive emotions, and also for the regulation of the emotional expression. It can be complicated by the fact that emotional valence may be differentially linked with the approach and avoidance goals (see, e. g. Carver & White, 1994, who presented data that support the idea that avoidance goals may be more linked with negative emotions and approach goals more with positive emotions). These goals can support, in their turn, different kinds of reasons for hiding the truth, and maybe different results for the two kinds of emotions. As shown in Faiciuc (2020a), emotion regulation efficiency could be associated positively, theoretically, both with the egocentric and altruistic reasons for hiding the truth, an idea supported also by some empirical studies (Cheshure et al., 2020; Donahue et al, 2014; Krokoszinski & Hosser, 2016; Loeffler et al., 2020; Makowski et al., 2021; Mumford et al., 2008). Still, it was predicted (Faiciuc, 2020a) that *the preference for egocentric reasons to hide the truth may be linked with one’s inability to self-regulate or to decenter, leading to difficulties in her/his emotion regulation*, as those aspects may be important for an efficient and stable emotion regulation in any situation in the complexity of the social life. Correlatively, it was predicted that *the preference for altruistic reasons to hide the truth should be positively linked with the emotion regulation efficiency*, even though emotion regulation could be more

difficult when not only the personal emotional state is to be considered, but also other's emotions. This prediction is supported also indirectly by several empirical results obtained by Eisenberg et al. (1994), Mestvirishvili et al. (2020), Myyrya, Juujärvi and Pessa (2010), Pohling et al. (2015), and Surdel and Klimenko (2018), which support a positive link between an efficient emotion regulation (as indicated, for example, by emotional intelligence), empathy and moral aspects of one's life. As shown by Coats and Blanchard-Fields (2008), when people have the goals to maintain their emotional well-being and to preserve their relationships with other people or group harmony (goals that may be more likely preferred by those with higher empathy), understanding that these goals are interrelated, then they would be especially motivated to regulate their emotions and the emotional expression in order to decrease the emotional problems with the close people. Consequently, they would be less inclined to use, for their emotion regulation, strategies through which feelings are vented through their direct expression or strategies of direct confrontation, preferring instead problem-solving strategies to solve interpersonal problems. Using such strategies may contribute to the development of their emotion regulation abilities. Moreover, a supplementary argument would be that those who prefer altruistic reasons for hiding the truth may understand better the altruistic necessity of emotional regulation, being, consequently, more satisfied with its result.

Although the above-mentioned prediction was not supported by the data from Faiciuc (2020a), it will be maintained in the present study, given that it was not tested for the positive emotions and for the emotion expression, and also not for the two possible dimensions in emotion regulation (the regulation of the emotional excess or emotional deficit, which may explain through their opposing correlations the absence of the predicted correlations for the dysregulation of the negative emotions), as it can be made with the QERG measure. So, in the present study, in comparison with other studies, the analysis of the relationship between emotion regulation efficiency and deception will be more direct and more detailed, including aspects of emotion regulation and of deception that have not been investigated before in the context of their association. The prediction regarding the association of the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth and, respectively, of the egocentric reasons for hiding the truth with the emotion regulation efficiency would take into consideration the way emotion regulation efficiency was measured by QERG. This efficiency is indicated directly by the level of satisfaction both with one's own positive and negative emotions, as not being higher in intensity, frequency or duration, but also not lower in intensity, frequency or duration than the desired level, or as not being different than the desired emotions (items 1-6), by the level of satisfaction with the expression of both one's own positive and negative emotions regarding the level of expression (not being higher, but also not lower than the desired one), or the way they are expressed (items 7-9), by the self-reported efficiency in emotion regulation

(items 36 and 37). Indirectly, it is indicated by the belief that emotions are controllable (item 38), and by the preference for the goals suggesting the desire to change one's own positive and negative emotions regarding their intensity, frequency, duration, adequacy, occurrence, and their expression (items 25, 35, 10-16, 26, 27). All these dimensions of emotion regulation should be viewed in conjunction when judging one's emotion regulation efficiency. An indication of the level of stringency of the standards used in emotion regulation may be the preference for emotion regulation goals that aim not only to modulate one's own emotions, but to totally prevent their occurrence (suggesting the highest stringency), or to totally eliminate them after their occurrence. From this point of view, it was predicted *that those preferring altruistic reasons for hiding the truth should prefer more (and those preferring egocentric reasons for hiding the truth should prefer less) stringent goals for emotion regulation* (items 10, 13), because they are presumably more able to achieve them, and in order to totally prevent the occurrence of the unwanted emotions that may disturb others. *Items 25 and 35 of QERG*, which indicate one's motivation to change one's own emotions and, respectively, their expression, *may correlate also negatively with the general tendency to hide the truth*, to the extent to which they may suggest, too, one's desire for authenticity. There is additionally the unlikely possibility that one lets her/his emotions and their expression as they are because they are perfectly adjusted to the context, or to her/his desires from the beginning, being perfectly satisfied with them. It may be that, in this case, those items would correlate also negatively with the tendency to hide the truth, as there might not be a need to hide the truth. On the other hand, *the preference for the items 25 and 35 of QERG should correlate positively with the preference for egocentric reasons for hiding the truth*, if these items indicate one's exclusive focus on her/his personal goals and feelings, suggesting a desire to be free from the "truth" of any social constraints and a lack of willingness to invest personal effort in taking into account those constraints. On the other hand, *they also should correlate negatively with the preference for altruistic reasons of hiding the truth*, if they indicate a problematic efficiency in the regulation of one's own emotions and their expression, and a lack of motivation to adjust them to the "truth" of the social context.

5. The relationship of the QERG items indicating the preference for adjusting emotions and their expression to the context with the tendency to hide the truth and with the preference for altruistic and egocentric reasons of hiding the truth

Items 15, 16, and 27 of QERG should be negatively linked with the tendency to hide the truth and with the preference for egocentric reasons for hiding the truth, and positively with the preference for altruistic reasons to hide the truth, as they indicate the desire to take into consideration the truth of the contextual reality in one's emotion regulation and emotion expression, or the needs of other people.

6. The relationship of the QERG items indicating the preference for autonomous emotion and expression regulation goals with the tendency to hide the truth, and with the preference for altruistic and egocentric reasons of hiding the truth

Items 19 and 30 should be linked positively with the preference for the more autonomous and principled reasons for hiding the truth of C5 (of level 4 and level 5, see below), because they may indicate a tendency toward a principled autonomous self-regulation, which may be negatively linked with the avoidance goals that are linked with social anxiety. Also, they may be positively linked with the preference for egocentric reasons for hiding the truth, based on the idea that egocentric people may value more their own image. As this type of goals engenders rather a subjective emotion regulation, the preference for them may be positively associated with the tendency to hide the truth.

7. The relationship of the QERG items indicating the preference for instrumental emotion and expression regulation goals with the preference for altruistic and egocentric reasons of hiding the truth

Items 21, 22, 32, and 33, which assess the preference for instrumental emotion and expression regulation goals, should be positively linked with egocentric reasons in hiding the truth, and negatively with the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth, based on the idea that those items suggest the fact that emotion regulation and expression are used as instruments for personal goals.

8. The relationship of the QERG items indicating the preference for other-oriented/social emotion and expression regulation goals with the preference for altruistic and egocentric reasons of hiding the truth

Item 34 of QERG should correlate positively with the preference for altruistic reasons for hiding the truth, and negatively with the preference for egocentric ones, because it suggests altruistic avoidance reasons for the regulation of emotion expression. In general, the other-oriented/social goals in regulating emotions and their expression (items 17, 18, 20, 28, 29, 31, and 34) should correlate positively with the preference for altruistic reasons of hiding the truth. Of them, items 17 and 28 are the ones that have the highest altruistic content. But items 17, 18, 20, 28, 29, 31 may correlate also positively with the preference for egocentric reasons of hiding the truth, because they indicate a preference for performance goals in the regulation of emotions and their expression, to the extent that performance goals are associated with an egocentric motivational focus because of their ego-involvement (suggested by Levy, Kaplan, & Patrick, 2004, apud Brophy, 2005, who showed that performance-goal oriented students are more self-centered than mastery-goal oriented students).

Relationship between MCT scores (moral competence and levels of moral judgment/orientation) and QERG items

Lind (2008) defines moral competence “as the ability of a subject to accept or reject arguments on a particular moral issue consistently in regard to their moral quality even though they oppose the subject’s stance on that issue” (p. 200). Consistency in moral judgment is defined regarding some preferred moral orientation (Lind, 2013). Moral orientations correspond to the six Kohlbergian moral stages or levels, conceived to be moral attitudes or moral motivations. That is why moral orientation is defined as the affective aspect of the moral judgment, whereas moral competence as the cognitive aspect of the moral judgment (Lind, 2013). A higher moral competence means a stronger preference for higher order moral orientations, and a weaker preference for lower order moral orientations (Lind, 2013). Lind (2000) states also that C score of the moral competence (or C index) of his MCT (formerly named MJT) instrument through which moral competence is measured indicates the degree to which a respondent lets that her/his moral judgment to be determined by moral principles and considerations and not by “psychological forces”, like the human tendency to select and accept only arguments that support a personal opinion or a personal decision. Such “psychological forces” may be affective ones, linked with moral preferences or egocentric emotions. This definition suggests implicitly that moral competence should be linked to one’s ability to regulate those affective “psychological forces”, i.e., to one’s emotion regulation. Moreover, the regulation of those affective forces may depend not only on one’s emotion regulation ability/efficiency, but also on one’s emotion regulation goals: if one’s is willing or not to regulate her/his emotions and their expression, why and when is willing to regulate them, i.e., in which conditions or situations prefers to use her/his emotion regulation abilities.

I am aware of only two published studies that have examined the relationship between moral competence measured with MCT and some indirect aspects of emotion regulation.

In the first one, Pohling et al. (2015) investigated “the relationship of empathy, personal values, and the five-factor model of personality with moral judgment competence and counterproductive work behavior as indicators of moral judgment and behavior.” They found that the moral competence index correlated positively significantly with the perspective taking aspect of empathy, with the empathic concern, and, to a lesser extent, with the fantasy component of empathy, but it did not correlate with the personal distress as a response to empathy eliciting situations. It correlated also positively with the values of universalism and benevolence (as self-transcendence values), negatively with the power, conformity, and security values (as conservation and self-enhancement values), and tended to correlate negatively with the tradition, achievement, and hedonism values (which are also conservation and self-enhancement values). Of the five factors of the “Big

Five” model of personality, it correlated positively only with the openness to experience, using a German short version of the Big Five Inventory (BFI-K; Rammstedt & John, 2005, apud Pohling et al., 2015). But, in another sample, with another measure, the German adaptation of the Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R; Ostendorf & Angleitner, 2004, apud Pohling et al., 2015), it correlated positively only with the “Values” facet of the Openness to experience, but also with Agreeableness (and with its facets Straightforwardness, Tender-mindedness, Compliance, and as a tendency with Altruism), and tended to correlate positively with the Self-consciousness facet of the Neuroticism factor. It also tended to correlate negatively with Angry Hostility facet of the Neuroticism factor, and correlated negatively with the Extraversion factor (and with its facets Gregariousness, and Activity). The multiple mediation analysis carried out by the above-mentioned authors indicated that “affective (but not cognitive) empathy transmitted its effect on ethical competence through benevolence, conformity, tradition, power, and hedonism” (p. 449), and that the “perspective taking lost its predictive power when investigated alongside affective empathy dimensions” (p. 449). Although personal distress, which is presumably the most directly linked with the emotion regulation efficiency, did not predicted directly moral competence, it had a positive specific indirect effect through hedonism: high personal distress was associated with rejecting hedonism values, which in turn was associated with higher levels of moral competence. This result indicates, in the above-mentioned authors’ opinion, a possible positive result of the personal distress for the moral competence, “as reflecting a measure of emotional self-control and the ability to distance oneself from emotionally charged situations”. They speculate also that perspective taking may be a necessary condition for transforming personal distress into feelings of sympathy and compassion.

In the second study, Surdel et al. (2018) examined also the relationship of moral competence with empathy, and positive and negative affectivity. In the case of this study, only fantasy, perspective taking, and negative affective state correlated positively with moral competence, and not empathic concern. Perspective taking was the strongest and the only significant empathy predictor of the moral competence, while negative affect was the second positive predictor of moral competence.

The relationship between moral competence, measured with MCT, with emotion regulation was studied also indirectly in a neuroimaging research by Jung et al. (2016). They used functional magnetic resonance imaging and examined resting-state functional connectivity (RSFC) in order to see if individual differences in moral competence are linked with RSFC in brain networks associated to emotion processing, cognitive control, and, implicitly, emotion regulation. Their research was based on the idea that “for a consistent application of moral norms and principles it might be helpful to regulate emotion elicited by a moral dilemma” (Jung et al., 2016, p. 3). They found that individuals with higher moral competence “showed greater

amygdala-ventromedial prefrontal connectivity, which may reflect better ability to cope with emotional conflicts elicited by moral dilemmas”. and “less inter-network connectivity between the amygdalar and fronto-parietal networks, suggesting a more independent operation of these networks” (Jung et al., 2016, p. 1), which might mean that they have better emotion regulation processes.

Using another measure of moral competence (the questionnaire Moral Competency Inventory, elaborated by Lennick and Kiel, in 2005, apud Mestvirishvili et al., 2020), Mestvirishvili et al. (2020) found a positive relationship between emotion intelligence and moral competence. Moral Competency Inventory is built on a different principle than MCT, assessing ten moral competencies with 40 items: 1) Acting consistently with principles, values and, beliefs; 2) Telling the truth; 3) Standing up for what is right; 4) Keeping promises; 5) Taking responsibility for personal choices; 6) Admitting mistakes and failures; 7) Embracing responsibility for serving others; 8) Actively caring about others; 9) Ability to let go of one's own mistakes; 10) Ability to let go of others' mistakes. It can be seen that it covers a more extended range of moral domains than MCT and that it is based on the self-reported moral behavior. In comparison, MCT was aimed to directly measure moral competence, through a moral task.

There is also a study (Myyrya et al., 2010) that investigated the relationship of the moral judgment, as measured with the Defining Issues Test (DIT, elaborated by Rest, 1979, apud Myyrya et al., 2010), with an empathy measure, and with the answers to a questionnaire for the personal values. Its results indicated that the preference for the personal interest schema was “negatively associated with perspective taking and universalism and positively related to achievement and hedonism” (p. 223). The preference for the maintaining norms schema “correlated negatively with empathic concern and perspective taking, as well as with universalism and benevolence” (p. 223), and positively with conformity and security. The preference for the post-conventional moral schema “was positively linked to empathic concern, perspective taking, self-direction, universalism and benevolence” (p. 223), and negatively with power, achievement and hedonism. The preferences for the personal interest schema and, respectively, for the maintaining norms schema were not predicted by the empathy variables after values were entered in the regression model. Only the preference for the post-conventional moral schema was predicted by an empathy variable after values were entered, namely the empathic perspective taking.

In a previous unpublished study (Faiciuc, 2020b), in which the relationship of the moral competence and moral orientation, as measured with MCT, with the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale: DERS was explored, there occurred a tendency toward a negative correlation between the total score of DERS and the moral competence index, and a negative correlation between the moral competence index and the limited access to emotion regulation strategies. In the same time, the

scores of several scales of the DERS and the total score for DERS correlated positively with the preference for the lower levels of moral orientation.

The data from the above-mentioned studies suggest a direct or indirect link of the moral competence and orientation with emotion regulation efficiency, but it is unclear the measure in which this link is related with one's preferred emotion regulation goals. Based on the theoretical meaning of the involved variables and on the existing results presented above, the following hypothesis were formulated.

1. *The link of moral competence and orientation with the emotion regulation goals*

Regarding the link between moral competence and the emotion regulation goals, one expectation was that *the moral competence index C and the preference for higher levels of moral orientation should correlate positively with the other-oriented **altruistic goals** for emotion regulation or expression (QERG item 17, for emotions, items 28, 34, for their expression). The preference for those altruistic goals should correlate negatively with the lower levels of moral orientation.* Other items that regard other-oriented goals and that may have an altruistic meaning (18, 20, 29, 31) have also a pronounced heteronomous content, which may be negatively related with the moral competence and the higher levels of the moral orientation, because they are presumably associated more with the autonomous principled reasoning than the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth of the highest level, given the theoretical base of the MCT instrument. In contrast, *the moral competence index C and the preference for higher levels of moral orientation should correlate negatively with the **egocentric goals** in the regulation of emotions (QERG items 21, 22, 25) or of their expression (QERG items 32, 33, 35). The preference for those egocentric goals in emotion regulation or expression should correlate positively with the preference for the first two stages of the moral orientation.*

Because *the moral competence and the preference for higher levels of moral orientation imply autonomous principled reasoning, they should correlate positively with the preference for the **goals suggesting through their content an autonomous regulation** of emotions and their expression (QERG items 16, 19, for emotions, and items 27, 30, for their expression) and with the **cognitive goals** of emotion regulation (QERG items 23 and 24), whereas the preference for the lower levels of the moral orientation should correlate negatively with these kinds of goals.* In contrast, *the moral competence and the preference for higher levels of moral orientation should correlate negatively with the preference for the **goals suggesting through their content a heteronomous regulation** of emotions and their expression (QERG items 18, 20, for emotions, 29, 31, for their expression), whereas the preference for the lower levels of the moral orientation should correlate positively with this kind of goals (especially the level 3 of moral orientation).*

2. *The link of moral competence and orientation with the emotion regulation efficiency*

Given the definition of the *C* index, it should correlate positively with the self-reported efficiency in emotion regulation (QERG items 36, 37) and, respectively, with the self-reported level of satisfaction with one's own emotions and their expression (QERG items 1-9). Similar positive correlations were expected in the case of the higher levels of the moral orientation, and corresponding negative correlations in the case of the lower levels of moral orientation.

Based on idea that people who tend to behave more morally would tend also to sacrifice their emotional wellbeing (as suggested by the negative association between moral competence and hedonism, and the positive association between negative affectivity and moral competence, cited above), there would be expected a *positive correlation particularly of the C index (and the preference for the higher levels of moral orientation) with the level of satisfaction with one's own negative emotional states and with one's self-reported efficiency in regulating them*. In contrast, those with a lower *C* index and with a higher preference for the lower stages of the moral orientation should be particularly preoccupied with maintaining and attaining positive states, out of egocentric reasons, and with avoiding the negative ones. Regarding the link between the investigated aspects of moral life and the aspects of one's emotions and their expression that are seen to be problematic (QERG items 10-16, 26,27), as targets for change in the emotion regulation and expression processes, *the moral competence index C and the preference for higher levels of moral orientation should correlate positively with the willingness to change one's own emotions and their expression, no matter on which problematic dimension*, because the unwillingness to make the effort to change them may indicate an egocentric position, and a deficient ability or motivation in the regulation of one's own emotions and their expression.

Basically, as noted also above, the predictions regarding the relationship between truth telling and the investigated aspects of emotion regulation were founded on the assumption of a structure of common goals between hiding the truth and self-regulation processes, which may be reciprocally/circularly linked also with one's moral development and moral orientation.

Given the small sample used for testing these predictions, the study has an exploratory character, as a pilot research. That is why, the results that had a probability value (p-value) higher than $p = .05$ and lower than $p = .1$ will be presented, too. The obtained results would be checked here through their corroboration (Lykken, 1968) with other results from Faiciuc (2020a, 2020b) and between them.

Method

Participants

At the research participated 144 students in the second year at the University of Fine Arts and Design from Cluj-Napoca (mean age: 20,22 years, 101 female, 39 males, and 4 without a specified gender) who completed at least one of the instruments used in the research. In order to secure confidentiality and the sincerity of the participants, they were required to note on the answer forms a pseudonym of their choice instead of their names. They received credit points for their voluntary participation. The number of participants may vary for each computed correlation, depending on the number of participants who gave answers for all the items used to compute the correlated scores.

Instruments

- **Moral Competence Test: MCT** (formerly Moral Judgment Test, MJT), elaborated by Lind in 1978, in its Romanian version (Lupu, 2009). It is an instrument for which there are numerous studies regarding its validity (see Lind, 2000). In 2014, it was renamed by Lind as the Moral Competence Test, in order to better reflect its purpose and to avoid possible confusions. The test includes two moral dilemmas (The workers' dilemma and the mercy-killing/doctor's dilemma), for which a solution is given by the author of the test. The respondents should rate (on a 7-point Likert scale, where 1 means "I strongly disagree" and 7 means "I strongly agree") the degree to which they agree or disagree with the given solution. Then, they have to rate to what degree they consider acceptable or not (on a 9-point Likert scale, where 1 means "I completely reject" and 9 means "I completely accept") six arguments in the favor of the given solution of a dilemma and six counterarguments for that solution. Each of the six arguments or counterarguments corresponds to one of the six levels (stages or types) of moral judgment development, as they were conceived by Lind, taking into consideration the Kohlbergian theory. They are described by Lind (2015) as follows:

Type 1: Use of physical or psychological force as a criterion of moral rightness: "The stronger party has the right of way."

Type 2: Morality of simple exchange: "I do to you what you do to me."

Type 3: Appeal to group solidarity and cohesion: "It is not good if this will harm the relationship to my family or my friends."

Type 4: Appeal to the law as the ultimate arbiter: "The law and order must be preserved."

Type 5: Keeping social contracts: "Promises and contracts must always be kept."

Type 6: Referring to universal moral principles: "This maxima must be followed by everyone if we want to live in a world of peace. (p. 3)

A participant would have a higher score for the moral competence if she/he agrees or disagrees in a consistent way with the same types of moral arguments, no

matter if they are pro or contra the solution preferred by her/him in solving the two dilemmas, taking into consideration only their moral quality. As MCT is an experimental test, it uses the Multivariate Analysis of Variance for the computing of the moral competence index: C score. The C-score is calculated by “analyzing the proportion of variance of an individual’s response pattern that is determined by the moral quality of the arguments rather than by their opinion agreement, their context, or by any of the possible combinations of these three design factors” (Lind, 2013). The C index ranges from 0 (lowest score) to 100 (highest score). Regarding the significance of the C index, Lind (2015) described several patterns of the answers of the respondents, in the ascending order of their corresponding C index:

1. Cannot distinguish between ‘arguments’ and ‘opinions’ on an issue: The participant says his/her opinion but refuses to rate the arguments.
2. Uses arguments only as justification for an opinion (“rationalization”) but would not let argument inform opinion: The participant strongly accepts all arguments supporting own opinion, and strongly rejects all arguments opposing it.
3. Can distinguish the moral quality of arguments regardless of their opinion-agreement: The participant rejects inadequate arguments even if they support his/her opinion.
4. Uses counter-arguments as a source of own knowing and reflection: The participant rates also counter-arguments high if they relate to a shared moral principle. (p. 14)

A separate moral competence index was computed for the mercy-killing dilemma (named also the doctor’s dilemma): C_d , and for the workers’ dilemma: C_w . Besides the C index for the moral competence, there are computed also scores for the preference for each of the six levels of moral arguments. They indicate what was called by Lind the moral orientation aspect of the moral judgment, the affective one, depending on the levels of the moral arguments that are the most or the least preferred ones. Given that MCT is rather a cognitive ideographic experimental task through which it is evaluated a competence that is changeable, especially through experience, Lind (2000) does not recommend the computation of a coefficient of internal consistency or the assessment of the fidelity of this instrument.

- **Questionnaire of Reasons for Hiding the Truth: C5** (elaborated by Faiciuc in 2016b; see also Faiciuc, 2016a). It is an instrument with 31 items (see Appendix 1, for its English version), for which respondents were required to assess on a 5-point Likert scale (from 0: “not at all” to 5: “completely”) to what extent the given statements are true in their case, i.e. if they have hidden or would hide the truth in the stated conditions. Those conditions were determined based on a theoretical analysis of almost all the possible reasons for which a person may be tempted to hide the truth or for which she/he hid the truth in the past. Some of those conditions may be interpreted as conditions in which a person is willing to morally disengage from the

norm of truth-telling. Based on theoretical reasons, the items were conceived to represent five levels of reasons for hiding the truth. The items that indicate that the immoral behavior of hiding the truth is accepted because the moral value of telling the truth is not recognized as such, as a moral issue, were grouped in the first level (items 4, 5, 19, 24, 25, and 29). The items that suggest that the immoral behavior of hiding the truth was adopted or would be adopted based on imitation or motivated by reciprocity were grouped in the second level (items 3, 9, 8, 18, 30). Those items that suggest that the immoral behavior of hiding the truth was adopted or would be adopted because of a deficient self-regulation, which is dominated by egocentric reasons (the moral value of telling the truth is recognized, but it loses competition with the immoral behavior of lying) were included in the third level (items 1, 2, 6, 7, 20, 21, 22, 23). In the fourth level, the included items (10, 12, 14) indicate convergent altruistic and egocentric reasons for hiding the truth, when a lie may bring benefits indistinctly both to the liar or to another close person or to her/his close community. Finally, the fifth level groups items (11, 13, 15, 16, 17, 26, 27, 28, 31) that suggest an altruistic immoral behavior, which does not bring a direct personal, egocentric, advantage to the liar (on the contrary, it may cause some harm to the liar). The total score of C5 indicates the avoidance of hiding the truth no matter the situation, as a recognition that truth telling is the highest value. A score was computed for each level, by summing up the answers for the corresponding items. Two aggregated scores were also computed, by summing up the scores for the levels that indicate egocentric reasons for hiding the truth (the first three ones), and the altruistic ones (the last two levels).

- **The Questionnaire for the Emotion Regulation Goals: QERG** (elaborated by Faiciuc, 2018). The questionnaire has 38 items, constructed based on a deductive method (a theoretical analysis of the investigated phenomenon): 9 items for assessing the self-reported level of satisfaction regarding the respondent's affective feelings and their expression on several dimensions (intensity, duration, frequency, and type), 16 items for assessing the preference for the investigated goals in the regulation of the affective feelings, 10 items for assessing the preference for the investigated goals of emotional expression regulation, 2 items for the assessment of the self-reported level of global success in emotional regulation (one for the emotional subjective feeling regulation, and one for the emotional expression regulation), and one item for assessing the self-reported level of the belief that emotions can be self-regulated. For each item, the answers are given on a 7-point Likert scale, with two versions (one from 0: "not at all" to 6: "extremely much", and another from -3: "strong disagreement" to 3: "strong agreement"). For 33 items, the answers are given separately for the positive and, respectively, negative emotions. Preliminary data supporting the convergent validity of QERG can be found in Faiciuc (2018).

Procedure: The instruments were administered collectively, on paper, without time limit, in different sessions, separated by 7.5 months. In the first session it was administered QERG, in the second one MCT and C5. In order to eliminate possible answer tendencies (for example, what Lind, in 2015, names acquiescence, i.e., the participant's agreement with all arguments), for some MCT and C5 instruments, an ipsatized version of the scores was computed, by subtracting from the absolute score of each item of an instrument the mean score of the absolute scores for all the items of that instrument, obtaining thus a relative score for that item. For C5, the same scores were computed as in Faiciuc (2016a). Five scores were added supplementary, which were obtained based on the main clusters resulted from the cluster analysis (see Faiciuc, 2020a). An additional score was computed for C5 only in this study, indicating the preference for performance reasons for hiding the truth, as a sum of answers to the items 18 and 21-24 of C5. For QERG, no aggregate scores were computed.

Results

Data regarding the psychometric qualities of the MCT and C5 instruments can be found in Faiciuc (2020a), as they were administered on the same sample as the one used in the present research. No descriptive statistics are given for the involved variables, given their large number and the variable number of participants considered for each computation. Because many of the variables were significantly departed from the normal distribution and because the sample was small, the nonparametric Spearman rank correlations were computed. For each computed correlation, the size of the sample for which it was computed is reported, indicating the number of participants that completed the instruments or the scales linked with the two correlated variables.

The chosen statistical significance threshold was $p = .05$. A one-tailed significance threshold was used, because the predictions were unidirectional. As the present data analysis has an exploratory character, Bonferroni correction was not used, taking into account also that its application is controversial, especially in such cases (Streiner, 2015).

The link between the answers for the items of the Questionnaire for the Emotion Regulation Goals: QERG and scores of C5 questionnaire

Self-reported satisfaction with the personal positive feelings

- Item "1. The intensity of my *positive* affective feelings is *greater* than I would want it to be." correlated or tended to correlate:

- positively with *the level 1 of C5*: $\rho = .274$, $p = .071$, $N = 30$, one-tailed, and with *the relative preference for the level 1 of C5*: $\rho = .285$, $p = .075$, $N = 27$, one-tailed;
- negatively with the *relative preference for the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = -.299$, $p = .065$, $N = 27$, one-tailed, with *the relative preference for the level 5 of C5*: $\rho = -.393$, $p = .021$, $N = 27$, one-tailed, and with the *score for the altruism cluster of C5*: $\rho = -.446$, $p = .01$, $N = 27$, one-tailed.
- Item “2. The intensity of my positive affective feelings is lower than I would want it to be” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - positively with *the total score of C5*: $\rho = .335$, $p = .044$, $N = 27$, one-tailed
 - positively with the *relative preference for the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .270$, $p = .071$, $N = 31$, one-tailed, with *the level 4 of C5*: $\rho = .263$, $p = .077$, $N = 31$, one-tailed;
 - positively with *the level 3 of C5*: $\rho = .301$, $p = .053$, $N = 30$, one-tailed;
 - positively with the *score for the cluster of avoidance reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .411$, $p = .013$, $N = 29$, one-tailed.
- Item “3. The frequency of my undesirable positive affective feelings is greater than I would want it to be.” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - positively with *the total score of C5*: $\rho = .337$, $p = .043$, $N = 27$, one-tailed;
 - positively with the *preference for the egocentric reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .38$, $p = .023$, $N = 28$, one-tailed, with *the level 1* ($\rho = .291$, $p = .056$, $N = 31$, one-tailed), *level 2* ($\rho = .461$, $p = .005$, $N = 31$, one-tailed), and *level 3* ($\rho = .255$, $p = .087$, $N = 30$, one-tailed) of C5;
 - negatively with the *relative preference for the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = -.264$, $p = .092$, $N = 27$, one-tailed, and with the *score for the altruism cluster of C5*: $\rho = -.266$, $p = .090$, $N = 27$, one-tailed;
 - positively with the *score for the cluster of approach reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .363$, $p = .024$, $N = 30$, one-tailed;
- Item “4. The frequency of my undesirable positive affective feelings is lower than I would want it to be.” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - positively with the *preference for the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .346$, $p = .033$, $N = 29$, one-tailed, and with *the level 5 of C5*: $\rho = .359$, $p = .026$, $N = 30$, one-tailed;
 - positively with *absolute score for the cluster of approach reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .256$, $p = .095$, $N = 28$, one-tailed;
- Item “5. The duration of my positive affective feelings is greater than I would want it to be.” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - negatively with the *score for the altruism cluster of C5*: $\rho = -.256$, $p = .099$, $N = 27$, one-tailed;
- Item “6. The duration of my positive affective feelings is lower than I would want it to be.” correlated or tended to correlate:

- positively with the total score of C5: $\rho = .368$, $p = .027$, $N = 27$, one-tailed;
- positively with the preference for the egocentric reasons for hiding the truth: $\rho = .34$, $p = .036$, $N = 29$, one-tailed, and with the level 1 of C5: $\rho = .297$, $p = .05$, $N = 32$, one-tailed;
- positively with the preference for the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth: $\rho = .285$, $p = .057$, $N = 32$, one-tailed, with the level 5 of C5: $\rho = .315$, $p = .037$, $N = 33$, one-tailed, and negatively with the relative preference for the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth: $\rho = -.284$, $p = .071$, $N = 28$, one-tailed, with the relative preference for the level 5 of C5: $\rho = -.258$, $p = .092$, $N = 28$, one-tailed, and with the score for the altruism cluster of C5: $\rho = -.262$, $p = .089$, $N = 28$, one-tailed;
- positively with the score for the altruism-egocentrism conflict cluster of C5: $\rho = .436$, $p = .010$, $N = 28$, one-tailed, and with the level 3 of C5: $\rho = .492$, $p = .002$, $N = 31$, one-tailed, with the relative preference for the level 3 of C5: $\rho = .346$, $p = .035$, $N = 28$;
- positively with the score for the cluster of avoidance reasons for hiding the truth: $\rho = .430$, $p = .009$, $N = 30$, one-tailed;
- positively with the score for the cluster of approach reasons for hiding the truth: $\rho = .249$, $p = .088$, $N = 31$, one-tailed;
- Item “7. I express my positive affective feelings more than I would want it.” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - positively with the preference for the egocentric reasons for hiding the truth: $\rho = .305$, $p = .054$, $N = 29$, one-tailed, with the level 2 of C5: $\rho = .247$, $p = .09$, $N = 31$, one-tailed, and with the relative preference for the egocentric reasons for hiding the truth: $\rho = .532$, $p = .002$, $N = 28$, one-tailed;
 - negatively with the relative preference for the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth: $\rho = -.533$, $p = .002$, $N = 28$, one-tailed, with the relative preference for the level 5 of C5: $\rho = -.603$, $p < .001$, $N = 28$, one-tailed, and with the score for the altruism cluster of C5: $\rho = -.413$, $p = .015$, $N = 28$, one-tailed;
 - positively with the score for the altruism-egocentrism conflict cluster of C5: $\rho = .392$, $p = .019$, $N = 28$, one-tailed, with the level 3 of C5: $\rho = .405$, $p = .012$, $N = 31$, one-tailed, with the relative preference for the level 3 of C5: $\rho = .362$, $p = .029$, $N = 28$;
 - positively with the score for the cluster of avoidance reasons for hiding the truth: $\rho = .277$, $p = .069$, $N = 30$, one-tailed;
- Item “8. I express my positive affective feelings less than I would want it.” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - negatively with the relative preference for the level 2 of C5: $\rho = -.395$, $p = .023$, $N = 26$, one-tailed;
 - positively with the score for the cluster of avoidance reasons for hiding the truth: $\rho = .279$, $p = .076$, $N = 28$, one-tailed;

- Item "9. I express my *positive* affective feelings in a *different* way than I would want it." correlated or tended to correlate:
 - positively with *the total score of C5*: $\rho = .295$, $p = .064$, $N = 28$, one-tailed;
 - positively with *the preference for the egocentric reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .281$, $p = .07$, $N = 29$, one-tailed;
 - positively with *the level 4 of C5*: $\rho = .27$, $p = .071$, $N = 31$, one-tailed;
 - negatively with *the relative preference for the level 5 of C5*: $\rho = -.326$, $p = .045$, $N = 28$;
 - positively with *the score for the altruism-egocentrism conflict cluster of C5*: $\rho = .544$, $p = .001$, $N = 28$, one-tailed, with *the level 3 of C5*: $\rho = .445$, $p = .006$, $N = 31$, one-tailed, and with *the relative preference for the level 3 of C5*: $\rho = .442$, $p = .009$, $N = 28$;
 - positively with *the score for the cluster of avoidance reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .494$, $p = .003$, $N = 30$, one-tailed, and with *the ipsatized score for the cluster of avoidance reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .387$, $p = .021$, $N = 28$, one-tailed;
 - negatively with *the ipsatized score for the cluster of approach reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = -.389$, $p = .020$, $N = 28$, one-tailed;

Self-perceived *efficiency of regulation of the positive emotions*

- Item "37. I manage to control the expression of my *positive* affective feelings so that it is in the way I want it to be." correlated or tended to correlate:
 - positively with *the relative preference for the level 5 of C5*: $\rho = .363$, $p = .037$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;

Self-reported *satisfaction with the personal negative feelings*

- Item "1. The intensity of my *negative* affective feelings is *greater* than I would want it to be." correlated or tended to correlate:
 - negatively with *the relative preference for the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = -.315$, $p = .063$, $N = 25$, one-tailed, with *the relative preference for the level 5 of C5*: $\rho = -.402$, $p = .023$, $N = 25$;
 - positively with *the score for the cluster of avoidance reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .346$, $p = .039$, $N = 27$, one-tailed;
- Item "2. The intensity of my *negative* affective feelings is *lower* than I would want it to be" correlated or tended to correlate:
 - positively with *the total score of C5*: $\rho = .414$, $p = .016$, $N = 27$, one-tailed;
 - positively with *the preference for the egocentric reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .446$, $p = .01$, $N = 27$, one-tailed, with *the level 1 of C5*: $\rho = .349$, $p = .032$,

$N = 29$, one-tailed, and with *the level 2 of C5*: $\rho = .403$, $p = .015$, $N = 27$, one-tailed;

- positively with *the level 5 of C5*: $\rho = .246$, $p = .095$, $N = 30$, one-tailed;
- positively with the *score for the cluster of approach reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .418$, $p = .013$, $N = 28$, one-tailed;

- Item “3. The frequency of my undesirable *negative* affective feelings is *greater* than I would want it to be.” correlated or tended to correlate:

- positively with *the total score of C5*: $\rho = .352$, $p = .045$, $N = 27$, one-tailed;
- positively with the *preference for the egocentric reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .346$, $p = .042$, $N = 26$, one-tailed, with *the level 2 of C5*: $\rho = .265$, $p = .086$, $N = 28$, one-tailed;

- positively with the *preference for the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .392$, $p = .02$, $N = 28$, one-tailed, with *the level 4 of C5*: $\rho = .433$, $p = .011$, $N = 28$, one-tailed, with *the level 5 of C5*: $\rho = .259$, $p = .087$, $N = 29$, one-tailed, and negatively with *the score for the altruism cluster of C5*: $\rho = -.318$, $p = .061$, $N = 25$, one-tailed, with *the relative preference for the level 5 of C5*: $\rho = -.373$, $p = .033$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;

- positively with *the score for the altruism-egocentrism conflict cluster of C5*: $\rho = .551$, $p = .002$, $N = 25$, one-tailed, with *the level 3 of C5*: $\rho = .462$, $p = .007$, $N = 28$, one-tailed, and with *the relative preference for the level 3 of C5*: $\rho = .442$, $p = .013$, $N = 25$;

- positively with the *absolute score for the cluster of avoidance reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .568$, $p = .001$, $N = 27$, one-tailed, and with its *relative score*: $\rho = .352$, $p = .042$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;

- positively with the *absolute score for the cluster of approach reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .260$, $p = .096$, $N = 27$, one-tailed, and negatively with its *relative score*: $\rho = -.346$, $p = .045$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;

- Item “4. The frequency of my undesirable *negative* affective feelings is *lower* than I would want it to be.” correlated or tended to correlate:

- positively with the *preference for the egocentric reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .302$, $p = .063$, $N = 27$, one-tailed, with *the level 1 of C5*: $\rho = .292$, $p = .062$, $N = 29$, and with *the level 2 of C5*: $\rho = .277$, $p = .073$, $N = 29$;

- positively with *absolute score for the cluster of approach reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .312$, $p = .053$, $N = 28$, one-tailed;

- Item “5. The duration of my *negative* affective feelings is *greater* than I would want it to be.” correlated or tended to correlate:

- negatively with the *relative preference for the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = -.309$, $p = .071$, $N = 24$, one-tailed, with *the relative preference for the level 5 of C5*: $\rho = -.53$, $p = .004$, $N = 28$, with *the score for the altruism cluster of C5*: $\rho = -.319$, $p = .064$, $N = 24$, one-tailed, and positively with *the level 4 of C5*: $\rho = .358$, $p = .031$, $N = 28$, one-tailed;

- positively with the *relative preference for the egocentric reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .326$, $p = .060$, $N = 24$, one-tailed;
- positively with the *score for the altruism-egocentrism conflict cluster of C5*: $\rho = .435$, $p = .017$, $N = 24$, one-tailed, and with the *level 3 of C5*: $\rho = .362$, $p = .032$, $N = 27$, one-tailed, with the *relative preference for the level 3 of C5*: $\rho = .29$, $p = .085$, $N = 24$, one-tailed;
- positively with *absolute score for the cluster of avoidance reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .469$, $p = .008$, $N = 26$, one-tailed;
- Item “6. The duration of my *negative* affective feelings is *lower* than I would want it to be.” correlated or tended to correlate:
- Item “7. I express my *negative* affective feelings *more* than I would want it.” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - positively with the *relative preference for the egocentric reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .283$, $p = .095$, $N = 23$, one-tailed;
 - positively with the *level 4 of C5*: $\rho = .333$, $p = .045$, $N = 27$, one-tailed, and with the *relative preference for the level 4 of C5*: $\rho = .385$, $p = .035$, $N = 23$, one-tailed;
 - negatively with the *level 5 of C5*: $\rho = -.284$, $p = .071$, $N = 28$, one-tailed, and with the *relative preference for the level 5 of C5*: $\rho = -.444$, $p = .017$, $N = 23$, one-tailed;
 - positively with the *score for the altruism-egocentrism conflict cluster of C5*: $\rho = .406$, $p = .027$, $N = 23$, one-tailed;
 - positively with the *score for the cluster of avoidance reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .350$, $p = .043$, $N = 25$, one-tailed, and with *ipsatized score for the cluster of avoidance reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .348$, $p = .052$, $N = 23$, one-tailed.
- Item “8. I express my *negative* affective feelings *less* than I would want it.” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - negatively with the *level 4 of C5*: $\rho = -.261$, $p = .099$, $N = 26$, one-tailed, and with the *relative preference for the level 4 of C5*: $\rho = -.405$, $p = .028$, $N = 23$, one-tailed;
 - positively with the *level 5 of C5*: $\rho = .324$, $p = .05$, $N = 27$, one-tailed;
 - negatively with the *ipsatized score for the cluster of avoidance reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = -.463$, $p = .013$, $N = 23$, one-tailed;
 - positively with the *ipsatized score for the cluster of approach reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .454$, $p = .015$, $N = 23$, one-tailed;
- Item “9. I express my *negative* affective feelings in a *different* way than I would want it.” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - positively with the *total score of C5*: $\rho = .395$, $p = .031$, $N = 23$, one-tailed;
 - positively with the *preference for the egocentric reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .399$, $p = .027$, $N = 24$, one-tailed, with the *level 1 of C5*: $\rho = .27$, $p = .086$,

$N = 27$, one-tailed, with the relative preference for the level 1 of C5: $\rho = .31$, $p = .075$, $N = 23$, one-tailed, with the level 2 of C5: $\rho = .45$, $p = .009$, $N = 27$, one-tailed, with the relative preference for the level 2 of C5: $\rho = .372$, $p = .04$, $N = 23$, one-tailed; and with the level 3 of C5: $\rho = .405$, $p = .02$, $N = 26$, one-tailed, and with the relative preference for the egocentric reasons for hiding the truth: $\rho = .344$, $p = .054$, $N = 23$, one-tailed;
 - negatively with the relative preference for the level 5 of C5: $\rho = -.351$, $p = .051$, $N = 23$, one-tailed;
 - positively with the score for the cluster of avoidance reasons for hiding the truth: $\rho = .440$, $p = .014$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;

Self-perceived efficiency of regulation of the negative emotions

- Item “36. I manage to control my *negative* affective feelings so that they are in the way I want them to be.” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - negatively with the score for the cluster of avoidance reasons for hiding the truth: $\rho = -.274$, $p = .088$, $N = 26$, one-tailed.
- Item “37. I manage to control the expression of my *negative* affective feelings so that it is in the way I want it to be.” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - negatively with the level 3 of C5: $\rho = -.273$, $p = .08$, $N = 28$, one-tailed;
 - negatively with the level 4 of C5: $\rho = -.28$, $p = .071$, $N = 29$, one-tailed;
 - positively with the relative preference for the level 5 of C5: $\rho = .331$, $p = .053$, $N = 26$, one-tailed;
 - positively with the score for the egocentrism cluster of C5: $\rho = .371$, $p = .034$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;
 - negatively with the score for the cluster of avoidance reasons for hiding the truth: $\rho = -.333$, $p = .045$, $N = 27$, one-tailed;

Personal belief that emotions are controllable

- Item “38. People can control their *positive* affective feelings.” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - negatively with the score for the egocentrism cluster of C5: $\rho = -.275$, $p = .097$, $N = 24$, one-tailed.

Preferred goals for the regulation of the positive emotions

- Item “10. First I aim and undertake something to *completely prevent (impede)* the occurrence of the unwanted *positive* affective feelings.” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - positively with the level 1 of C5: $\rho = .336$, $p = .038$, $N = 29$, one-tailed;

- positively with *the level 2 of C5*: $\rho = .28$, $p = .071$, $N = 29$, one-tailed;
- positively with *the level 4 of C5*: $\rho = .302$, $p = .052$, $N = 29$, one-tailed;
- positively with *the score for the cluster of approach reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .262$, $p = .089$, $N = 28$, one-tailed.
- Item “11. First I aim and undertake something to *decrease the intensity* of the unwanted *positive* affective feelings.” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - positively with *the preference for the egocentric reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .263$, $p = .092$, $N = 27$, one-tailed, with *the level 1 of C5*: $\rho = .338$, $p = .034$, $N = 30$, one-tailed, and with *the level 2 of C5*: $\rho = .41$, $p = .012$, $N = 30$, one-tailed;
 - positively with *the level 4 of C5*: $\rho = .324$, $p = .038$, $N = 31$, one-tailed;
 - negatively with *the relative preference for the level 3 of C5*: $\rho = -.324$, $p = .05$, $N = 27$, one-tailed;
 - positively with *the score for the cluster of approach reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .274$, $p = .075$, $N = 29$, one-tailed.
- Item “12. First I aim and undertake something to *decrease the duration* of the unwanted *positive* affective feelings.” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - positively with *the preference for the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .343$, $p = .029$, $N = 31$, one-tailed, with *the level of 5 of C5*: $\rho = .377$, $p = .018$, $N = 31$, with *the relative preference for the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .324$, $p = .050$, $N = 27$, one-tailed, and with *the relative preference for the level 5 of C5* $\rho = .29$, $p = .071$, $N = 27$, one-tailed;
 - negatively with *the preference for the egocentric reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = -.378$, $p = .026$, $N = 27$, one-tailed;
 - negatively with *the score for the altruism-egocentrism cluster of C5*: $\rho = -.426$, $p = .013$, $N = 27$, one-tailed, and with *the relative preference for the level 3 of C5*: $\rho = -.407$, $p = .017$, $N = 27$, one-tailed;
 - negatively with *the ipsatized score for the cluster of avoidance reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = -.323$, $p = .05$, $N = 27$, one-tailed;
 - positively with *the ipsatized score for the cluster of approach reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .322$, $p = .051$, $N = 27$, one-tailed.
- Item “13. First I aim and undertake something to *completely eliminate* the occurred unwanted *positive* affective feelings.” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - positively with *the level 1 of C5*: $\rho = .34$, $p = .036$, $N = 29$, one-tailed;
 - positively with *the level 2 of C5*: $\rho = .359$, $p = .028$, $N = 29$, one-tailed;
 - negatively with *the score for the altruism-egocentrism cluster of C5*: $\rho = -.3$, $p = .068$, $N = 26$, one-tailed, with *the relative preference for the level 3 of C5*: $\rho = -.437$, $p = .013$, $N = 26$, one-tailed;
 - positively with *the score for the cluster of approach reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .268$, $p = .084$, $N = 28$, one-tailed.

- Item “16. First I aim and undertake something to change my *positive* affective feelings so that to be more suited with what I think that it should be suited to the *context* in which I find myself” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - positively with the *total score of C5*: $\rho = .393$, $p = .019$, $N = 28$, one-tailed;
 - positively with the *preference for the egocentric reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .433$, $p = .011$, $N = 28$, one-tailed, with the *level 1 of C5*: $\rho = .412$, $p = .012$, $N = 30$, one-tailed, with the *level 2 of C5*: $\rho = .513$, $p = .002$, $N = 30$, one-tailed, with the *relative preference for the level 2 of C5*: $\rho = .317$, $p = .05$, $N = 28$, one-tailed, and with the *score for the egocentrism cluster of C5*: $\rho = .287$, $p = .069$, $N = 28$, one-tailed;
 - negatively with the *relative preference for the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = -.251$, $p = .099$, $N = 28$, one-tailed, with the *relative preference for the level 5 of C5*: $\rho = -.254$, $p = .096$, $N = 28$, one-tailed;
 - positively with the *score for the cluster of avoidance reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .265$, $p = .079$, $N = 30$, one-tailed, and negatively with the *ipsatized score for the cluster of avoidance reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = -.291$, $p = .067$, $N = 28$, one-tailed.
 - positively with the *score for the cluster of approach reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .401$, $p = .015$, $N = 29$, one-tailed, and with the *ipsatized score for the cluster of approach reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .294$, $p = .065$, $N = 28$, one-tailed.
- Item “18. First I aim and undertake something to change my *positive* affective feelings so that to be in accord with what I believe that most of those around me feel or would feel in a similar context.” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - positively with the *preference for the egocentric reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .356$, $p = .04$, $N = 25$, one-tailed, and with the *level 2 of C5*: $\rho = .374$, $p = .027$, $N = 27$, one-tailed;
 - positively with the *preference for the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .36$, $p = .03$, $N = 28$, one-tailed, and with the *level 5 of C5*: $\rho = .425$, $p = .012$, $N = 28$, one-tailed;
 - negatively with the *score for the altruism-egocentrism cluster of C5*: $\rho = -.325$, $p = .057$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;
 - positively with the *score for the cluster of approach reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .446$, $p = .011$, $N = 26$, one-tailed, and with the *ipsatized score for the cluster of approach reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .522$, $p = .004$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;
 - negatively with the *ipsatized score for the cluster of avoidance reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = -.519$, $p = .004$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;
 - positively with the *performance item 23 of C5*: $\rho = .475$, $p = .005$, $N = 28$, one-tailed, and tended to correlate positively with the *performance item 18 of C5*: $\rho = .29$, $p = .067$, $N = 28$, one-tailed, and *performance item 24 of C5*: $\rho = .298$, $p = .062$, $N = 28$, one-tailed

- Item “19. First I aim and undertake something to change my *positive* affective feelings so that to be in accord with the *image I have about myself*.” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - positively with the *preference for the egocentric reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .262$, $p = .098$, $N = 26$, one-tailed, with the *level 1 of C5*: $\rho = .352$, $p = .03$, $N = 29$, one-tailed, and with the *level 2 of C5*: $\rho = .294$, $p = .061$, $N = 29$, one-tailed;
- Item “20. First I aim and undertake something to change my *positive* affective feelings so that to be in accord with the *image that I believe others have it about me*.” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - positively with the *level 1 of C5*: $\rho = .34$, $p = .038$, $N = 28$, one-tailed;
 - positively with the *preference for the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .365$, $p = .026$, $N = 29$, one-tailed, with the *level 4 of C5*: $\rho = .432$, $p = .01$, $N = 29$, one-tailed, with the *relative preference for the level 4 of C5*: $\rho = .377$, $p = .032$, $N = 25$, one-tailed, with the *level 5 of C5*: $\rho = .288$, $p = .065$, $N = 29$, one-tailed, and negatively with the *relative preference for the level 5 of C5*: $\rho = -.282$, $p = .086$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;
 - positively with the *level 3 of C5*: $\rho = .292$, $p = .07$, $N = 27$, one-tailed;
 - positively with the *score for the cluster of avoidance reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .378$, $p = .026$, $N = 27$, one-tailed;
 - positively with the *score for the cluster of approach reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .259$, $p = .096$, $N = 27$, one-tailed;
 - positively with the performance items 22 of C5: $\rho = .507$, $p = .002$, $N = 29$, one-tailed, and 23 of C5: $\rho = .433$, $p = .009$, $N = 29$, one-tailed, and tended to correlate positively with the performance item 18 of C5: $\rho = .305$, $p = .054$, $N = 29$, one-tailed;
- Item “21. First I aim and undertake something to change my *positive* affective feelings so that to *help me achieve the goals that I set for myself*.” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - positively with the *level 1 of C5*: $\rho = .28$, $p = .071$, $N = 29$, one-tailed;
 - positively with the *level 2 of C5*: $\rho = .28$, $p = .067$, $N = 30$, one-tailed;
- Item “22. First I aim and undertake something to change my *positive* affective feelings so that the *goals that I set for myself to be unimpeded by them*.” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - positively with the *level 1 of C5*: $\rho = .298$, $p = .052$, $N = 31$, one-tailed;
 - positively with the *level 2 of C5*: $\rho = .27$, $p = .071$, $N = 31$, one-tailed;

Preferred goals for the regulation of the negative emotions

- Item “11. First I aim and undertake something to *decrease the intensity* of the unwanted *negative* affective feelings.” correlated or tended to correlate:

- negatively with *the level 5 of C5*: $\rho = -.256$, $p = .098$, $N = 27$, one-tailed, and *the relative preference for the level 5 of C5*: $\rho = -.284$, $p = .095$, $N = 23$, one-tailed;
- positively with *the ipsatized score for the cluster of avoidance reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .365$, $p = .043$, $N = 23$, one-tailed.
- negatively with *the ipsatized score for the cluster of approach reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = -.365$, $p = .043$, $N = 23$, one-tailed.
- Item “12. First I aim and undertake something to *decrease the duration* of the unwanted *negative* affective feelings.” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - negatively with *the score for the altruism cluster of C5*: $\rho = -.398$, $p = .027$, $N = 24$, one-tailed;
- Item “13. First I aim and undertake something to *completely eliminate* the occurred unwanted *negative* affective feelings.” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - positively with *the relative preference for the level 1 of C5*: $\rho = .273$, $p = .098$, $N = 24$, one-tailed;
 - negatively with *the relative preference for the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = -.354$, $p = .045$, $N = 24$, one-tailed, and with *the score for the altruism cluster of C5*: $\rho = -.316$, $p = .066$, $N = 24$, one-tailed.
- Item “14. First I aim and undertake something to change the *negative* affective feelings into positive ones.” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - negatively with *the score for the altruism cluster of C5*: $\rho = -.264$, $p = .088$, $N = 28$, one-tailed.
- Item “16. First I aim and undertake something to change my *negative* affective feelings so that to be more suited with what I think that it should be suited to *the context* in which I find myself” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - positively with *the total score of C5*: $\rho = .296$, $p = .085$, $N = 23$, one-tailed;
 - positively with *the level 2 of C5*: $\rho = .36$, $p = .032$, $N = 27$, one-tailed;
 - positively with *the level 4 of C5*: $\rho = .312$, $p = .057$, $N = 27$, one-tailed;
 - positively with *the score for the cluster of avoidance reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .368$, $p = .035$, $N = 25$, one-tailed,
- Item “17. First I aim and undertake something to change my *negative* affective feelings so that to be in accord with *what other persons important to me would want me to feel*.” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - negatively with *the relative preference for the egocentric reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = -.49$, $p = .006$, $N = 25$, one-tailed, and with *the relative preference for the level 1 of C5*: $\rho = -.483$, $p = .007$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;
 - positively with *the relative preference for the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .431$, $p = .016$, $N = 25$, one-tailed, with *the level 5 of C5*: $\rho = .258$, $p = .085$, $N = 30$, one-tailed, with *the relative preference for the level 5 of C5*: $\rho = .352$, $p = .042$, $N = 25$, one-tailed, and with *the score for the altruism cluster of C5*: $\rho = .449$, $p = .012$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;

- Item “18. First I aim and undertake something to change my *negative* affective feelings so that to be in accord with *what I believe that most of those around me feel or would feel in a similar context.*” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - positively with *the total score of C5*: $\rho = .466$, $p = .008$, $N = 26$, one-tailed;
 - positively with *the preference for the egocentric reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .465$, $p = .007$, $N = 27$, one-tailed, with *the level 1 of C5*: $\rho = .309$, $p = .048$, $N = 30$, one-tailed, and with *the level 2 of C5*: $\rho = .402$, $p = .014$, $N = 30$, one-tailed;
 - positively with *the preference for the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .476$, $p = .004$, $N = 30$, one-tailed, with *the level 4 of C5*: $\rho = .375$, $p = .021$, $N = 30$, one-tailed, with *the level 5 of C5*: $\rho = .381$, $p = .017$, $N = 31$, one-tailed, and with *the score for the altruism cluster of C5*: $\rho = .296$, $p = .071$, $N = 26$, one-tailed;
 - positively with *the level 3 of C5*: $\rho = .283$, $p = .068$, $N = 29$, one-tailed;
 - positively with *the score for the cluster of avoidance reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .293$, $p = .065$, $N = 28$, one-tailed;
 - positively with *the score for the cluster of approach reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .463$, $p = .006$, $N = 29$, one-tailed;
 - positively with the performance items 18 of C5: $\rho = .471$, $p = .004$, $N = 31$, one-tailed, 22 of C5: $\rho = .388$, $p = .015$, $N = 31$, one-tailed, and 24 of C5: $\rho = .4$, $p = .013$, $N = 31$, one-tailed, and tended to correlate positively with the performance item 21 of C5: $\rho = .277$, $p = .069$, $N = 30$, one-tailed, and the performance item 23 of C5: $\rho = .281$, $p = .063$, $N = 31$, one-tailed;
- Item “19. First I aim and undertake something to change my *negative* affective feelings so that to be in accord with *the image I have about myself.*” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - positively with *the relative preference for the level 4 of C5*: $\rho = .278$, $p = .084$, $N = 26$, one-tailed;
 - positively with *the score for the altruism-egocentrism cluster of C5*: $\rho = .329$, $p = .05$, $N = 26$, one-tailed, and with *the relative preference for the level 3 of C5*: $\rho = .333$, $p = .048$, $N = 26$, one-tailed;
 - positively with *the score for the ipsatized score for the cluster of avoidance reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .434$, $p = .013$, $N = 26$, one-tailed;
 - negatively with *the ipsatized score for the cluster of approach reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = -.439$, $p = .012$, $N = 26$, one-tailed;
- Item “20. First I aim and undertake something to change my *negative* affective feelings so that to be in accord with *the image that I believe others have it about me.*” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - negatively with *the score for the egocentrism cluster of C5*: $\rho = -.343$, $p = .043$, $N = 26$, one-tailed, and positively with *the level 1 of C5*: $\rho = .312$, $p = .05$, $N = 29$, one-tailed, and with *the level 2 of C5*: $\rho = .273$, $p = .076$, $N = 29$, one-tailed;

- positively with *the level 4 of C5*: $\rho = .461$, $p = .006$, $N = 29$, one-tailed, and with *the relative preference for the level 3 of C5*: $\rho = .475$, $p = .007$, $N = 26$, one-tailed;
- positively with *the score for the cluster of avoidance reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .275$, $p = .078$, $N = 28$, one-tailed;
- positively with the performance item 22 of C5: $\rho = .259$, $p = .083$, $N = 29$, one-tailed;
- Item “21. First I aim and undertake something to change my *negative* affective feelings so that *to help me achieve the goals that I set for myself*.” correlated:
 - negatively with *the score for the altruism cluster of C5*: $\rho = -.364$, $p = .048$, $N = 22$, one-tailed.
- Item “25. I let my *negative* affective feelings *the way they are*, without trying to change them in any way, waiting for them to change by themselves.” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - negatively with *the total score of C5*: $\rho = -.3$, $p = .072$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;
 - negatively with *the preference for the egocentric reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = -.335$, $p = .047$, $N = 26$, one-tailed, with *the level 1 of C5*: $\rho = -.248$, $p = .097$, $N = 29$, one-tailed, and positively with *the relative preference for the level 2 of C5*: $\rho = .535$, $p = .003$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;
 - negatively with *the preference for the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = -.381$, $p = .021$, $N = 29$, one-tailed, with *the level 4 of C5*: $\rho = -.298$, $p = .058$, $N = 29$, one-tailed, and with *the level 5 of C5*: $\rho = -.277$, $p = .069$, $N = 30$, one-tailed;
 - negatively with *the score for the altruism-egocentrism cluster of C5*: $\rho = -.393$, $p = .026$, $N = 25$, one-tailed, with *the level 3 of C5*: $\rho = -.451$, $p = .008$, $N = 28$, one-tailed, and with *the relative preference for the level 3 of C5*: $\rho = -.411$, $p = .021$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;
 - positively with *the score for the egocentrism cluster of C5*: $\rho = .348$, $p = .044$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;
 - negatively with *the score for the cluster of avoidance reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = -.488$, $p = .005$, $N = 27$, one-tailed, and with *the score for the ipsatized score for the cluster of avoidance reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = -.474$, $p = .008$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;
 - positively with *the score for the ipsatized score for the cluster of approach reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .469$, $p = .009$, $N = 25$, one-tailed.

Cognitive goals in emotion regulation

- Item “23. First I aim and undertake something *to understand my positive* affective feelings.” correlated or tended to correlate:

- positively with the score for the egocentrism cluster of C5: $\rho = .279$, $p = .084$, $N = 26$, one-tailed, and the relative preference for the level 2 of C5: $\rho = .421$, $p = .016$, $N = 26$, one-tailed;
- negatively with the score for the altruism-egocentrism cluster of C5: $\rho = -.467$, $p = .008$, $N = 26$, one-tailed, and the relative preference for the level 3 of C5: $\rho = -.536$, $p = .002$, $N = 26$, one-tailed;
- negatively with the score for the ipsatized score for the cluster of avoidance reasons for hiding the truth: $\rho = -.491$, $p = .005$, $N = 26$, one-tailed;
- positively with the ipsatized score for the cluster of approach reasons for hiding the truth: $\rho = .497$, $p = .005$, $N = 26$, one-tailed;
- negatively with the item 22 of C5: $\rho = -.376$, $p = .02$, $N = 30$, one-tailed;
- Item “23. First I aim and undertake something to understand my negative affective feelings.” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - positively with the score for the egocentrism cluster of C5: $\rho = .302$, $p = .071$, $N = 25$, one-tailed, and with the relative preference for the level 2 of C5: $\rho = .454$, $p = .011$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;
 - negatively with the score for the altruism-egocentrism cluster of C5: $\rho = -.315$, $p = .062$, $N = 25$, one-tailed, and with the relative preference for the level 3 of C5: $\rho = -.431$, $p = .016$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;
 - negatively with the score for the ipsatized score for the cluster of avoidance reasons for hiding the truth: $\rho = -.417$, $p = .019$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;
 - positively with the ipsatized score for the cluster of approach reasons for hiding the truth: $\rho = .418$, $p = .019$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;
- Item “24. First I aim to avoid dividing the affective feelings in wanted and unwanted ones.” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - positively with the preference for the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth: $\rho = .291$, $p = .059$, $N = 30$, one-tailed, with the level 5 of C5: $\rho = .299$, $p = .051$, $N = 31$, one-tailed, with the relative preference for the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth: $\rho = .337$, $p = .043$, $N = 27$, one-tailed, and with the relative preference for the level 5 of C5: $\rho = .325$, $p = .049$, $N = 27$, one-tailed;
 - negatively with the relative preference for the egocentric reasons for hiding the truth: $\rho = -.351$, $p = .036$, $N = 27$, one-tailed;
 - negatively with the score for the altruism-egocentrism cluster of C5: $\rho = -.442$, $p = .011$, $N = 27$, one-tailed, and the relative preference for the level 3 of C5: $\rho = -.431$, $p = .012$, $N = 27$, one-tailed;
 - negatively with the score for the ipsatized score for the cluster of avoidance reasons for hiding the truth: $\rho = -.267$, $p = .09$, $N = 27$, one-tailed;
 - positively with the ipsatized score for the cluster of approach reasons for hiding the truth: $\rho = .261$, $p = .094$, $N = 27$, one-tailed;
 - positively with the item 18 of C5: $\rho = .323$, $p = .038$, $N = 31$, one-tailed;

Preferred goals for the regulation of the expression of positive emotions

- Item “26. First I aim and undertake something to change the way in which I express my *positive* affective feelings so that they are *less visible*.” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - positively with *the level 1 of C5*: $\rho = .322$, $p = .048$, $N = 28$, one-tailed;
 - positively with *the preference for the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .363$, $p = .026$, $N = 29$, one-tailed, and with *the level 5 of C5*: $\rho = .419$, $p = .012$, $N = 29$, one-tailed;
 - positively with *the score for the cluster of approach reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .363$, $p = .052$, $N = 27$, one-tailed;
- Item “27. First I aim and undertake something to change the way I express my *positive* affective feelings so that it is in agreement with *what I think that it would be suitable in the context in which I find myself*.” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - positively with *the score for the altruism cluster of C5*: $\rho = .305$, $p = .069$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;
 - negatively with *the score for the altruism-egocentrism cluster of C5*: $\rho = -.275$, $p = .091$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;
- Item “28. First I aim and undertake something to change the way in which I express my *positive* affective feelings so that it is in accord with *the way other persons important to me would want me to express them*.” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - negatively with *the score for the egocentrism cluster of C5*: $\rho = -.514$, $p = .005$, $N = 24$, one-tailed, with *the relative preference for the level 1 of C5*: $\rho = -.447$, $p = .014$, $N = 24$, one-tailed, and with *the relative preference for the level 2 of C5*: $\rho = -.612$, $p = .001$, $N = 24$, one-tailed;
 - positively with *the relative preference for the level 3 of C5*: $\rho = .296$, $p = .08$, $N = 24$, one-tailed;
 - positively with *the score for the ipsatized score for the cluster of avoidance reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .296$, $p = .08$, $N = 24$, one-tailed;
 - negatively with *the ipsatized score for the cluster of approach reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = -.304$, $p = .074$, $N = 24$, one-tailed;
 - tended to correlate negatively with the performance item 18 of C5: $\rho = -.275$, $p = .082$, $N = 27$, one-tailed, and positively with the performance item 21 of C5: $\rho = .28$, $p = .079$, $N = 27$, one-tailed;
- Item “29. First I aim and undertake something to change the way in which I express my *negative* affective feelings so that it is in agreement with *the way I believe that most of those around me express or would express them in a similar context*.” tended to correlate:
 - positively with the performance item 23 of C5: $\rho = .265$, $p = .083$, $N = 29$, one-tailed;

- Item “30. First I aim and undertake something to change the way in which I express my *positive* affective feelings so that it is *in agreement with the image I have about myself*” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - positively with *the score for the altruism cluster of C5*: $\rho = .272$, $p = .094$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;
 - negatively with *the score for the egocentrism cluster of C5*: $\rho = -.278$, $p = .089$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;
- Item “31. First I aim and undertake something to change the way in which I express my *positive* affective feelings so that it is *in accord with the image that I believe others have it about me*.” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - negatively with *the relative preference for the egocentric reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = -.456$, $p = .013$, $N = 24$, one-tailed, with *the relative preference for the level 1 of C5*: $\rho = -.554$, $p = .002$, $N = 24$, one-tailed, and with *the relative preference for the level 2 of C5*: $\rho = -.309$, $p = .071$, $N = 24$, one-tailed, and with *the score for the egocentrism cluster of C5*: $\rho = -.469$, $p = .01$, $N = 24$, one-tailed;
 - positively with *the preference for the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .385$, $p = .055$, $N = 27$, one-tailed, with *the relative preference for the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .351$, $p = .046$, $N = 24$, one-tailed, with *the level 4 of C5*: $\rho = .287$, $p = .073$, $N = 27$, one-tailed, with *the relative preference for the level 4 of C5*: $\rho = .364$, $p = .04$, $N = 24$, one-tailed, with *the level 5 of C5*: $\rho = .324$, $p = .049$, $N = 27$, one-tailed, and with *the score for the altruism cluster of C5*: $\rho = .481$, $p = .009$, $N = 24$, one-tailed;
 - positively with the performance item 23 of C5: $\rho = .321$, $p = .051$, $N = 27$, one-tailed;
- Item “32. First I aim and undertake something to change the way in which I express my *positive* affective feelings so that it would *help me to achieve the goals that I set for myself*.” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - positively with *the level 4 of C5*: $\rho = .275$, $p = .078$, $N = 28$, one-tailed;
- Item “33. First I aim and undertake something to change the way in which I express my *positive* affective feelings so that *the goals that I set for myself to be unimpeded by their expression*.” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - negatively with *the score for the altruism cluster of C5*: $\rho = -.29$, $p = .08$, $N = 25$, one-tailed, and with *the relative preference for the level 5 of C5*: $\rho = -.277$, $p = .09$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;
 - positively with *the score for the altruism-egocentrism cluster of C5*: $\rho = .445$, $p = .013$, $N = 25$, one-tailed, and with *the relative preference for the level 3 of C5*: $\rho = .387$, $p = .028$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;
 - positively with *the score for the ipsatized score for the cluster of avoidance reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .347$, $p = .044$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;

- negatively with *the ipsatized score for the cluster of approach reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = -.35$, $p = .043$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;
- Item “34. First I aim and undertake something to change the way in which I express my *positive* affective feelings so that their expression *not to be disturbing in any way for those around me*.” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - negatively with *the relative preference for the egocentric reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = -.354$, $p = .041$, $N = 25$, one-tailed, with *the relative preference for the level 1 of C5*: $\rho = -.527$, $p = .003$, $N = 25$, one-tailed, and with *the score for the egocentrism cluster of C5*: $\rho = -.303$, $p = .071$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;
 - positively with *the relative preference for the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .404$, $p = .022$, $N = 25$, one-tailed, with *the level 5 of C5*: $\rho = .269$, $p = .083$, $N = 28$, one-tailed, and with *the score for the altruism cluster of C5*: $\rho = .369$, $p = .035$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;
- Item “35. I let the expression of my *positive* affective feelings to be a *spontaneous one, without trying to change it in any way*.” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - positively with the total score of C5: $\rho = .28$, $p = .087$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;
 - positively with *the preference for the egocentric reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .331$, $p = .053$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;
 - positively with *the score for the cluster of approach reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .277$, $p = .085$, $N = 26$, one-tailed;

Preferred goals for the regulation of the expression of negative emotions

- Item “26. First I aim and undertake something to change the way in which I express my *negative* affective feelings so that they are *less visible*.” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - positively with *the preference for the egocentric reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .284$, $p = .08$, $N = 26$, one-tailed, with *the level 1 of C5*: $\rho = .391$, $p = .018$, $N = 29$, one-tailed, and with *the level 2 of C5*: $\rho = .252$, $p = .094$, $N = 29$, one-tailed;
 - positively with *the preference for the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .274$, $p = .075$, $N = 29$, one-tailed, with *the level 5 of C5*: $\rho = .318$, $p = .044$, $N = 30$, one-tailed, and negatively with *the relative preference for the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = -.306$, $p = .069$, $N = 25$, one-tailed, with *the relative preference for the level 5 of C5*: $\rho = -.345$, $p = .046$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;
 - positively with *the level 3 of C5*: $\rho = .218$, $p = .074$, $N = 28$, one-tailed,
 - positively with *the score for the cluster of approach reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .32$, $p = .048$, $N = 28$, one-tailed;

- Item “27. First I aim and undertake something to change the way I express my *negative* affective feelings so that it is in agreement with *what I think that it would be suitable in the context in which I find myself.*” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - positively with *the preference for the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .332$, $p = .042$, $N = 28$, one-tailed, with *the level 4 of C5*: $\rho = .483$, $p = .005$, $N = 28$, one-tailed, with *the relative preference for the level 4 of C5*: $\rho = .495$, $p = .007$, $N = 24$, one-tailed, with *the level 5 of C5*: $\rho = .293$, $p = .062$, $N = 29$, one-tailed, and with *the score for the altruism cluster of C5*: $\rho = .429$, $p = .018$, $N = 24$, one-tailed;
 - negatively with *the score for the egocentrism cluster of C5*: $\rho = -.576$, $p = .002$, $N = 24$, one-tailed, with *the relative preference for the level 1 of C5*: $\rho = -.423$, $p = .02$, $N = 24$, one-tailed, and with *the relative preference for the level 2 of C5*: $\rho = -.357$, $p = .043$, $N = 24$, one-tailed;
 - positively with *the score for the ipsatized score for the cluster of avoidance reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .362$, $p = .041$, $N = 24$, one-tailed;
 - negatively with *the ipsatized score for the cluster of approach reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = -.362$, $p = .041$, $N = 24$, one-tailed;
- Item “28. First I aim and undertake something to change the way in which I express my *negative* affective feelings so that it is in accord with *the way other persons important to me would want me to express them.*” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - negatively with *the score for the egocentrism cluster of C5*: $\rho = -.449$, $p = .012$, $N = 25$, one-tailed; with *the relative preference for the level 1 of C5*: $\rho = -.368$, $p = .035$, $N = 25$, one-tailed, and with *the relative preference for the level 2 of C5*: $\rho = -.447$, $p = .013$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;
 - positively with *the level 5 of C5*: $\rho = .26$, $p = .083$, $N = 30$, one-tailed;
 - positively with *the performance item 21 of C5*: $\rho = .309$, $p = .051$, $N = 29$, one-tailed, and negatively with *the performance item 24 of C5*: $\rho = -.245$, $p = .096$, $N = 30$, one-tailed;
- Item “29. First I aim and undertake something to change the way in which I express my *negative* affective feelings so that it is in agreement with *the way I believe that most of those around me express or would express them in a similar context.*” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - negatively with *the relative preference for the egocentric reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = -.272$, $p = .089$, $N = 26$, one-tailed, with *the relative preference for the level 1 of C5*: $\rho = -.341$, $p = .044$, $N = 26$, one-tailed, and with *the score for the egocentrism cluster of C5*: $\rho = -.293$, $p = .073$, $N = 26$, one-tailed;
 - positively with *the preference for the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .385$, $p = .02$, $N = 29$, one-tailed, with *the level 5 of C5*: $\rho = .448$, $p = .007$,

- $N = 30$, one-tailed, and with *the score for the altruism cluster of C5*: $\rho = .273$, $p = .089$, $N = 26$, one-tailed;
- positively with *the score for the cluster of approach reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .292$, $p = .066$, $N = 28$, one-tailed;
 - positively with the performance items 18 of C5: $\rho = .345$, $p = .031$, $N = 30$, one-tailed, 22 of C5: $\rho = .448$, $p = .006$, $N = 30$, one-tailed, and 23 of C5: $\rho = .413$, $p = .012$, $N = 30$, one-tailed;
- Item “30. First I aim and undertake something to change the way in which I express my *negative* affective feelings so that it is *in agreement with the image I have about myself*” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - positively with *the level 4 of C5*: $\rho = .322$, $p = .044$, $N = 30$, one-tailed, and with *the relative preference for the level 4 of C5*: $\rho = .334$, $p = .052$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;
 - positively with *the score for the altruism-egocentrism cluster of C5*: $\rho = .392$, $p = .026$, $N = 25$, one-tailed, and with *the relative preference for the level 3 of C5*: $\rho = .228$, $p = .082$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;
 - negatively with *the score for the egocentrism cluster of C5*: $\rho = -.32$, $p = .06$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;
 - positively with *the score for the ipsatized score for the cluster of avoidance reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .407$, $p = .022$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;
 - negatively with *the ipsatized score for the cluster of approach reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = -.411$, $p = .021$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;
 - Item “31. First I aim and undertake something to change the way in which I express my *negative* affective feelings so that it is *in accord with the image that I believe others have it about me*.” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - positively with *the score for the altruism cluster of C5*: $\rho = .281$, $p = .082$, $N = 26$, one-tailed, and with *the relative preference for the level 4 of C5*: $\rho = .262$, $p = .098$, $N = 26$, one-tailed;
 - negatively with *the score for the egocentrism cluster of C5*: $\rho = -.448$, $p = .011$, $N = 26$, one-tailed, and with *the relative preference for the level 1 of C5*: $\rho = -.328$, $p = .051$, $N = 26$, one-tailed;
 - positively with the performance item 22 of C5: $\rho = .267$, $p = .073$, $N = 31$, one-tailed, and negatively with the performance item 24 of C5: $\rho = -.247$, $p = .09$, $N = 31$, one-tailed;
 - Item “32. First I aim and undertake something to change the way in which I express my *negative* affective feelings so that it would *help me to achieve the goals that I set for myself*.” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - positively with *the relative preference for the egocentric reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = .366$, $p = .036$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;
 - negatively with *the relative preference for the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth*: $\rho = -.396$, $p = .025$, $N = 25$, one-tailed, with *the relative preference*

for the level 5 of C5: $\rho = -.367$, $p = .036$, $N = 25$, one-tailed, and positively with the level 4 of C5: $\rho = .279$, $p = .072$, $N = 29$, one-tailed;

- Item “33. First I aim and undertake something to change the way in which I express my *negative* affective feelings so that the goals that I set for myself to be unimpeded by their expression.” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - positively with the relative preference for the level 1 of C5: $\rho = .268$, $p = .097$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;
- Item “34. First I aim and undertake something to change the way in which I express my *negative* affective feelings so that their expression *not to be disturbing in any way for those around me.*” correlated or tended to correlate:
 - negatively with the relative preference for the egocentric reasons for hiding the truth: $\rho = -.365$, $p = .036$, $N = 25$, one-tailed, with the relative preference for the level 1 of C5: $\rho = -.472$, $p = .009$, $N = 25$, one-tailed, with the relative preference for the level 2 of C5: $\rho = -.393$, $p = .026$, $N = 25$, one-tailed, and with the score for the egocentrism cluster of C5: $\rho = -.373$, $p = .033$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;
 - positively with the preference for the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth: $\rho = .262$, $p = .085$, $N = 29$, one-tailed, with the level 4 of C5: $\rho = .255$, $p = .091$, $N = 29$, one-tailed, and with the relative preference for the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth: $\rho = .392$, $p = .026$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;
 - positively with the score for the ipsatized score for the cluster of avoidance reasons for hiding the truth: $\rho = .283$, $p = .085$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;
 - negatively with the ipsatized score for the cluster of approach reasons for hiding the truth: $\rho = -.279$, $p = .088$, $N = 25$, one-tailed;

Regarding the predicted relationship between the performance reasons for hiding the truth and the answers to the performance regulation goals for emotions and their expression, the following results were obtained:

- a positive correlation between the score for performance reasons for hiding the truth of C5 and the preference for the goal to change one’s own positive emotions and negative emotions in accordance with the way most people would feel in a similar context: $\rho = .321$, $p = .048$, $N = 28$ (for positive emotions), $\rho = .478$, $p = .004$, $N = 30$ (for negative emotions);
- a positive correlation between the score for performance reasons for hiding the truth of C5 and the preference for the goal to change one’s own positive emotions in accordance with the other people’s image on the own person: $\rho = .422$, $p = .013$, $N = 28$;
- a positive correlation between the score for performance reasons for hiding the truth of C5 and the preference for the goal to change the expression of one’s own negative emotions in accordance with the way most people would feel in a similar context: $\rho = .331$, $p = .037$, $N = 30$.

The results obtained regarding the associations between the emotion regulation goals and the moral competence and orientation are presented in the Tables 1-9.

The correlation between C index and item I11 for positive emotions was statistically significant using the bootstrap method, $\rho = .256$, $p = .049$, $N = 43$, with a 95% CI: $[-.034, .522]$. Also, the correlation between C index and item I11 for negative emotions was statistically significant using the bootstrap method, $\rho = .281$, $p = .034$, $N = 43$, with a 95% CI: $[-.07, .56]$.

Table 1

The relationship of the moral competence index (general and for each moral dilemma) with the satisfaction with one's own emotions, their expression, desire, and belief in the possibility of emotional regulation, and with the efficiency in their regulation (items 1-9, 25, 35, 36, 37, 38)

QERG Items	Spearman's rank correlation	C index (Moral Competence)	C index Doctor's dilemma	C index Workers' dilemma
I2 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.284 .024 49	-.003 .491 49	-.036 .402 49
I3 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.154 .148 48	-.022 .442 48	.206 .080 48
I5 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.029 .422 48	-.199 .088 48	.101 .248 48
I8 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.040 .391 50	-.082 .286 50	.216 .066 50
I8 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.320 .015 46	-.225 .067 46	-.199 .093 46
I25 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.263 .036 48	-.260 .037 48	-.145 .163 48
I35 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.136 .190 44	-.064 .339 44	-.209 .087 44
I38 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.192 .098 47	-.172 .124 47	.312 .016 47

Table 2

The relationship of the moral competence index (general and for each moral dilemma) with the preferred dimensions on which emotions and their expression are changed, and of the emotion regulation process (items 10-16, 26, 27)

QERG Items	Spearman's rank correlation	C index (Moral Competence)	C index Doctor's dilemma	C index Workers' dilemma
I10 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.111 .226 48	.009 .476 48	.191 .097 48
I11 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.227 .059 49	.249 .042 49	.104 .239 49
I11 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.201 .090 46	.230 .062 46	.202 .089 46
I15	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.330 .010 50	.371 .004 50	.137 .172 50
I26 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.056 .353 47	-.317 .015 47	.131 .189 47

Table 3

The relationship of the moral competence index (general and for each moral dilemma) with the personal and social context in which one is willing to change her/his emotions or their expression (items 17-24, 28-34)

QERG Items	Spearman's rank correlation	C index (Moral Competence)	C index Doctor's dilemma	C index Workers' dilemma
I17 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.107 .237 47	-.028 .426 47	.291 .023 47
I18 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.200 .094 45	-.305 .021 45	.023 .439 45
I19 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.147 .160 48	.202 .084 48	.091 .269 48
I20 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.136 .182 47	-.090 .274 47	.321 .014 47
I20 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.221 .066 48	.272 .031 48	.214 .072 48

QERG Items	Spearman's rank correlation	C index (Moral Competence)	C index Doctor's dilemma	C index Workers' dilemma
I23 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.151 .153 48	-.171 .123 48	-.197 .090 48
I23 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.186 .105 47	-.233 .058 47	-.229 .061 47
I28 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.062 .344 45	-.027 .430 45	.332 .013 45
I29 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.076 .308 46	-.335 .011 46	.106 .241 46
I31 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.148 .166 45	.142 .177 45	.309 .020 45
I31 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.055 .355 49	.222 .062 49	.179 .109 49
I32 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.241 .052 47	-.158 .144 47	-.338 .010 47
I34 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.059 .348 46	-.078 .304 46	.201 .090 46
I34 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.345 .008 48	.059 .346 48	.455 .001 48

Table 4

The relationship of the preference for levels of moral orientation with the satisfaction with one's own emotions, their expression, desire, and belief in the possibility of emotional regulation, and with the efficiency in their regulation (items 1-9, 25, 35-38)

QERG Items	Spearman's rank correlation	Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Level 4	Level 5	Level 6
I1 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.073 .306 51	.126 .189 51	.137 .171 50	.086 .275 51	.236 .048 51	.051 .360 51
I1 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.171 .117 50	-.062 .334 50	-.147 .158 49	-.219 .063 50	.012 .467 50	-.077 .297 50
I2 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.178 .109 50	.167 .123 50	.257 .037 49	-.176 .110 50	-.136 .174 50	-.197 .085 50

QERG Items	Spearman's rank correlation	Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Level 4	Level 5	Level 6
I3 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.254 .036 51	-.023 .437 51	.073 .307 50	<i>-.188</i> .093 51	-.312 .013 51	-.337 .008 51
I3 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.341 .008 49	-.272 .029 49	-.214 .072 48	-.155 .144 49	-.119 .208 49	-.115 .216 49
I4 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.060 .339 50	-.005 .487 50	.069 .319 49	-.063 .331 50	-.227 .056 50	-.274 .027 50
I4 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.097 .251 50	.107 .229 50	.101 .246 49	-.175 .112 50	-.324 .011 50	-.264 .032 50
I5 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.250 .040 50	.051 .363 50	-.163 .132 49	-.189 .094 50	.006 .484 50	-.217 .065 50
I6 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.155 .134 53	.197 .078 53	.016 .455 52	.109 .219 53	-.106 .224 53	.032 .410 53
I6 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.092 .268 48	.255 .040 48	-.156 .147 47	-.028 .426 48	-.001 .498 48	-.194 .093 48
I7 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.152 .144 51	-.025 .431 51	.029 .422 50	-.146 .153 51	-.126 .189 51	-.251 .038 51
I7 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.031 .418 47	.016 .458 47	.124 .206 46	-.287 .025 47	.046 .379 47	-.074 .310 47
I8 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.026 .428 51	.100 .243 51	-.109 .225 50	.253 .037 51	-.095 .255 51	.040 .390 51
I8 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.009 .475 47	-.030 .421 47	-.072 .318 46	-.044 .384 47	-.203 .086 47	-.151 .155 47
I25 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.054 .359 48	-.207 .079 48	-.128 .195 47	.063 .335 48	-.065 .330 48	-.137 .177 48
I25 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.032 .414 49	.207 .076 49	.052 .364 48	-.087 .276 49	-.039 .395 49	-.068 .321 49
I35 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.208 .073 50	.209 .073 50	.007 .482 49	.111 .222 50	.123 .198 50	-.058 .344 50
I36 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.204 .087 46	-.020 .446 46	-.024 .438 45	.034 .411 46	-.183 .112 46	-.239 .055 46

QERG Items	Spearman's rank correlation	Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Level 4	Level 5	Level 6
I37 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient	-.082	-.212	-.281	.079	-.048	-.055
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.292	.076	.029	.299	.374	.358
	N	47	47	46	47	47	47
I37 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient	-.040	.131	-.223	.007	.041	-.043
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.394	.187	.066	.481	.391	.385
	N	48	48	47	48	48	48
I38 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient	.011	.026	.103	.029	.269	.087
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.470	.430	.245	.422	.032	.279
	N	48	48	47	48	48	48
I38 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient	.247	.013	.087	.289	.094	.143
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.045	.466	.280	.023	.263	.165
	N	48	48	47	48	48	48

Table 5

The relationship of the preference for levels of moral orientation with the preferred dimensions on which emotions and their expression are changed and of the emotion regulation process (items 10-16, 26, 27)

QERG Items	Spearman's rank correlation	Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Level 4	Level 5	Level 6
I10 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient	.040	.166	.148	.047	.244	.210
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.392	.127	.158	.374	.046	.074
	N	49	49	48	49	49	49
I12 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient	-.191	-.121	-.108	.173	-.032	.055
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.097	.206	.236	.120	.414	.354
	N	48	48	47	48	48	48
I13 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient	.314	.360	.330	.243	.212	.294
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.014	.006	.011	.046	.072	.020
	N	49	49	48	49	49	49
I13 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient	.142	.254	.355	.142	.028	.201
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.168	.041	.007	.168	.425	.086
	N	48	48	47	48	48	48
I14	Correlation Coefficient	.208	.120	.027	.173	.065	.113
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.072	.202	.425	.112	.325	.215
	N	51	51	50	51	51	51
I16 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient	-.093	-.238	-.014	.175	.209	.132
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.267	.053	.464	.120	.080	.189
	N	47	47	46	47	47	47
I26 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient	.113	.262	.086	.190	.230	.296
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.222	.036	.284	.098	.058	.021
	N	48	48	47	48	48	48
I27 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient	-.001	-.275	.021	.092	.150	-.078
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.497	.029	.446	.267	.155	.300
	N	48	48	47	48	48	48

Table 6

The relationship of the preference for levels of moral orientation with the personal and social context in which one is willing to change her/his emotions or their expression (items 17-24, 28-34)

QERG Items	Spearman's rank correlation	Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Level 4	Level 5	Level 6
I17 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.109 .230 48	.127 .194 48	.082 .291 47	.330 .011 48	.164 .132 48	.230 .058 48
I17 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.126 .195 49	-.028 .423 49	-.042 .388 48	.394 .003 49	.015 .458 49	.189 .096 49
I18 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.105 .243 46	.334 .012 46	.199 .095 45	-.044 .387 46	-.069 .324 46	.011 .471 46
I19 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.129 .188 49	-.189 .096 49	-.215 .071 48	.103 .241 49	-.108 .231 49	-.008 .479 49
I20 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.050 .369 48	.216 .070 48	.100 .252 47	.190 .098 48	.199 .087 48	.065 .331 48
I21 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.040 .392 49	-.029 .421 49	.028 .426 48	.148 .154 49	.227 .058 49	.055 .355 49
I21 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.229 .067 44	-.158 .152 44	-.178 .127 43	.192 .106 44	-.003 .493 44	-.047 .380 44
I22 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.037 .399 51	-.046 .375 51	-.106 .232 50	-.165 .123 51	-.059 .342 51	-.273 .026 51
I22 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.315 .015 47	-.314 .016 47	-.099 .257 46	-.052 .365 47	-.126 .199 47	-.045 .381 47
I23 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.233 .054 49	-.107 .232 49	-.008 .479 48	-.054 .357 49	-.394 .003 49	-.148 .155 49
I23 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.248 .044 48	-.221 .066 48	-.109 .234 47	-.113 .223 48	-.269 .032 48	-.153 .149 48
I24	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.103 .236 51	.232 .050 51	.248 .041 50	.080 .289 51	.015 .459 51	.047 .373 51

QERG Items	Spearman's rank correlation	Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Level 4	Level 5	Level 6
I28 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.014 .462 49	-.223 .062 49	-.076 .303 48	.249 .043 49	-.080 .293 49	.128 .190 49
I29 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.079 .296 48	-.002 .495 48	-.049 .373 47	.185 .104 48	-.197 .090 48	.067 .325 48
I30 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.026 .431 47	.075 .308 47	-.043 .389 46	-.238 .053 47	.067 .328 47	-.002 .494 47
I31 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.103 .238 50	-.010 .471 50	-.070 .317 49	-.170 .119 50	-.109 .225 50	-.203 .079 50
I32 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.025 .434 48	-.189 .099 48	.056 .353 47	-.166 .129 48	-.031 .416 48	-.177 .115 48
I34 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.312 .016 47	-.246 .048 47	-.137 .183 46	-.062 .339 47	-.302 .020 47	-.118 .214 47
I34 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.311 .015 49	-.469 .000 49	-.189 .099 48	.225 .060 49	.067 .324 49	.064 .331 49

Table 7

The relationship of the relative preference for levels of moral orientation with the satisfaction with one's own emotions, their expression, desire, and belief in the possibility of emotional regulation, and with the efficiency in their regulation (items 1-9, 25, 35, 36, 37, 38)

QERG Items	Spearman's rank correlation	relative level 1	relative level 2	relative level 3	relative level 4	relative level 5	relative level 6
I1 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.337 .008 50	.074 .305 50	.031 .416 50	.027 .425 50	.044 .380 50	.051 .362 50
I2 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.166 .122 51	.136 .171 51	-.206 .073 51	.231 .051 51	-.125 .191 51	-.166 .123 51
I2 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.228 .057 49	.226 .059 49	.327 .011 49	-.281 .025 49	-.160 .135 49	-.320 .012 49
I3 positive	Correlation Coefficient	-.159	.183	.360	-.067	-.211	-.198

QERG Items	Spearman's rank correlation	relative level 1	relative level 2	relative level 3	relative level 4	relative level 5	relative level 6
emotions	Sig. (1-tailed) N	.135 50	.102 50	.005 50	.322 50	.070 50	.084 50
I3 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.199 .088 48	.011 .469 48	.030 .420 48	.016 .457 48	.045 .380 48	.139 .174 48
I4 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.086 .277 49	.096 .255 49	.292 .021 49	-.014 .462 49	-.110 .226 49	-.400 .002 49
I4 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.172 .119 49	.164 .131 49	.292 .021 49	-.094 .260 49	-.294 .020 49	-.213 .071 49
I5 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.288 .022 49	.159 .138 49	-.083 .285 49	-.046 .376 49	.074 .307 49	-.010 .472 49
I6 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.113 .212 52	.138 .165 52	-.031 .412 52	.072 .305 52	-.283 .021 52	-.060 .336 52
I6 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.034 .411 47	.296 .022 47	-.172 .124 47	-.015 .459 47	-.017 .456 47	-.208 .080 47
I7 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.216 .066 50	.082 .287 50	.215 .067 50	-.012 .466 50	-.084 .281 50	-.077 .297 50
I7 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.117 .220 46	.052 .365 46	.228 .064 46	-.244 .051 46	.070 .322 46	.161 .143 46
I8 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.084 .282 50	.060 .339 50	-.134 .176 50	.340 .008 50	-.242 .045 50	.103 .238 50
I8 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.118 .217 46	.179 .117 46	.010 .473 46	.023 .440 46	-.235 .058 46	-.144 .170 46
I9 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.059 .339 51	.083 .280 51	.085 .277 51	.130 .182 51	-.297 .017 51	.090 .265 51

QERG Items	Spearman's rank correlation	relative level 1	relative level 2	relative level 3	relative level 4	relative level 5	relative level 6
I9 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.107 .243 45	.299 .023 45	-.145 .171 45	.140 .180 45	-.208 .085 45	.083 .295 45
I25 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.153 .150 48	.273 .030 48	.042 .388 48	-.136 .179 48	-.118 .211 48	-.040 .393 48
I35 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.153 .147 49	.127 .192 49	-.177 .112 49	-.013 .464 49	-.027 .428 49	-.271 .030 49
I36 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.317 .017 45	-.083 .294 45	.040 .398 45	.129 .199 45	-.113 .230 45	-.235 .060 45
I36 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.016 .459 46	-.116 .222 46	-.201 .090 46	.174 .124 46	.161 .142 46	-.088 .281 46
I37 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.079 .301 46	-.113 .227 46	-.200 .092 46	.188 .106 46	.111 .232 46	.065 .334 46
I37 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.048 .374 47	.248 .047 47	-.314 .016 47	.017 .456 47	.124 .204 47	-.139 .176 47
I38 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.113 .225 47	-.069 .323 47	-.029 .422 47	-.110 .230 47	.233 .058 47	.135 .183 47
I38 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.207 .081 47	-.189 .102 47	-.072 .316 47	.218 .071 47	-.057 .352 47	.028 .426 47

Table 8

The relationship of the relative preference for levels of moral orientation with the preferred dimensions on which emotions and their expression are changed and of the emotion regulation process (items 10-16, 26, 27)

QERG Items	Spearman's rank correlation	relative level 1	relative level 2	relative level 3	relative level 4	relative level 5	relative level 6
I10 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.222 .065 48	.029 .423 48	-.016 .458 48	-.047 .375 48	.042 .388 48	.192 .095 48
I12 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.206 .083 47	-.030 .421 47	-.064 .334 47	.203 .085 47	-.091 .270 47	.109 .233 47
I13 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.079 .300 47	.207 .081 47	.177 .117 47	-.144 .168 47	-.312 .016 47	-.167 .132 47
I14	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.179 .107 50	.012 .468 50	-.245 .043 50	.151 .147 50	-.154 .142 50	-.032 .412 50
I15	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.153 .145 50	-.167 .122 50	-.148 .153 50	.219 .063 50	.042 .387 50	.006 .483 50
I16 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.218 .073 46	-.355 .008 46	-.020 .447 46	.213 .077 46	.139 .178 46	.180 .116 46
I27 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.019 .448 47	-.240 .052 47	.163 .136 47	.094 .264 47	.258 .040 47	-.143 .169 47

Table 9

The relationship of the relative preference for levels of moral orientation with the personal and social context in which one is willing to change her/his emotions or their expression (items 17-24, 28-34)

QERG Items	Spearman's rank correlation	relative level 1	relative level 2	relative level 3	relative level 4	relative level 5	relative level 6
17 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.022 .441 48	-.161 .136 48	-.151 .153 48	.365 .005 48	-.100 .250 48	.071 .316 48
I18 positive	Correlation Coefficient	.004	.374	.073	-.193	-.248	-.052

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QERG Items	Spearman's rank correlation	relative level 1	relative level 2	relative level 3	relative level 4	relative level 5	relative level 6
emotions	Sig. (1-tailed) N	.489 45	.006 45	.318 45	.103 45	.050 45	.366 45
I18 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.078 .296 49	.187 .099 49	-.073 .309 49	-.082 .288 49	.040 .393 49	.008 .478 49
I19 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.017 .455 48	.215 .071 48	-.274 .030 48	-.092 .267 48	-.082 .291 48	.082 .289 48
I19 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.088 .276 48	-.036 .403 48	-.154 .149 48	.245 .047 48	-.170 .124 48	.215 .071 48
I21 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.164 .147 43	-.108 .246 43	-.191 .110 43	.292 .029 43	-.069 .330 43	.004 .489 43
I22 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.204 .087 46	-.243 .052 46	.039 .400 46	.168 .132 46	-.036 .406 46	.227 .064 46
I23 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.238 .052 48	-.021 .444 48	.144 .164 48	.179 .112 48	-.299 .020 48	.159 .140 48
I24	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.028 .424 50	.209 .073 50	.093 .261 50	-.078 .296 50	-.187 .097 50	-.190 .093 50
I28 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.084 .286 48	-.219 .067 48	.003 .491 48	.260 .037 48	-.106 .237 48	.093 .265 48
I29 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.103 .246 47	.023 .440 47	-.047 .377 47	.216 .073 47	-.319 .014 47	.087 .280 47
I30 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.125 .204 46	.208 .083 46	-.099 .257 46	-.308 .019 46	-.010 .473 46	.108 .238 46
I31 positive emotions	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.199 .095 45	.161 .145 45	.036 .408 45	-.146 .170 45	-.014 .464 45	-.141 .178 45

QERG Items	Spearman's rank correlation	relative level 1	relative level 2	relative level 3	relative level 4	relative level 5	relative level 6
I31 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient	.212	.093	.111	-.130	-.110	-.071
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.072	.263	.225	.187	.226	.314
	N	49	49	49	49	49	49
I34 negative emotions	Correlation Coefficient	-.269	-.478	-.005	.422	.198	.176
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.032	.000	.487	.001	.089	.116
	N	48	48	48	48	48	48

Discussion and conclusions

Hypotheses 4, and 3

The relationship of the tendency and reasons for hiding the truth with satisfaction with one's own emotions, their expression, desire of emotion regulation, and efficiency in their regulation (items 1-9, 25, 35, 36, 37)

The general tendency to hide the truth correlated positively with the dissatisfaction with the excessive frequency of the positive and negative emotions, with the dissatisfaction with the deficit in the intensity and duration of the positive emotions, and with the deficit in the intensity of the negative emotions. There was also a tendency that those who tend to hide the truth to be dissatisfied with the way they express their positive feelings. They were also dissatisfied with the way they express their negative feelings. In the same time, they tended to let the expression of the positive feelings to be unregulated (to let them as they are), contrary to what was predicted. However, they tend to try to regulate their negative feelings, as predicted. No significant association was obtained between the self-reported efficiency in emotion regulation and the tendency to hide the truth. It is a result that it is in apparent contradiction with the data obtained in Faiciuc (2020a), when a significant positive correlation between the dysregulation of the negative emotions and the general tendency to hide the truth was obtained. In the same time, that result is in contrast also with the data from this study that indicate a dissatisfaction with the excessive frequency of the emotions and with their expression, data that support the result from Faiciuc (2020a) and the predictions of the present study. Maybe the denial of the emotion regulation problems should be understood in the context in which, in the QERG measure, participants are asked to state explicitly if they consider that they are able to manage their emotions. Perhaps some of them, the ones who lie the most, do not want to recognize directly their shortcomings, tending the lie even in this case, when answering to the direct question if they can or cannot manage their emotions. But when they are asked indirectly, as in DERS

and about their satisfaction with their emotional life in QERG, the problems in their emotion regulation are revealed. Data regarding the link between social desirability as a trait, which may characterize those who tend to hide the truth the most, and emotion regulation can be used as a support for this explanation.

People high in social desirability were reported to be high in sympathy, and perspective taking and low in situational personal distress (e.g., Eisenberg et al., 1991), to have dispositional empathy, higher positive affect, lower reactivity and negative affect, and to try to present themselves as well regulated (Eisenberg et al., 1994). They may have a defensive coping style (Weinberger, 1990, apud Eisenberg et al., 1994), which was positively associated with low scores on measures of anxiety or anger, and some measures of behavioral and emotional regulation, involving mainly unconscious processes of holding ego-threatening thoughts and feelings out of awareness. That is why they report little subjective distress despite bodily responses to the contrary, and they have high behavioral control, i.e., low impulsiveness (King et al., 1992). King et al. (1992) showed that social desirability correlate positively with a measure of self-deception, and both did not correlate with emotional expressiveness, indicating that expressiveness and repressiveness are conceptually distinct. So, King et al. (1992) suggest that individuals who report themselves to be self-controlled may be engaged in denial or deception. This interpretation is in agreement with the data obtained by Sackeim et al. (1979), who found a significant negative correlation between self-deception and psychopathology scores, which was stronger than the negative correlation between other-deception and psychopathology scores. In King et al. (1992), other-deception, as measured with a self-concealment (secretive trait) scale (which correlated negatively with the self-deception scale), correlated even positively with some measures of emotion regulation problems, indicating impoverished emotional experience, lack of emotional expression, and inhibition of emotional response. Also Uziel (2014) distinguishes between two kinds of answers that can be linked with social desirability and two kinds of scales representing them: impression management scales: IM (sometimes called “lie scales”), and self-deception enhancement scales: SDE. They have found that the statements of those with high scores at IM, but not at SDE, correspond to their behavior in real life, even though self-control was perceived as central both by those with high scores at IM and at SDE. The cited author conclusion was that “IM scales measure substantive content associated with self-control aimed at social adaptation, whereas the SDE scale depicts individuals with a grandiose self-perception, who fail to impress knowledgeable others” (Uziel, 2014, p. 200). It may be that in the answers at the QERG items regarding the self-reported efficiency in emotion regulation both types of answers can be encountered, each of them having a different relationship with the respondents’ emotion regulation performance.

Another explanation can be found in Wismeijer’s (2011) review about the effects of secrets on subjective well-being. He cites data that indicate that the

distinction between having a secret (keeping a major secret: KMS), i.e., secrecy as an act, and being a secretive person (self-concealment: SC), i.e., secrecy as a trait (“predisposition to actively conceal from others personal information that one perceives as distressing or negative”), revealed by Larson and Chastain (1990, p. 440), is important regarding the relationship of keeping secrets with emotional well-being (Kelly et al., 2006). On the one hand, SC seems to be indeed positively associated with neuroticism, overall psychological distress, with problematic internal behaviors: low self-esteem, social anxiety, high mood monitoring, low mood labeling, and external behaviors: lack of seeking counseling, lack of social support, preference for solitude (Wismeijer, 2011, p. 317). It is in agreement with the result from Faiciuc (2020a) regarding the positive relationship between the tendency to hide the truth and the dysregulation of the negative emotions, and with the one from the present study regarding the positive relationship between the tendency to hide the truth and dissatisfaction with one’s own emotions and the way they are expressed, even though self-concealment does not overlap completely with the tendency to hide the truth. Tendency to hide the truth may imply not only the concealment of information that one perceives as distressing or negative to herself/himself, with a protective goal in mind, but also concealment of other types of information, which may serve instrumental or altruistic goals. On the other hand, KMS was linked with positive effects on one’s own well-being, through its socio-protective function: feeling better about oneself, by creating a desirable identity image, reducing or preventing negative feedback, social disapproval, and stigmatization from others, when one is sensitive to negative evaluation (in accordance with data cited by Wismeijer, 2011, p. 317). KMS may be more linked with hiding the truth from instrumental or altruistic reasons for hiding the truth. So, the general tendency to hide the truth has a component that may be positively linked with emotion regulation problems, whereas another one may be negatively linked with emotional dysregulation. Maybe that is why the satisfaction with the self-reported efficiency in emotion regulation was not negatively linked with the general tendency to hide the truth. Moreover, even in the case of the self-concealment, the emotion regulation of those having this trait seems to have a positive aspect: high mood monitoring, and a negative one: low mood labeling, which may create an unclear impression regarding one’s efficiency in emotion regulation. Kelly et al. (2006) advances the hypothesis that the type of person who is a high self-concealer might be more vulnerable to symptoms such as depression, and anxiety, i.e., she/he has from the beginning emotion regulation problems, that secrecy has not a negative effect per se (in other words, I would say it may be used only as a regulatory means through which an initial emotion regulation problem is perpetuated). From this perspective, the efficiency of one’s emotion regulation should be judged having in mind the level of the problematic emotions that should be regulated. So, those tending to hide the truth may judge their emotion regulation efficiency relative to the perceived level of their emotion regulation problems, i.e., they may have higher

regulatory needs from the beginning. It may be that they start by lying to themselves, leading to emotion regulation problems, and only then they lie to others in order to conceal their problems, as a protective strategy.

The hypothesis that the general tendency to lie should correlate negatively with the goal to let emotions and their expression as they are was supported only weakly, as a tendency in that direction for the case of the regulation of the negative emotions.

So, it may be concluded that the relationship between the general tendency to hide the truth and emotion regulation is more complicated than expected, as lying to oneself or to others may be differently associated with various emotion regulation aspects, depending also on context, and, as also shown below, on the reasons for which one is hiding the truth.

Those who prefer (absolutely or relatively) altruistic reasons for hiding the truth, by comparison with their internal standards and desires regarding their emotions, did not complain about an excessive intensity of their positive feelings (particularly those who prefer the altruistic reasons of the highest type), tended to consider that they do not have an excessive frequency and duration of their positive feelings, and believe that they do not express their positive feelings in an excessive or improper way (particularly those who prefer the altruistic reasons of the highest type). They (particularly those who prefer the altruistic reasons of the highest type) also considered that the intensity of their negative feelings, and their duration do not exceed their wishes. Those who preferred (absolutely or relatively) altruistic reasons for hiding the truth (particularly those who prefer the altruistic reasons of the highest type) did not consider that they express their negative feelings in excess or inappropriately, in comparison with what they want. Those who preferred altruistic reasons of hiding the truth of level 4 (in which altruistic and egocentric reasons converge) deviated from this general pattern. They tended to be dissatisfied with the excessive duration of their negative feelings, and with their excessive expression, not wanting to express more their negative feelings, being also dissatisfied with their excessive expression of the positive feelings (as a tendency). In general, for most of those who preferred altruistic reasons for hiding the truth, their general dissatisfaction was not with their emotional excess, but rather with their emotional deficit. This is true for the deficit in frequency, and in the duration of the positive emotions, and in the expression of the negative emotions, especially for those preferring the highest level of altruistic reasons for telling the truth. It only tends to be true for the deficit in the intensity of the positive feelings, particularly for those who prefer the level 4 of altruistic reasons for hiding the truth, and in the intensity of the negative feelings, particularly for those who prefer the level 5 of altruistic reasons for hiding the truth. These results are in general in line with the predicted ones, in the part regarding the satisfaction with the emotional excess, indicating a better ability to regulate this emotional aspect. They are also in agreement with the data regarding the positive association of emotion intensity and, respectively, emotion regulation

efficiency with empathy and perspective taking obtained by Eisenberg et al. (1994), taking into account that the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth should be positively linked with empathy and perspective taking. The altruistic reasons for hiding the truth of the highest type (level 5 from C5) may be related more with the perspective taking aspect of empathy from the Eisenberg et al.'s (1994) study, and the level 4 reasons for hiding the truth more with the empathic concern aspect of empathy from that study. This correspondence was made taking in view that, in Eisenberg et al. (1994), perspective taking was primarily positively associated with emotion regulation, and only secondarily with negative emotion (after controlling the individual differences regarding the emotion regulation), whereas empathic concern was primarily positively associated with the negative emotion, and only secondarily with emotion regulation (when negative emotion was controlled). This pattern of results seems to correspond with the pattern of results for the two kinds of altruistic reasons of hiding the truth from the present study, if only the level of satisfaction with one's own emotions is considered, as an indirect measure of one's emotion regulation efficiency.

The novelty in the data obtained here is the dissatisfaction with the emotional life as too flattened of those who prefer altruistic reasons of hiding the truth, especially of the highest kind. Maybe they do not consider their emotions too flat, but they want more altruistic positive or negative emotions. That may be the reason for which their satisfaction with their efficiency in emotion regulation was not at the expected level. They seem to be particularly satisfied only with the expression of their feelings, mostly the positive ones, although they seem to be not too focused on their excessive control (they do not want particularly to let them as they are, either). But regarding their efficiency in their conscious emotion regulation, although they consider that the negative feelings should be changed and not to be let as they are (especially the ones preferring the level 4 of altruistic reasons of hiding the truth), they do not see themselves as particularly successful in their regulation. This result supports the idea that this category of participants does not want only to appear as more able to avoid an excessive internal emotional life (in case such a feat would improve one's social image), but they may have genuinely a problem with an excessive control of their internal emotional life, in opposition with their own desire. That is why they may not see it as particularly efficient, since it is more than they would want it to be. Aiming to control the expression of emotion and being efficient in that task may lead them to an unwanted overcontrol of their internal emotional life. The highest correlations, i.e., bringing the strongest evidence against the null hypothesis, were the ones regarding the *negative association of the preference for the altruistic reasons of hiding the truth, particularly of the highest kind, with the answer to the item 7 of QERG, indicating the self-reported dissatisfaction with the excessive expression of the personal positive feelings, and, respectively, with the answer to the item 5 of QERG,*

indicating the self-reported dissatisfaction with the excessive duration of the personal negative feelings.

The data obtained with the DERS scores for negative emotions in Faiciuc (2020a) are in line with the ones obtained here. As in Faiciuc (2020a), the predicted significant positive correlation between the emotion regulation efficiency and the altruistic reasons to hide the truth did not occur for the negative emotions. The novelty is that it did not occur also for the positive emotions, but it occurred for the emotion expression, especially for the positive ones. The absence of the predicted correlations may be explained, as mentioned above, as a result of the fact that the efficiency in emotion regulation should be considered from two different directions: the level of satisfaction in the control of unwanted, excessive emotions, but also the level of satisfaction with the control in obtaining emotions at the desired level. In fact, the prediction of a positive correlation between the preference for altruistic reasons for hiding the truth and the efficiency in emotion regulation may be supported by the data from this study, but only for the case of the regulation of the excessive emotions and for those altruistic reasons of the highest kind. In contrast, that correlation tended to be negative in the case of the regulation of the emotional deficit. This interpretation depends on admitting that, if one is satisfied with one's level of emotion and do not claim that she/he lets them unregulated, it means that she/he is satisfied/dissatisfied with the way she/he regulates those emotions in the stated direction. It is true that the efficiency in regulation should be seen also as in relationship with the desired level of an emotion: if it is too high or too low, the regulative effort may be less successful for the usual emotions with a medium level. Future research should take into account this aspect. It should consider also the fact that different positive emotions or negative emotions may have particular relationships with the altruistic or egocentric motivations. Also, as in Faiciuc (2020a), the same exception of a positive correlation between emotional dysregulation especially for the negative emotions and the preference for altruistic reasons of level 4 occurred, the same nonacceptance of the level of one's own negative emotions and dissatisfaction with the emotion expression. Future research should clarify why those with this motivation for hiding the truth are dissatisfied with their emotion regulation. Are their standards for emotional regulation higher than the ones of those who prefer altruistic reasons for hiding the truth of the level 5, are their negative emotions more prominent, or are their regulatory strategies deficient, or a combination of those possible causes is the case, as it suggested by the data obtained in Faiciuc (2020a)? The desire of those who prefer altruistic reasons of the highest kind when lying to feel more than they feel may be linked with the result from Faiciuc (2020a), in which a significant positive correlation occurred between this type of motivation for lying and the lack of emotional clarity, as if the dull character of their emotions would be linked with their reduced level regarding their intensity, frequency and duration.

Those who preferred (absolutely or relatively) egocentric reasons for hiding the truth, by comparison with their internal standards and desires regarding their emotions, were particularly unsatisfied with the excessive frequency of their positive feelings, and tended to be unsatisfied with their excessive intensity of the positive feelings. In the same time, they wanted that their positive emotions to have a longer duration (especially those who prefer the most egocentric reasons for hiding the truth). They were also unsatisfied with their negative feelings, particularly with their excessive frequency (especially the ones preferring reasons of level 2 for hiding the truth) and, as a tendency, with their excessive duration. In contrast, they wanted to have negative emotions with a higher intensity. They were also unsatisfied regarding the excessive expression of their positive emotions or regarding the way they are expressed, especially the ones who prefer the egocentric reasons of level 2. The same dissatisfaction with emotion expression occurred for the way negative emotions are expressed by them, and, only as a tendency, with their excessive expression. In spite of this dissatisfaction, they considered that they are efficient in the regulation of the expression of their negative emotions. It may be that those who prefer egocentric reasons for hiding the truth are less willing to admit openly, when they are asked directly, that they have a problem in regulating the expression of their negative emotions, tending to lie in their answer for the egocentric reason to protect their image, corresponding to those having the self-concealment trait (see above). Also, it is possible that they answer to this question by making a comparison with their self-assessed efficiency in regulating the expression of their positive emotions, with which they are more dissatisfied than with the expression of their negative emotions. Perhaps this result regarding their efficiency in regulating the expression of the negative emotions is linked also with the results regarding the desire to regulate their emotions and their expression. Those who prefer egocentric reasons for hiding the truth, especially of the lowest kind, seem to want to regulate their negative feelings, but those who prefer relatively egocentric reasons for hiding the truth of the second level (based on reciprocity and instrumentally), on the contrary, seem to not want to regulate their negative feelings in any way, and to let them as they are, as predicted. This result may explain the absence of a clear association between the self-reported efficacy in the emotion regulation of the negative feelings and the preference for egocentric reasons of hiding the truth.

Regarding the desire to regulate the expression of the emotions, there occurred a tendency marginally significant for a positive correlation between letting the expression of the positive emotions as it is, without any regulation, and the preference for egocentric reasons for hiding the truth, as predicted. In the same time, as shown above, those with egocentric reasons for hiding the truth were unsatisfied with the expression of their positive emotions. So, it seems that they are not willing or able to make the effort to regulate them, in spite of their dissatisfaction with their regulation.

The obtained data are more in accordance with the predicted results regarding the expected positive association between the preference for egocentric reasons for hiding the truth and a problematic emotion regulation. But they are partially in agreement also with those obtained in Faiciuc (2020a) with the DERS measure, when a negative correlation between the preference for egocentric reasons for hiding the truth and the level of dysregulation for the negative emotions occurred. In this study, too, the expected negative correlation between the self-reported efficiency in the regulation of the negative emotions and the preference for the egocentric reasons for hiding the truth did not occur. But the discussed data are also in contradiction with those obtained in Faiciuc (2020a), where those who relatively preferred egocentric reasons for hiding the truth had significantly fewer emotional regulation problems as measured with DERS. In this study, such a positive association between the preference for egocentric reasons for hiding the truth and the emotion regulation ability occurred only in the case of the regulation of the expression of the negative emotions, but not in the case of the regulation of the negative emotions. This difference may be understood taking into account that DERS measure is focused in its assessment on the causes of the dysregulation solely for negative emotions, mainly regarding their intensity. In the same time, QERG is focused on the self-reported satisfaction with emotion regulation, and the satisfaction with the emotional life on several dimensions (excess, deficit, frequency, duration, and intensity), no matter if it is regulated or not, both for positive, and, respectively, negative emotions, and for their expression. On the other hand, the results obtained with DERS in Faiciuc (2020a) for the ipsatized scores of the C5 regarding the egocentric reasons for hiding the truth can be understood from the perspective of the results from this study, which indicate a powerful positive relationship between the relative preference for egocentric reasons for hiding the truth of level 2 and the preference for the goal to let the negative emotions as they are. Consequently, not trying to regulate one's own negative emotions may mean that one is satisfied with their "regulation", in fact with their lack of regulation, even though they may be dissatisfied with their negative emotions. When there is no goal for regulation, there is no dysregulation. But this idea seems not to be true in the case of the expression of the positive emotions presented above, maybe because, in comparison with DERS, through which dysregulation is measured indirectly, here the efficiency in regulation is measured directly, based on the self-assessment of the respondents. Such a self-assessment may reflect both the conscious desire for emotion regulation and the desire to not make the effort to fulfill that emotion regulation desire, maybe because one does not have the efficient strategies to fulfill it or because she/he has competing reasons for not fulfilling it. It is an idea partially related with the construct proposed by King and Emmons (1990) of "ambivalence over emotional expressiveness", i.e., "wanting to express emotion and being unable to do so as well as to expressing emotion and later regretting it" (King et al., 1992, p.90). The results discussed above may be understood also from the perspective of an idea proposed by Dweck (1986, apud

Kumar & Jagacinski, 2011)) and Nicholls (1984, apud Kumar et al., 2011), and tested empirically by Kumar et al. (2011). In their view, ego-involved people would begin to doubt that they have an ability when they encounter a difficulty in its use and, therefore, their commitment to demonstrate that they have that ability would decrease. If that difficulty persists, they would end up believing that they do not have that ability at all. As a consequence, they will abandon the goal of demonstrating that they have that ability. In a similar way, in the present case, people having trouble with the regulation of their emotions may abandon altogether the goal of demonstrating their emotion regulation ability. The data from the present study suggest that, as predicted, those who prefer egocentric reasons for hiding the truth have problems in the regulation of their emotions, especially with their excessive frequency and their expression both for the positive and the negative emotions, in spite of the fact that they are not willing to admit them directly or in spite of the fact that they aim to regulate them or not. In the same time, they are unsatisfied also with the emotional deficit, wanting that their positive emotions to last longer, and their negative emotions to have a higher intensity. The causes of their problems in regulating the emotions are unclear, but it seems that for those who prefer relatively more the egocentric reasons of level 2 (more instrumental), one possible cause may be the lack of a desire to regulate their emotions. It can be coupled with the general tendency of those who prefer egocentric reasons for hiding the truth to believe that positive emotions cannot be controlled. Their main problem seems to be the regulation of their positive emotions, and only secondary the regulation of their negative emotions. It is possible that the excessive frequency of their positive emotions to be linked with their shorter time and with the lower intensity of their negative emotions. Perhaps some negative emotions should be helpful in controlling the positive ones, as it is the case with several moral emotions like shame or guilt, but their intensity may be too low to counteract some undesirable positive emotions. It would be of help if future measurements for the emotion regulation goals would take into account several kinds of positive and negative emotions, which may have a different relation with the moral life. The highest correlations, bringing the strongest evidence against the null hypothesis, were the ones that regard *the positive correlation of the preference for the egocentric reasons of level 2 with the dissatisfaction with the excessive frequency of the positive emotions, and, respectively, with the dissatisfaction in expressing the negative emotions in a different way than the desired one, and the positive correlation of the relative preference for the egocentric reasons of hiding the truth with the dissatisfaction with the excessive expression of the positive emotions, and with the goal to let the negative emotions the way they are (for the reasons of level 2).*

The above-mentioned results are in agreement with the results obtained by Spantidaki Kyriazi et al. (2021) regarding the relationship between some emotion regulation goals and nonclinical psychopathy, if nonclinical psychopathy is taken to correspond to those preferring egocentric reasons for hiding the truth. Spantidaki

Kyriazi et al. (2021) note, in the first place, citing several empirical studies, that psychopathy has some aspects that are linked with lower levels of negative emotions (boldness), especially fear, and other aspects (callousness, lack of empathy, impulsivity, disinhibition) that are linked with higher levels of negative emotions, especially other-oriented (anger, hostility, and contempt). The same contradictory pattern of results occurs also regarding the relationship between psychopathy and emotion regulation. Citing a series of studies made by Garofalo and collaborators in 2020 and 2018, Spantidaki Kyriazi et al. (2021, p. 3) conclude that “when it comes to associations with emotion regulation, overall levels of psychopathy tend to be positively related with problems in emotion regulation, even after controlling for negative emotionality, although effect sizes are often small to moderate”, a conclusion in agreement with the results obtained also in Faiciuc (2020a) and here, regarding the preference for egocentric reasons for hiding the truth. Nevertheless, they show also that the existing data support a positive association between emotional dysregulation and psychopathy only in the case of the affective (e.g., callousness, lack of empathy) and behavioral (e.g., disinhibition) features of psychopathy, whereas the interpersonal (e.g., manipulation) features of psychopathy have typically been found to be unrelated or positively related to emotion regulation. These data are also partially in line with the data found in the present study and in Faiciuc (2020a), in the case of those preferring egocentric reasons of hiding the truth of level 2, in the measure that their preference reflects mainly the manipulation aspect of psychopathy. Spantidaki Kyriazi et al. (2021) note also that there are no studies regarding the association between psychopathic traits and the desired emotions, i.e., emotion goals that “set the direction of emotion regulatory efforts” (Spantidaki Kyriazi et al., 2021, p. 3), which may be of help in understanding the above-mentioned puzzling results cited by them. Regarding the desire for positive emotions, they cite empirical studies that indicate that agreeableness (which correlated negatively with psychopathy) is positively associated with the desire for positive emotions, but, in the same time, indicate that also extraversion (which correlates positively with the boldness aspect of psychopathy) is associated positively associated with the desire for positive emotions. Spantidaki Kyriazi et al. (2021) conducted two studies through which they intended to find out how psychopathy is related with the desire to experience five emotions: anger, fear, sadness, and joy. Their data indicated that individuals higher in psychopathic traits want to experience some level of negative emotions, especially anger, which is in agreement with the results from the present study that suggest that those preferring egocentric reasons for hiding the truth want to have negative emotions with higher intensity. Based on the entire pattern of their data, Spantidaki Kyriazi et al. (2021) conclude that individuals higher in psychopathic traits “may be less motivated to avoid negative emotions, and less motivated to experience joy”, “rather than having an active preference for negative emotions” (p. 16). Particularly, such individuals “may be less motivated to down-regulate

anger (and, to a lesser extent, fear and sadness), and less motivated to up-regulate joy” (Spantidaki Kyriazi et al., 2021, p. 19), these results being more robust for the behavioral traits of psychopathy. Spantidaki Kyriazi et al. (2021) note also that it is unclear if their results indicate a lower aversion to, or greater tolerance toward, these negative emotions among individuals with higher levels of psychopathic traits. Their conclusion is also in agreement with the results from the present study that suggest that those preferring egocentric reasons for hiding the truth of level 2 do not want to regulate their negative emotions, and those who generally prefer the egocentric reasons for hiding the truth do not want more positive emotions. As a novelty, the current research offers a more refined perspective over the emotion goals than the study of the Spantidaki Kyriazi et al. (2021), indicating that those goals may vary depending on the emotional dimension that is taken into consideration. In contrast, Spantidaki Kyriazi et al.’s (2021) study brings useful data that may explain the lack of motivation for regulating some emotions, based on their perceived utility and perceived pleasantness. Their results indicate that, in the case of psychopathy, there are different mechanisms explaining the lack of motivation to regulate anger, fear, and joy, as individuals with higher psychopathy scores suffer less from anger, derive less pleasure from joy and more from anger, and believe that anger and fear are useful emotions.

If the preference for egocentric reasons for hiding the truth is put in correspondence with the self-focused personal distress as a reaction to perspective-taking instructions or to situations in which empathy should occur, the results obtained here can be also compared with the results obtained by Eisenberg et al. (1994). The cited authors note that the awareness of one’s own feelings, and the ability to (consciously and automatically) regulate one’s own emotions may allow the disconnection of the empathic responses to others from the personal distress, thus leading to altruistic motivation. Reversely, those having emotion regulation problems should have rather an egocentric motivation. In Eisenberg et al. ‘s (1994) study, dispositional self-focused personal distress was predicted both by high negative emotional intensity and low emotion regulation, being also negatively associated with the positive affect. The results reported here regarding the emotional regulation profile of those preferring egocentric reasons for hiding the truth overlap partially with the Eisenberg et al. ‘s (1994) results regarding the dispositional personal distress. The overlapping part refers to the indirect signs of emotion regulation problems of those preferring egocentric reasons for hiding the truth, namely their dissatisfaction with the excessive frequency and duration of the negative emotions, and to their dissatisfaction with the decreased duration of the positive emotions, but not with their decreased frequency or intensity, which, on the contrary, are considered to be in excess.

Those who preferred reasons for hiding the truth in which the altruistic/moral reasons and the egocentric ones are in competition desired longer positive emotions, and were dissatisfied with the excessive frequency and duration of their negative

emotions. They were dissatisfied with the excessive expression and the modality of expression of the negative and positive emotions. Consequently, they tended to consider that the efficiency in the regulation of the expression of negative emotions is problematic, even though they try hard to regulate their negative emotions and not let them as they are. In comparison with the participants who preferred egocentric reasons for hiding the truth, for those whose reasons for hiding the truth were mixed and in competition, the main emotion regulation problems were their excessive negative emotions and the dissatisfaction with the expression of their emotions, and the lack of means for regulating their emotions, in spite of the fact that they do want to regulate them (a result in agreement with the one obtained with DERS, in Faiciuc, 2020a, which indicated that they have limited access to emotion regulation strategies). So, if some of those with egocentric reasons (those preferring reasons for hiding the truth of level 2) for hiding the truth do not want to regulate their negative emotions, those with mixed reasons for hiding the truth want to regulate them, but they seem less able to do it, even though they are not willing to admit that directly. The highest correlations, bringing the strongest evidence against the null hypothesis, were *the positive correlation of the preference for the reasons of hiding the truth of level 3 with the dissatisfaction with the deficient duration of the positive emotions, with the inadequate way in which positive emotions are expressed (a correlation that is similarly high also for the cluster of egocentric-altruistic reasons of hiding the truth), and with the dissatisfaction with the excessive frequency of the expressed negative feelings (a correlation that is similarly high also for the cluster of egocentric-altruistic reasons of hiding the truth), and the negative correlation with the goal to let the negative emotions the way they are.* It may be that this category of participants corresponds also to the category described by Eisenberg et al. (1994) as feeling self-focused personal distress as a reaction to perspective-taking instructions or to situations in which empathy should occur, as they may have empathic concern (altruistic motivations), but their emotion regulation problems do not allow its disconnection from the personal distress generated by their egocentric motivations.

In comparison with the results obtained in Faiciuc (2020a), in this study, the negative association between the preference for these reasons of hiding the truth and the dysregulation of the negative emotions was not found, if only the direct self-report of the emotion regulation efficacy is considered. It occurred only as a tendency for the case of the regulation of the expression of the negative emotions. On the other hand, such a negative association is supported by the data from this study that indirectly suggest problems with the regulation of the negative emotions, as it happens in DERS. In this case, too, it may be that, when asked directly to assess their ability in managing emotions, some of this kind of participants tend to lie, to answer in the direction of the social desirability, or in the direction of their desire.

Those who preferred approach reasons for hiding the truth were, unexpectedly, dissatisfied with their excessive frequency of the positive and negative emotions, when the absolute preference for this kind of reasons was considered, but

when the relative preference for these reasons was taken into account, they were, on the contrary, not dissatisfied with their negative emotions as being in excess, as expected. They tended to be also dissatisfied with the deficient frequency of the positive and negative emotions. These participants were dissatisfied, too, with the deficient duration of the positive emotions, and with the deficient intensity of their negative emotions. Regarding the expression of their emotions, they were satisfied with the way they express their positive emotions, and dissatisfied with the deficient expression of their negative feelings. They let their negative emotions and tend to let the expression of their positive feelings the way they are. So, this kind of participants tended to have rather unstable positive and negative emotions, sometimes exceeding their desire, other times being below the desired level. In both cases, they do not make efforts to regulate some of them (the negative ones) or their expression, preferring to let them as they are. The pattern of correlations in the case of such kind of reasons for hiding the truth overlaps the most with the obtained pattern for the egocentric reasons of hiding the truth. The highest correlation, bringing the strongest evidence against the null hypothesis, was *the positive one between the preference for this kind of reasons for hiding the truth and the preference for the goal to let negative emotions the way they are.*

Those who preferred avoidance reasons for hiding the truth were dissatisfied with their deficient intensity and duration of the positive feelings, and with the way they express their positive and negative emotions. They were dissatisfied with their excessive intensity, duration, and frequency of the negative emotions, with their excessive expression of the negative emotions, but not with their deficient expression. The results indicated that they avoid to let their negative emotions the way they are. Regarding the emotion regulation efficiency, they were dissatisfied with the efficiency in their expression regulation of the negative emotions, and tended to be dissatisfied with the efficiency in their regulation of the negative emotions. So, their main problem is the excessive negative emotion and its excessive expression, and their dissatisfaction in regulating emotions and in obtaining longer and more intense positive feelings. The pattern of correlations in the case of such kind of reasons for hiding the truth overlaps the most with the pattern obtained for the mixed reasons for hiding the truth (egocentric in competition with the altruistic/moral ones). These results are in agreement with the ones obtained with DERS (Faiciuc, 2020a), for which also a positive correlation occurred between the preference for this kind of reasons of hiding the truth and the problems in the regulation of the negative emotions (dysregulation of the negative emotions). The highest correlations, bringing the strongest evidence against the null hypothesis, were *the positive correlations of this kind of reasons of hiding the truth with the dissatisfaction with the short duration of the positive feelings, with the long duration and the high frequency of the negative feelings, and with the inadequate expression of the positive feelings, and the negative correlation with the goal to let negative emotions as they are.*

The hypotheses regarding the association of the satisfaction with one's own emotions with the approach and, respectively, avoidance reasons for hiding the truth were supported by data mainly in the case of the avoidance reasons for hiding the truth, and for the negative emotions. Several exceptions and unpredicted results occurred, but the general pattern was the predicted one, i.e., that those preferring to hide the truth in order to avoid undesired consequences considered that their negative emotions and their expression are excessive, more than they would want them to be (an indication of their wish to avoid the unpleasant emotions), and their positive emotions as deficient, less they would want them to be. In the same time, those preferring to hide the truth in order to approach desired consequences tended to not be dissatisfied with excessive negative emotions and their expression, and even considered that their negative emotions are deficient in some aspects in comparison with their desires. They only tended to desire longer and more frequent positive emotions, and, unexpectedly, even were dissatisfied significantly about the excessive frequency of their positive emotions. These results are in agreement with the data obtained by Carver and White (1994), cited in the introductory part of this study, which indicate that avoidance goals may be more linked with negative emotions, and approach goals more with positive emotions.

The prediction that the goal to let unchanged one's own emotions and their expression should correlate positively with the preference for egocentric and avoidance reasons for hiding the truth was supported only in the case of the negative emotions for the egocentric reasons of hiding the truth of level 2 and for the avoidance reasons of hiding the truth and in the case of the expression of the positive emotions (only as a tendency, for the both kinds of reasons for hiding the truth).

Hypotheses 4, 5, and 3

The relationship of the tendency and reasons for hiding the truth with the preferred dimensions on which emotions and their expression are changed and of the emotion regulation process (items 10-16, 26, 27)

The general tendency to hide the truth correlated positively only with the goal of changing the adequacy to the context of the positive feelings, which is in accordance with their dissatisfaction with the way they express them. So, the hypothesis that the tendency to hide the truth should correlate negatively with the goals through which emotions and their expression is adjusted to the perceived context was not supported by the data. On the contrary, for the positive emotions, that relationship was a positive one, suggesting that changing emotions in accordance with the context may not necessarily mean respect for the truth, as it was assumed initially.

Those who preferred (absolutely or relatively) altruistic reasons for hiding the truth, in the case of those who preferred reasons for hiding the truth of level 4,

had as a preferred goal to decrease the intensity of unwanted positive feelings, and tended to completely prevent the occurrence of the unwanted positive feelings. In general, particularly for those who preferred reasons for hiding the truth of level 5, their preferred goal was to decrease the duration of the unwanted positive feelings, and tended slightly to not want to change their adequacy to the context. They also slightly tended to not aim to change the intensity of the unwanted negative feelings, or to change their valence into a positive one, and did not aim to change in the first place their duration, or to completely eliminate them. They tended instead to aim to change the adequacy to context of their unwanted negative feelings. Regarding the expression of their emotions, they preferred aiming to make their positive and negative emotions less visible (particularly for those preferring reasons of hiding the truth of level 5). A strange result is that, in the case of the relative preference for altruistic reasons for hiding the truth, its correlation with the aim to make negative emotions less visible is negative, and not positive. It is a result in opposition with the case of the absolute preference for the altruistic reasons of hiding the truth, presented above. It may indicate that the desire to make the negative emotions less visible may be linked with a response bias in this case, when the altruistic reasons are not the most preferred ones, suggesting a general tendency for hiding also the truth of the emotional life. But when the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth were the most preferred ones, hiding emotions by making them less visible was negatively associated with hiding the truth for altruistic reasons, maybe because hiding emotions in this case is not seen to serve an altruistic goal, whereas expressing them is seen to be an altruistic endeavor. Those who preferred altruistic reasons for hiding the truth also aimed preferentially to make the expression of the negative emotions more adequate to the context, particularly in the case of those who preferred altruistic reasons for hiding the truth of level 4, and tended to prefer the goal to make the expression of their positive emotions more adequate to the context, too. The highest correlation, bringing the strongest evidence against the null hypothesis, was *the one between the preference for the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth of level 4 and the preference for the goal of making the expression of the negative emotions more adequate to the context*. These results are partially in line with the predicted ones and with the results presented above regarding the level of dissatisfaction with one's own emotions and their expression, and regarding the self-reported efficiency in emotion regulation and expression, indicating the same focus on successful emotion regulation (leading to a low level of dissatisfaction with emotions in excess), on the regulation of the positive emotions (which is reported to be the most efficient, particularly regarding their expression), and on the regulation of the expression of the negative emotions (in line with their low level of dissatisfaction in this respect, particularly regarding their adequacy to the context). In general, they support the expected positive link between the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth and the effort to regulate one's own emotions and their expression. Their

novelty is that they indicate that those efforts are focused on the undesired positive emotions, not on the negative ones, and that they are rather gentle, not too suppressive. Future studies should identify which positive emotions are regulated in this way, and why the regulatory focus is on them. An important finding is also that they tend to focus more on the regulation of the emotional expression than on the regulation of their emotions. This finding can be put in relationship with a finding of Webb, Miles and Sheeran (2012), who showed that suppressing the expression of emotion was effective as an emotion regulation strategy, whereas suppressing the experience of emotion was not effective.

Those who preferred (absolutely or relatively) egocentric reasons for hiding the truth wanted preferentially to completely impede the occurrence of the unwanted positive feelings (particularly those preferring the reasons of hiding the truth of level 1), or to completely eliminate them once they occurred, to make them more adequate to the context (particularly those preferring the reasons of hiding the truth of level 2), to decrease their intensity, but they did not want to decrease their duration. Regarding the negative emotions, those who preferred reasons for hiding the truth of level 2 preferred also the goal to improve their adequacy to context, and those who preferred reasons for hiding the truth of level 1 slightly tended to prefer to eliminate completely the negative emotions once they occurred. Regarding the expression of their emotions, they preferentially aimed to make their positive emotions (those preferring reasons for hiding the truth of level 2), and negative emotions (particularly those who prefer reasons for hiding the truth of level 1) less visible. But they did not preferentially want to improve the adequacy to the context of the expression of their negative feelings. The highest correlations, bringing the strongest evidence against the null hypothesis, were *the positive one between the preference for reasons of hiding the truth of level 2 and the preferred goal to improve the adequacy to the context of the positive emotions*, and *the negative one between the score for the cluster of egocentric reasons of hiding the truth and the preference for the goal to improve the adequacy to the context of the expression of the negative emotions*. These results are in agreement with the above-mentioned ones regarding the level of dissatisfaction with one's own emotions and the self-reported efficiency in emotion regulation and expression, but in a different direction than in the case of the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth. Those with egocentric reasons for hiding the truth had also preferred regulatory goals, particularly regarding their positive emotions, but they are less successful than those with altruistic reasons for hiding the truth in attaining them or less motivated to attain them. Consequently, they had higher levels of dissatisfaction with their excessive emotional life, exactly with its part related to the positive emotions. Maybe their regulatory process is more deficient or their regulatory standards or requests are higher than those of the participants who preferred altruistic reasons for hiding the truth. Therefore, they are demotivated in trying to regulate their emotions, and they come to believe that their positive emotions are not

controllable. Their regulatory pattern is different than the one of those with altruistic reasons for hiding the truth, too, being more focused on completely eliminating the emotions after they occurred, more suppressive, more focused on regulating the adequacy to the context of emotions, and less focused on the regulation of the emotional expression. They do not aim to decrease the duration of the unwanted positive feelings, whereas those with altruistic reasons for hiding the truth want that their undesired positive emotions to be shorter in time. Their focus is on changing solely the expression of the positive emotions to the context, whereas those with altruistic reasons for hiding the truth want to change mainly the expression of their negative emotions to the context. This regulatory pattern supports partially the predicted emotional dysregulation for those preferring egocentric reasons for hiding the truth, because it indicates a discrepancy between their preferred regulatory goals and the obtained results. As a novelty, it indicates that for this category of participants, too, the unwanted positive emotions are the main regulatory target, not the negative ones. This focus may explain why, in Faiciuc (2020a), the preference for egocentric reasons of hiding the truth did not correlate as expected with the DERS score, which assesses mainly the dysregulation of the negative emotions.

Those who preferred reasons for hiding the truth in which the altruistic/moral reasons and the egocentric ones are in competition did not prefer to decrease the intensity or duration of the positive emotions, and they did not want to eliminate them completely once they occurred. Regarding their expression, they slightly tended to not prefer the goal of improving its adequacy to the context. They tended also slightly to prefer the aim to make the expression of their negative emotions less visible. So, it seems that this kind of participants, in spite of the fact that they are generally dissatisfied with their emotional life, and in spite of their self-reported intention to regulate their emotions, do not have clearly preferred dimensions of emotions and of the emotion regulation process as targets of regulation, i.e., they do not implement their regulatory intentions in a clear way and do not make efforts in that direction. On the contrary, they prefer not to effectively change them in some respects. So, these results are in line with the above-mentioned ones regarding the high level of dissatisfaction with one's own emotions and the self-reported tendency of regulatory deficiency in the expression of the negative emotions. They are also in agreement with the obtained in Faiciuc (2020a), indicating the same regulatory problems, generated perhaps by the internal conflict between the two contradictory motivations.

Those who preferred approach reasons for hiding the truth tended to completely prevent the occurrence of the unwanted positive emotions, or to eliminate them completely once they occurred, to decrease their intensity, and duration. They also preferred the goal of improving the adequacy of the positive emotions to the context. Their tendency was to aim to make their expression less visible, even though they tend also to let it as it is. They did not want preferentially

to decrease the intensity of the unwanted negative feelings, but only to make them less visible. These results are in general in line with the above-mentioned ones regarding the level of dissatisfaction with one's own emotions and the self-reported efficiency in emotion regulation and expression. They indicate a focus on the regulation of the positive emotions, the most challenging for them, particularly on the adequacy to context of their expression (which is successful, as indicated by the level of satisfaction regarding this aspect of the emotion regulation), and not on the negative emotions. Nevertheless, the result of the regulation process may be sometimes an unsatisfactory one even for the positive emotions as a consequence of a suboptimal regulation or of the focus put on overregulation through suppressive processes. Their pattern of emotional regulation is more similar to the one of those having egocentric reasons for hiding the truth.

Those who preferred avoidance reasons for hiding the truth did not want preferentially to decrease the duration of their unwanted positive feelings, but they tended to want preferentially to improve their adequacy to the context. They aimed preferentially to decrease the intensity of the unwanted negative emotions, and to improve their adequacy to the context. These results are in agreement with the above-mentioned ones regarding the level of dissatisfaction with one's own emotions and the self-reported efficiency in emotion regulation and expression. They indicate the same deficiency in regulating excessive negative emotions in spite of their focus and desire to regulate them, and the same problem in adjusting their positive and negative feelings to the context.

In Faiciuc (2020a), the suppression metaemotion did not correlate preferentially only with one kind of reasons for hiding the truth. This result is in partial agreement with the result from the present study, as some kind of preference for suppressive regulatory goals occurred for almost all the reasons for hiding the truth, even though it occurred predominantly for the egocentric and approach reasons for hiding the truth, a pattern that did not occur in Faiciuc (2020a). In order to explain this difference, it is needed to take into account that the suppression metaemotion overlap only partially with the goal to completely eliminate an already occurred emotion and with the goal to make less visible the expression of an emotion.

Regarding the hypothesis that those preferring altruistic reasons for hiding the truth should have more stringent goals for emotion regulation, data support weakly and partially that hypothesis as they indeed had as a goal to completely prevent the occurrence of the unwanted emotions, but only in the case of the positive emotions. In comparison with those preferring egocentric reasons of hiding the truth in competition with the altruistic ones, they indeed had more stringent goals for emotion regulation. Unpredicted was the data that indicate that those preferring egocentric reasons for hiding the truth have also such a stringent regulatory goal for the positive emotions.

The obtained data suggest that, for those preferring altruistic reasons of hiding the truth, the approach and avoidance motivational focus may be in balance, as a base

for their seemingly more efficient emotion regulation processes. Future studies should investigate this hypothesis. These results indicate also that, from a moral point of view, the regulation of the positive emotions is as important as the regulation of the negative ones, if not more important. This idea is in agreement with the Eisenberg et al.'s (1994, p. 777) suggestion that well-regulated people maintain an optimal level of emotional arousal by regulating their negative and positive emotions, including those based on empathy, so that to have some "emotional force", but not so aversive that "it engenders a self-focus". They hypothesize that a sympathetic, other-oriented response require a moderately high level of inhibitory control, as a capacity to "suppress positively toned impulses and thereby resist the execution of inappropriate approach tendencies" (p. 777). In this way, "people who are moderately high in inhibitory control may be more capable than other people both of maintaining an optimal distance from the emotionally evocative situation and of inhibiting self-oriented tendencies" (Eisenberg et al., 1994, p. 777). So, they suggest a nonlinear relationship between emotion regulation and altruistic behavior, which may explain the difficulty of finding the expected positive correlation between the altruistic motivation and emotion regulation, this relationship being dependent on the composition of the sample regarding the range of the inhibition of control trait. Their data indicated that the link between empathic concern and inhibition control may be particularly complex. On the one hand, inhibition of control moderated the relationship between the intensity of the negative emotions and empathic concern primarily for those with a higher intensity of their negative emotions. Only for them high inhibition of control was associated positively with a high level of empathic concern. So, the above-mentioned authors conclude that "for emotionally intense people, the ability to regulate emotion with inhibitory mechanisms may facilitate the tendency to sympathize with others." (p. 793). On the other hand, "undercontrolled people may experience vicarious emotion as aversive, whereas highly inhibited people may not freely allow themselves to experience others' emotion" (Eisenberg et al., 1994, p. 794). Moreover, Eisenberg et al. (1994, p. 779) note that "positive and negative affect may relate differently to vicarious emotional responding", as "people who are generally more content may be less preoccupied with their own needs and better able to respond to those of others".

The complicated relationship between one's emotion regulation efficiency and moral traits is suggested also by the data obtained by Côté, Decelles, McCarthy, Van Kleef and Hideg (2011), regarding the link between emotion regulation knowledge defined as emotional intelligence and prosocial and deviant behavior. Their data supported their hypothesis that emotion regulation knowledge can promote both prosocial and interpersonally deviant behavior. Based on the idea that the efficient emotion regulation promotes goal achievement, they predicted that emotion-regulation knowledge should increase the effects of "other-oriented and self-oriented personality traits on prosocial behavior and interpersonal deviance, respectively". The data of two empirical studies conducted by them

supported that prediction: for the “individuals with higher emotion-regulation knowledge, moral identity exhibited a stronger positive association with prosocial behavior in a social dilemma”, whereas “Machiavellianism exhibited a stronger positive association with interpersonal deviance in the workplace”. So, they concluded that emotion-regulation has both a positive and a negative side. The results obtained in the present research suggest that the kind of emotion regulation involved in those with deviant behavior and those with prosocial behavior may not be the same.

The same ambivalent relationship of the efficient regulation of the positive and negative emotions with moral behavior was noted also by Sinclair-Harding (2018). She cites studies that indicate, on the one hand, that childhood disruptive behaviors are related to “problems of understanding, identifying and regulating emotions” (p. 43), as children with conduct problems “exhibit less positive emotion expression in response to successful task completion compared to their peers and also find it difficult to regulate negative emotionality when frustrated” (p. 43). On the other hand, she underlines the fact that there are studies indicating that, on the contrary, lower physiological reactivity, i.e., lower emotional intensity, “is found to be a robust correlate with antisocial and aggressive behaviors”, “callous-unemotional traits and insensitivity to punishment” (p. 44), insensitivity to punishment, failing to learn avoidance. The contradictory data cited by this author may be put in relationship with the emotion regulation profiles found for those having different reasons for hiding the truth in the present study and in Faiciuc (2020a). They suggest that emotion regulation problems are related more to conflicting egocentric and altruistic reasons for hiding the truth (when the egocentric ones gain the competition). In the same time, the instrumental egocentric reasons for hiding the truth, focused on a bargain morality, were not accompanied by major emotion regulation problems, because emotion regulation was not a preferred goal in this case. These profiles can be put in correspondence with the results obtained by Loeffler et al. (2020), which indicate that emotion regulation is linked with narcissism differently for the two types of narcissism, although the emotion regulation performance was not associated with narcissism when the types of narcissism are not distinguished. Grandiose narcissism was not associated with depressive symptoms, as those high on this trait avoided suppression of the positive emotions, and the uncontrolled expression of their negative emotions. In contrast, vulnerable narcissism was associated with anhedonia and with depressive symptoms, as those high on this trait reported that they use suppression as an emotion regulation strategy more frequently than those high on grandiose narcissism. Similarly, Cheshure et al. (2020) also note that the existing studies indicate conflicting associations between narcissism and emotion dysregulation, and that an explanation for these results is that different aspects of the narcissism may have divergent associations with emotion regulation difficulties. They (Cheshure et al., 2020, p. 1) support empirically this idea, using the

above-mentioned DERS measure, by showing that narcissistic admiration (“an agentic form of narcissism that is characterized by assertive self-enhancement and self-promotion”) “was negatively associated with problematic responses to emotions and poor recognition of emotions”, whereas narcissistic rivalry (“an antagonistic form of narcissism that is characterized by self-protection and self-defense”) “was positively associated with both of these forms of emotion dysregulation”. The cited authors conclude that “narcissistic admiration may be characterized by the ability to regulate emotional experiences more effectively which is markedly different from narcissistic rivalry which is characterized by emotion dysregulation” (p. 1).

The complexity of the emotion regulation in its relationship with positive and negative emotions is noted also by Charles (2010), who support the view that successful emotion regulation “may paradoxically entail the elicitation of negative emotions”, “as well as the co-occurrence of positive and negative affect”. This idea may be linked with the complex pattern of preferred goals regarding the regulation of the positive and negative emotions in its relationship with the preferred goals/reasons for which one is hiding the truth, as both positive and negative emotions may be needed in order to achieve those goals: e.g., negative emotions as shame or guilt, or positive emotions as pride can motivate a person to hide the truth or not, depending on one’s motivational focus (altruistic, egocentric, of approach, or avoidance).

The relationship of the tendency and reasons for hiding the truth with the personal and social context in which one is willing to change her/his emotion or their expression

Hypotheses 1, and 3

1. *The relationship of the tendency and reasons for hiding the truth with the cognitive goals in regulating emotions (items 23 and 24)*

The obtained results were generally in line with the predicted ones, which were based on the data from Faiciuc (2020a). One important exception was the result that the preference for the cognitive goals of QERG did not correlate negatively with the tendency to hide the truth, contrary to what was expected.

The reasons for hiding the truth were associated following the same pattern with the preference for the goal of understanding one’s own positive emotions and for the goal of understanding one’s own negative emotions, but the associations were higher in the case of the goal of understanding one’s own positive emotions. *Those preferring egocentric reasons for hiding the truth*, particularly those preferring egocentric reasons of level 2 (a correlation that did not occur in Faiciuc, 2020a), preferred the goal of understanding one’s own positive or negative emotions. The same was true also for *those preferring approach reasons for hiding the truth*, who also preferred the goal of understanding one’s own positive or negative emotions (*the*

correlation in this case brings a strong evidence against the null hypothesis). In contrast, those who preferred reasons for hiding the truth in which the altruistic/moral reasons and the egocentric ones are in competition and those with avoidance reasons for hiding the truth did not want preferentially to understand their positive (a case for which the negative correlations bring a strong evidence against the null hypothesis) and negative emotions. Those with altruistic reasons for hiding the truth did not have a clear preference for this kind of cognitive goals for emotion regulation, but they preferred the cognitive goal to not make a distinction between the wanted and unwanted emotions instead, especially in the case of those preferring the altruistic reasons of the highest kind (level 5). The same was true for those who preferred approach reasons for hiding the truth, but only as a slight tendency to prefer the goal of not making that distinction between emotions. In contrast, those who preferred egocentric reasons for hiding the truth did not prefer this kind of cognitive goal for emotion regulation, contrary to what was predicted. Those who preferred reasons for hiding the truth in which the altruistic/moral reasons and the egocentric ones are in competition, and those who preferred avoidance reasons for hiding the truth did not prefer it, too, as it was the case with the first kind of cognitive goals for emotion regulation. Both cognitive goals of QERG correlated negatively with the preference for egocentric reasons of hiding the truth of level 3, a result that occurred only as a tendency in Faiciuc (2020a).

These results may indicate a higher level of the desire to accept³ their emotions no matter their kind for those preferring altruistic reasons for hiding the truth, whereas those preferring egocentric reasons for hiding the truth focus themselves on wanting to understand their emotions in their efforts to regulate them, which does not necessarily mean that they succeed in attaining these goals. It may be interpreted as a sign that they are not satisfied with the current level of understanding of their emotions, but also as a sign of their self-centeredness. Those preferring the approach reasons for hiding the truth preferred both kinds of cognitive goals. In contrast, those preferring reasons for hiding the truth in which the altruistic/moral reasons and the egocentric ones are in competition and those preferring avoidance reasons for hiding the truth do not preferentially have either of the two cognitive goals for their emotion regulation. That result may explain their difficulties with emotion regulation.

The results obtained regarding the positive correlation of *the preference for altruistic reasons for hiding the truth and, respectively, approach reasons for hiding the truth* with the desire to accept emotions no matter their kind is in accordance with the results obtained in Faiciuc (2020a). There, too, a tendency for a positive correlation between the preference for these kinds of reasons for hiding the truth and the preference for the emotion regulation cognitive strategy of

³ An interpretation supported by the positive correlations of the preference for this goal with measures used in Faiciuc (2020a) for assessing the acceptance of one's own emotions.

acceptance occurred. But, in Faiciuc (2020a), an exception occurred also, as those preferring altruistic reasons of hiding the truth of level 4 did not accept their negative emotional responses, feeling rather guilt, and not shame or embarrassment for their negative emotions, especially for those participants with a high level of emotional dysregulation. This result may be put in correspondence with the results from the present study, indicating that they were more dissatisfied with their negative emotions than those preferring altruistic reasons of hiding the truth of level 5. These data indicate their emotion regulation problems, that they feel guilty for them, maybe because they have higher expectations and internalized standards in this respect, and because they associate a moral value to their emotion regulation goals. The negative correlation of the preference for the *reasons for hiding the truth in which the altruistic/moral reasons and the egocentric ones are in competition* with the cognitive emotion regulation goals has also a correspondent in the results obtained in Faiciuc (2020a): a tendency toward a negative correlation of the preference for this kind of reasons for hiding the truth with the preference for the learning emotion regulation goals. In Faiciuc (2020a), there occurred, too, positive correlations of *the preference for the egocentric reasons of hiding the truth* with the preference for learning emotion regulation goals, and with the metaemotion of compassionate care for one's own emotions. They correspond to the positive correlation between the preference for this kind of reasons of hiding the truth and the cognitive emotion regulation goal to understand one's own emotions that occurred in the present study. As noted above, these results may indicate these participants' egocentric focus on their own feelings, their inability to understand them, and/or the desire to master them at all costs from egocentric reasons. Also, in the case of the negative correlation of the preference for *avoidance reasons of hiding the truth* with the preference for the emotion regulation goal of not discriminating between wanted and unwanted emotions, there is a correspondent result in Faiciuc (2020a): the positive correlation of the preference for this kind of reasons for hiding the truth and the nonacceptance of one's own emotions, as measured both with CERQ and DERS. These results were in agreement, too, with the predicted ones, as it was hypothesized that the preference for avoidance reasons for hiding the truth should correlate negatively with the cognitive goals of emotion regulation, and the preference for approach reasons for hiding the truth should correlate positively with them. Convergent indirect support was found also in the scientific literature. Coats et al. (2008) related avoidance strategies in emotion regulation with a lower level of cognitive-emotional complexity, whereas the approach strategies in emotion regulation with a higher level of cognitive-emotional complexity, providing also empirical data in that respect. They define cognitive-emotional complexity as having three components: "understanding how to use emotion to inform cognition in daily life, instead of seeing cognition and emotion as conflicting", "differentiation of self-chosen emotional standards from societal standards", and "integrating multiple

emotional perspectives to form complex representations of situations” (Coats et al., 2008, p. 40). Of the three components, they believe that, for emotion regulation, the most important is the first one, “because understanding emotions and their everyday applicability may be a prerequisite for knowing how to regulate them”, for “proactive” and not “passive emotion regulation strategies” (Coats et al., 2008, p. 40). In contrast, those with lower levels of cognitive-emotional complexity, use “coping strategies of escape/avoidance and distancing themselves from the situation at hand” (Coats et al., 2008, p. 40). The first component of the cognitive-emotional complexity can be put in correspondence with the cognitive goals of emotion regulation from the present study, the passive/avoidance emotion regulation strategies with the preference for avoidance reasons of hiding the truth, and the proactive/approach emotion regulation strategies with the preference for approach reasons for hiding the truth. Kalokerinos, Erbas, Ceulemans and Kuppens (2019, p.3) presented data that indicate the importance of the emotion differentiation, “which involves experiencing and labeling emotions in a granular way”, in defining clearer emotional goals, and in discounting incidental emotional information and, consequently, for a more efficient use of the emotion regulation strategies. This emotion differentiation can be put in correspondence with the cognitive goals from the present study. Contrary to their prediction and to the results obtained by Rusk et al. (2011), they found “few relationships between differentiation and the selection of putatively adaptive or maladaptive strategies” (Kalokerinos et al., 2019, p. 3). Instead, they found that for low differentiators, all emotion regulation strategies “were more strongly associated with increased negative emotion than among high differentiators”. They interpreted this result as suggesting “that low differentiation may hinder successful emotion regulation”, or “that effective regulation may underlie differentiation benefits” (Kalokerinos et al., 2019, p. 3). Their result may explain why those preferring avoidance reasons for hiding the truth, who do not prefer cognitive goals in emotion regulation, had emotion regulation problems. It is important to note that having cognitive goals for emotion regulation (as those preferring egocentric reasons for hiding the truth seem to have) does not mean necessarily having also an emotion differentiation ability. Finally, Kramer and Yoon (2007, p. 130) support theoretically and with empirical data the idea that “individuals with a predominant approach motivation are likely to rely on their affect regardless of its valence for information”, “because their internal focus of attention makes momentary affect salient”, whereas “individuals with a predominant avoidance motivation tend not to monitor their internal states and should therefore in general be less likely to use their affect as input when making judgments”, with the exception of the situation in which affect “is made salient by its mismatch to their chronic affective valence” (i.e., the tendency to feel negative or positive emotions). They (Kramer et al., 2007, p. 29) cite data that link eagerness “to increased reliance on internal information”, and vigilance “to increased reliance on external information”, and also the independent self with an

internal, promotion self-regulatory, focus, and an interdependent self to an external, prevention self-regulatory, focus. This data can be linked with the obtained negative association between the preference for avoidance reasons of hiding the truth and the preference for cognitive goals in emotion regulation, and the positive association of the preference for approach and, respectively, egocentric reasons of hiding the truth with the preference for cognitive goals in emotion regulation. It can be speculated that an optimal emotion regulation would be one in which both internal and external information is used, allowing more easily to find out the regularities in the interaction between one's own needs and external environment. Consequently, this idea should mean that this optimal emotion regulation is an emotion regulation in which the approach and avoidance motivational forces are in balance. Those preferring altruistic reasons for hiding the truth may be closer to such a balanced emotion regulation process. Perhaps that is why the preference for altruistic reasons for hiding the truth was not associated with the preference for cognitive goal of understanding one's own emotions.

Hypotheses 7, and 3

2. The relationship of the tendency and reasons for hiding the truth with the instrumental goals in regulating emotions and their expression (items 21, 22, 32, and 33)

Those who preferred egocentric reasons for hiding the truth tended, as expected, to have preferentially as a goal to change their positive feelings so that to help the achievement or not to impede the achievement of their personal goals. They also had as a preferential goal to change the expression of their negative feelings so that to help the achievement or, as a tendency for those preferring the level 1 reasons for hiding the truth, not to impede the achievement of their personal goals. In contrast, as expected, those with altruistic reasons for hiding the truth did not preferentially aim to change their negative feelings and their expression (particularly those preferring the level 5 reasons for hiding the truth) in order to help the achievement of their personal goals, and tended to not do that in order to not impede the achievement of their personal goals (particularly those who prefer the level 5 reasons for hiding the truth). They also slightly tended to not have as a preferential goal the change of the expression of their positive feelings in order to not impede the achievement of their personal goals, particularly for those who prefer altruistic reasons for hiding the truth of level 5. An exception was the case of the participants who preferred the altruist reasons for hiding the truth of level 4, who tended to have as a preferential goal to change the expression of their positive and negative emotions (but not of their emotions) in order to help the achievement of their personal goals. Those who preferred reasons for hiding the truth in which the altruistic/moral reasons and the egocentric ones are in competition had as a

preferential goal to change the expression of their positive feelings in order to not impede the achievement of their personal goals. *Those who preferred the avoidance reasons for hiding the truth* had the same preferential goal in regulating the expression of their positive emotions. In contrast, unexpectedly, *those who preferred approach reasons for hiding the truth* did not want to regulate preferentially the expression of their positive and negative emotions in order to not impede the achievement of their personal goals. Still, given that this goal has a preventive meaning, it is understandable that it was preferred by those with an avoidance motivational focus, and rejected by those with an approach motivational focus. The general pattern was, as predicted, the one in which those preferring egocentric reasons for hiding the truth use the regulation of their positive emotions, and of the expression of their negative emotions for instrumental goals, whereas those preferring altruistic reasons for hiding the truth, especially of the highest kind, do not prefer to use the regulation of their negative feelings and of their expression for instrumental goals. In between there are those who prefer the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth of level 4, who tend to regulate only the expression of their emotions instrumentally, in order to help the achievement of their goals, those preferring reasons for hiding the truth in which the altruistic/moral reasons and the egocentric ones are in competition, and those preferring the avoidance reasons for hiding the truth, who also regulate instrumentally only the expression of their emotions, but solely for the positive emotions, and not for helping the achievement of their goals, but in order to not impede their achievement. So, the use of the emotion regulation and expression for instrumental goals seems to be particularly linked with egocentric reasons for hiding the truth, whereas the emotion expression, especially of the positive ones, can be regulated for instrumental reasons preferentially also by the participants who have altruistic or mixed reasons for hiding the truth. Consequently, the above-mentioned data supported only partially the initial hypotheses, mainly for the case of the regulation of emotions, but not for their expression, and not for the cases of those preferring the avoidance and approach reasons for hiding the truth.

Some of the above-mentioned results are in accordance with correspondent results from Faiciuc (2020a). The higher desire of those preferring egocentric reasons for hiding the truth to have instrumental emotion regulation goals so that emotions and their expression to play a role in the achievement in the personal goals (this study) can be linked with the positive correlation between the preference for such goals and their self-reported lack of difficulties to engage in goal directed behavior when they are in a negative emotional state (Faiciuc, 2020a). So, they may want preferentially to help the achievement of their goals by regulating their emotions exactly because they have problems in regulating them, because they stand in the way of goal achievement, or because they tend to see more their emotions as means for achieving goals.

Hypotheses 8, and 3

3. *The relationship of the tendency and reasons for hiding the truth with the other-oriented/social goals in regulating emotions and their expression (items 17, 18, 20, 28, 29, 31, and 34)*

The total score of C5, i.e., the general tendency to lie was positively associated with the preferred emotion regulation goal of adjustment of the negative emotions to the social context, i.e., to the typical emotion perceived to be associated to a situation.

Those preferring egocentric reasons for hiding the truth had as a preferred emotion regulation goal to adjust their positive and negative emotions to the social context, to the typical emotion perceived to be associated to a situation (for the positive emotions, particularly those who preferred the level 2 reasons for hiding the truth, and for the negative emotions, particularly those who preferred the level 1 reasons for hiding the truth). Those who preferred the egocentric reasons for hiding the truth of level 1 had as a preferred emotion regulation goal to change their positive and negative emotions in accordance with the perceived image of others about their person. For the negative emotions, this goal was preferred by those preferring egocentric reasons for hiding the truth, no matter their level. In the same time, those preferring egocentric reasons for hiding the truth, particularly those who preferred the reasons of level 1, did not have preferentially the emotion regulation goal to change the expression of their positive and negative emotions in accordance with the perceived image of others about their person. Those preferring egocentric reasons for hiding the truth, particularly those who preferred the reasons of level 1, rejected as a preferred goal changing their negative emotions in accordance with the will of an important person from their life. They (particularly those preferring the level 2 reasons for hiding the truth) also rejected as a preferred emotion regulation goal to change the expression of a positive or negative emotion in accordance with the will of such a person.

Like those preferring egocentric reasons for hiding the truth, *those preferring altruistic reasons for hiding the truth* had also as a preferred emotion regulation goal to adjust their positive and negative emotions to the social context, especially those preferring the altruistic reasons of level 5. But, unlike them, they had also as a preferred goal to regulate the expression of their negative feelings in order to adjust it to the typical expression for a particular social context. Like those preferring egocentric reasons for hiding the truth of level 1, they, particularly those preferring the altruistic reasons of level 4, had also as a preferred goal to change their positive and negative emotions in accordance with the perceived image of others about their person. The absolute preference for altruistic reasons of hiding the truth of level 5 also tended to correlate positively with the preference for this kind of emotion regulation goals, but the relative preference for altruistic reasons

of hiding the truth of level 5 tended to correlate negatively with it. This result suggests that, in the case of the positive correlation for the reasons of hiding the truth of level 5, a response bias might have been involved. Unlike the participants preferring egocentric reasons for hiding the truth, they had as a preferred goal to change also the expression of their positive emotions and, as a tendency, the expression of their negative emotions in accordance with the perceived image of others about their person. The participants who preferred altruistic reasons for hiding the truth had as a preferred goal to regulate their negative emotions and, as a slight tendency, their expression, so that to be in accordance with the will of an important person from their life. They also had as a goal to change the expression of their positive emotions and negative emotions (in this case, as a tendency, the preference for this goal being significantly correlated with the relative preference for altruistic reasons for hiding the truth) so that not to disturb those around them with it.

The participants who preferred *reasons for hiding the truth in which the altruistic/moral reasons and the egocentric ones are in competition* tended not to prefer as a goal to adjust their positive emotions to the social context, but only their negative emotions. They also only tended to prefer the goal to adjust their positive emotions in accordance with the perceived image of others about their person, whereas for the negative emotions they preferred this goal strongly, at a statistically significant level. Regarding the expression of the emotions, they had only a slight tendency to prefer the goal of changing the expression of their positive emotions in accordance with the will of an important person from their life. So, it seems that this category of participants is rather not inclined to have as an aim in their emotion regulation the adjustment to the social environment, particularly in their emotional expression.

Those preferring approach reasons for hiding the truth had as a preferred emotion regulation goal to adjust their positive and negative emotions to the social context, and tended to aim to make such an adjustment also for the expression of their negative emotions. There occurred a slight tendency in their preference to aim the adjustment of their positive emotions in accordance with the perceived image of others about their person. Also, they only slightly tended to prefer to change the expression of their positive emotions in accordance with the will of an important person from their life. Regarding the expression of their negative emotions, they only tended to avoid their preferential regulation based on the goal to not to disturb those around them with it.

The participants *preferring avoidance reasons for hiding the truth* did not want to preferentially aim to change their positive emotions in accordance with the social context, but tended to have such a goal for their negative emotions. They also only tended to aim preferentially to adjust their negative emotions in accordance with the perceived image of others about their person. Regarding the expression of their emotions, they only tended to have as a preferential goal to change the expression of their positive emotions in accordance with the will of an

important person from their life, and, for the expression of their negative emotions, to change it so that to not be disturbing for those around them.

The highest correlations, bringing the strongest evidence against the null hypothesis, were the following:

- between the preference for the goal *to adjust the positive emotions in accordance with the social context* and the *relative preference for approach* (positive correlation) and *avoidance reasons for hiding the truth* (negative correlation);

- between the preference for the goal *to adjust the negative emotions in accordance with the social context* and the *total score of C5* (tendency to lie, no matter the reason), the *preference for egocentric reasons for hiding the truth*, and the *preference for altruistic reasons for hiding the truth* (all three correlations were positive);

- between the preference for the goal *to adjust the expression of the negative emotions in accordance with the social context* and the preference for the *altruistic reasons to hide the truth of level 5*;

- between the preference for the goal *to adjust the negative emotions in accordance with the perceived image of others about one's own person* and the *preference for the altruistic reason to hide the truth of level 4* (positive correlation), and the *relative preference for the egocentric-altruistic reason to hide the truth of level 3* (positive correlation);

- between the preference for the goal *to adjust the expression of the positive emotions in accordance with the perceived image of others about one's own person* and the *relative preference for the egocentric reasons of level 1* (negative correlation), and the *score for the altruism cluster of C5* (positive correlation);

- between the preference for the goal *to adjust the negative emotions in accordance with the will of an important person from one's own life* and the *relative preference for the egocentric reasons for hiding the truth* (negative correlation), and the *relative preference for egocentric reasons of level 1* (negative correlation);

- between the preference for the goal *to adjust the expression of the positive emotions in accordance with the will of an important person from one's own life* and the *score for the egocentrism cluster of C5* (negative correlation), and the *relative preference for egocentric reasons to hide the truth of level 2* (negative correlation);

- between the preference for the goal *to adjust the expression of the positive and, respectively, negative emotions so that they are not disturbing for other people* and the *relative preference for egocentric reasons for hiding the truth of level 1* (negative correlation);

The general pattern seems to be one in which those who tend to lie, no matter their reasons, have as a general regulative goal for their negative emotions to adjust them to the social context. Only those preferring altruistic and egocentric reasons

for hiding the truth aim to adjust also their positive feelings to the social context or to adjust their emotions to the others' image about them. Those preferring egocentric reasons for hiding the truth were the only ones who were willing to change their emotions to what they perceive to be the typical emotion felt by others for a given situation. So, the prediction that those preferring egocentric reasons of hiding the truth would not prefer at all other-oriented emotion regulation goals was not supported by data. It was supported only for some of the other-oriented emotion regulation goals. Those preferring egocentric reasons may have other-oriented goals from egocentric reasons, as performance emotion regulation goals. In fact, the desire to change one's own emotions to others' image about one's own person or to others' typical emotion for a given situation may be seen to represent a performance emotion regulation goal. Unlike those preferring egocentric reasons for hiding the truth, or those preferring mixed reasons for hiding the truth, those who preferred altruistic reasons for hiding the truth, as predicted, were more willing to adjust their emotions or their expression for the sake of others, i.e., in accordance with the desires of important persons from their life, or to not disturb those around them, and were more willing to adjust also the expression of their emotions to the social context, not only their emotions.

Hypotheses 6, and 3

4. *The relationship of the tendency and reasons for hiding the truth with the autonomous/self-oriented goals in regulating emotions and their expression (items 19 and 30: adjustment to one's own image)*

Those preferring egocentric reasons for hiding the truth tended to have, as predicted, a preference for adjusting their positive emotions to their own image (the association was statistically significant in the case of the participants who preferred egocentric reasons of level 2). In the same time, they tended to avoid preferring that goal to regulate the expression of their positive and negative emotions.

Only those preferring altruistic reasons for hiding the truth of level 4 (and not also those preferring altruistic reasons of hiding the truth of level 5, according to what was hypothesized) tended to have a preference for adjusting their negative emotions to their own image and preferred as a goal the regulation of the expression of their negative emotions so that to be in agreement with their own image. The score for the altruism cluster of C5 also tended to correlate positively with the preference for the goal to regulate the expression of one's own positive emotions in accordance with her/his own image.

The participants preferring reasons for hiding the truth in which the altruistic/moral reasons and the egocentric ones are in competition had as a preferred goal to change their negative emotions and their expression so that they are in accordance with their own image.

Those preferring relatively approach reasons for hiding the truth avoided to have as a preferred goal for the regulation of their negative emotions and their expression the adjustment to their self-image. In the same time, *those preferring relatively avoidance reasons for hiding the truth* had as a preferred goal for the regulation of their negative emotions and their expression the adjustment to their self-image.

So, the general pattern is that those preferring egocentric reasons for hiding the truth aim to adjust only their positive emotions to their personal image. In the same time, those preferring mixed reasons (egocentric in competition with altruistic ones), altruistic reasons for hiding the truth, or avoidance reasons for hiding the truth aim to adjust only the negative emotions and their expression to their own image. It seems that, for those hiding the truth, their self-image is important for regulating their emotions or their expression, but there occurred a difference regarding the emotions that are in their regulatory focus. This conclusion is in partial agreement with the above-mentioned results indicating that, for those preferring egocentric reasons for hiding the truth, the main regulatory problem is with their positive emotions. The importance of one's own image in emotion regulation for those hiding the truth may be understood in the context in which the image of an emotion may be more important for them than the real emotion, i.e., the truth of one's emotional life, no matter the reason for which that image is important (for immoral or moral reasons). These data support in a great measure the initial hypothesis that the preference for the goals that aim to change one's own emotions and their expression in accordance with one's own image should correlate positively with the preference for altruistic reasons for hiding the truth, and negatively with the preference for avoidance reasons for hiding the truth. But data supported also the tentative hypothesis that those preferring egocentric reasons for hiding the truth might also prefer to change their emotions in accordance with their own image, but only in the case of their positive emotions.

Hypotheses 1, and 2

5. *The relationship of the tendency and reasons for hiding the truth with the performance goals in regulating emotions and their expression (items 17, 18, 20 for emotion, and 28, 29, 31 for emotion expression)*

Of the performance goals of QERG, only the preference for the goal of changing one's own negative emotions in accordance with the way most people would feel in a similar context correlated positively, as expected, with the tendency to hide the truth. There was also a tendency toward a positive correlation between the tendency to hide the truth and the preference for the goal of changing one's own positive emotions in accordance with the way most people would feel in a similar context

The absolute or relative preference for altruistic reasons for hiding the truth of level 4 correlated positively instead with the preference for several performance goals of QERG: the goal of adjusting one's own negative emotions to what most people would feel in a similar context, the goal of adjusting one's own positive emotions and their expression, as well as one's own negative emotions to the others' image on the own person. These results are in agreement with the tendencies for a positive correlation between the relative preference for the altruistic reasons of hiding the truth of level 4 and the preference for the performance goals assessed with Measure **B**, and, respectively, between the absolute preference for the altruistic reasons of hiding the truth of level 4 and the preference for the performance-avoidance goals assessed with Measure **B**.

The preference for egocentric reasons of level 3 correlated positively, as expected, only with the preference for the performance goal of regulating one's own negative emotions so that to adjust them to the image of other persons about one's own person, and tended to correlate positively with the preference for two other performance goals from QERG: the desire to regulate one's own positive emotions so that to adjust them to other persons' image about one's own person, and the intention to regulate the expression of one's own positive emotions so that to be in agreement with desires of important persons from one's life.

As expected, the relative preference for egocentric reasons of hiding the truth of level 1 correlated negatively, as in Faiciuc (2020a), in the case of the performance goals assessed with measure **A**, with the preference for the performance goals of QERG to adjust one's own negative emotions and the expression of one's positive and negative emotions to the desires of important persons in one's own life, to adjust the expression of one's own negative emotions to the way most persons would express them in a similar context, and to adjust the expression of one's own positive emotions to the other people's image on the own person. On the other hand, the absolute preference for egocentric reasons of hiding the truth of level 1 correlated positively with the preference for other performance goals of QERG: to adjust one's own negative emotion to what most of the people would feel in a similar context, and to adjust one's own positive and negative emotions to other people's image on the own person. These results have also support in the data obtained in Faiciuc (2020a), where the relative preference for egocentric reasons of hiding the truth of level 1 correlated positively with the relative preference for performance-approach emotion regulation goals of Measure **B**. The absolute preference for the egocentric reasons of hiding the truth of level 2 also correlated or tended to correlate positively with the preference for some of the performance goals of QERG: to adjust one's own positive and negative feelings to the way most people would feel in a similar context, to adjust one's own negative feelings to other people's image about one's own person. In the same time, as in the case of the egocentric reasons of hiding the truth of level 1, the relative preference for the egocentric reasons of hiding the truth of level 2 also correlated or tended to

correlate negatively with the performance goals of QERG to adjust the expression of one's own positive and negative emotions to the desires of the important people from one's own life, and to adjust the expression of one's own positive emotions to other people's image about one's own person. These results were not found in Faiciuc (2020a).

The relative preference for the altruistic reasons of hiding the truth only tended to correlate negatively with the performance goals of QERG, and only for a single case: the goal to regulate one's own positive emotions so that to adjust them to other persons' image about one's own person. For all the other cases of QERG performance goals, its correlation or the correlation of the absolute preference for this kind of reasons for hiding the truth with the preference for them were positive or tended to be positive (such cases were: the goal regulate to one's own negative emotions and their expression so that to be in agreement with desires of important persons from one's own life, the goal of adjusting one's own positive emotion, and the negative emotions and their expression to what most of the people would feel/express in a similar context, the goal of adjusting one's own positive emotions to the other people's image on the own person). These results are in agreement with the results obtained in Faiciuc (2020a), as, in that study, the relative preference for the altruistic reasons of hiding the truth tended to correlate positively with the performance emotion regulation goals assessed with Measure A.

The predicted negative correlation between the relative preference for the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth of level 5 and the preference for performance goals from QERG did not occur. On the contrary, for several performance goals from QERG, that correlation was a positive one, following the same trend presented above.

6. *The relationship of the performance reasons for hiding the truth with the performance goals in regulating emotions and their expression (items 17, 18, 20, 28, 29, 31)*

The predicted positive association between the preference for performance reasons of hiding the truth and the answers to the performance regulation goals for emotions and their expression was obtained only for the goals to change one's own positive emotions, negative emotions, and the expression of the negative emotions in accordance with the way most people would feel/express them in a similar context, and for the goal to change one's own positive emotions in accordance with the other people's image on the own person, mainly in the cases of the performance reasons for hiding truth out of fear of not to be ridiculed, or of not losing one's own reputation. *Many of the obtained correlations regarding this predicted association were highly significant.* The regulation goal for one's own emotions and their expression in accordance with the desires of important persons in one's own life does not seem to be an item indicating a performance motivational orientation.

7. The relationship of the performance reasons for hiding the truth with the cognitive goals in regulating emotions (items 23, 24)

The predicted negative association between the cognitive goals in emotion regulation and the performance reasons for hiding the truth was supported only for the case of the association between the preference for the goal of understanding one's own positive emotions and the reason for hiding the truth out of fear of not being ridiculed. The preference for the cognitive goal to not distinguish between desirable and undesirable emotions was even positively associated with the performance reason for hiding the truth because lying is highly accepted and tolerated in one's community, indicating a general relativistic stance.

The general pattern of results from this study regarding the relationship of the performance and cognitive emotion regulation goals with the various reasons for hiding the truth and the tendency to hide the truth overlaps to a great extent with the pattern of results obtained in Faiciuc (2020a) in this respect, in spite of the notable difference between the instruments for the assessment of the emotion regulation goals. This overlapping can be used as a support for the convergent validity of the two instruments.

Hypothesis 3

The results presented above concerning the relationships between the preference for approach and, respectively, avoidance reasons for hiding the truth and the answers to the QERG items indicate that the predictions made regarding the relationship between these kinds of reasons for hiding the truth and the preference for potentially approach and, respectively, avoidance goals in regulating emotions and their expression were supported only partially by data, especially regarding the avoidance goals. Those preferring avoidance reasons for hiding the truth complained more, indeed, as predicted, about the excessive frequency, duration, and expression of their negative emotions (but not about their excessive intensity). But they did not complain about their deficient expression, and did not want to change their positive emotions so that to be more adequate to the context, but only to change the way they are expressed. These results indicate indirectly a desire to avoid negative emotions and to maintain their positive emotions, but this desire was not translated, as expected, into conscious goals to regulate them in a particular way, so that they to be avoided, with only some exceptions. These exceptions were: the preference for the goal to adjust one's own negative emotions in accordance with other people's image on one's own person, and the avoidance of the cognitive regulation goals regarding their emotions, of changing their positive emotions in accordance with the way most people would feel in a similar situation, and of letting their negative emotions and their expression (as a tendency) as they are. Unexpectedly, this kind of participants preferred also the

goal to change their negative emotions (and their positive emotions, as a tendency) and their expression (as well as the expression of the positive ones, as a tendency) in accordance with their own image, implicitly having in mind their own goals, which was initially considered to be more related with the approach goals. Perhaps this result indicates also an avoidance tendency, both of the negative emotions and of their threat to one's own image. Those preferring approach reasons for hiding the truth, as predicted, complained or tended to complain less about the excessive frequency, duration, and expression of their negative emotions, and more about the deficient expression of their negative emotions, were willing to understand both their negative and positive feelings, and tended to not want to decrease the intensity of their negative feelings, or to change them in accordance with the desires of important persons in their life. These results indicate their tendency to not avoid especially their negative feelings. In the same time, for their positive emotions, they were willing to decrease their duration in case they are undesired (as a tendency), to adjust them to the perceived way of feeling of most people in a similar situation. Unexpectedly, in their case also, this kind of participants did not prefer the goal to change their negative emotions and their expression in accordance with their own image. Still, this result indicates that they are not willing to avoid their negative feelings and, maybe, that they are not considered a threat to their own image. So, this kind of participants may be characterized more by their lesser desire to avoid their negative feelings than by their higher desire to have positive feelings.

These results suggest that the relationship discussed above is more complex than it was expected and that the approach and avoidance meaning of the emotion regulation goals may be not as clear as it was assumed initially. Negative emotions are not necessarily avoided more than the positive emotions, as it was presumed initially, or the avoidance process may not be always a conscious regulatory process, based on a conscious intention. Moreover, the egocentric or altruist orientations of the participants may have had an influence on the expected correlations of the approach and, respectively, avoidance emotions regulation goals and approach and, respectively, avoidance reasons for hiding the truth. In the interpretation of these results, the fact that the approach and avoidance motivational focus was assessed indirectly should be taken into account, too. With a more direct measure, the results may be different.

The relationship of moral competence with one's emotion regulation goals and with the satisfaction with one's own emotions and their regulation

Hypothesis 1

1. *The relationship between moral competence and altruistic regulation goals for emotions and their expression (QERG item 17, for emotions, items 28, 34, for their expression)*

The hypothesis of a positive link between moral competence and the preference for altruistic emotion regulation goals was supported mainly for the case of the moral competence indicated in the workers' dilemma, regrading especially the regulation of the positive emotions and their expression so that to please important people in one's personal life. It was supported also for the negative emotions, but only for *the goal of wanting to regulate their expression so that to not disturb the people around, which correlated positively strongly with the moral competence in the workers' dilemma, and with the global moral competence.*

2. *The relationship between moral orientation and the altruistic regulation goals for emotions and their expression (QERG item 17, for emotions, items 28, 34, for their expression)*

Of the higher levels of moral orientation, the absolute and the relative preference for the level 4 of moral judgment (the law as the main arbiter in moral judgment) correlated the most and the highest positively, as expected, with the preference for the altruistic regulation goals for emotions and their expression: with the preference for the goal to adjust one's positive and negative emotions to please important people in one's personal life, the goal to adjust the expression of one's own negative emotions to please important people in one's personal life, the goal of wanting to regulate the expression of the negative emotions so that to not disturb people from around (in this case as a tendency for the absolute preference, and statistically significant for the relative preference). The relative preference for the level 5 of moral judgment (social contract morality) only tended to correlate positively with the preference for the goal to adjust the expression of one's own negative emotions to please important people in one's personal life. The absolute preference for the highest level of moral judgment (level 6, universal moral principles as the main moral criterion for moral judgment) only tended to correlate with the preference for the goal to adjust one's positive and negative emotions to please important people in one's personal life.

Of the lower levels of moral orientation, the absolute and the relative preference for the level 2 of moral judgment (morality of simple exchange) correlated the most and the highest negatively, as expected, with the preference for altruistic regulation goals for emotions and their expression: with the preference for the goal to adjust the expression of one's own negative emotions to please important people in one's personal life (as a tendency), and for the goal to adjust the expression of one's positive and negative emotions so to not disturb people around. The absolute preference for the level 1 of moral judgment (force as criterion of moral judgment) correlated negatively only with the preference for the goal to adjust the expression of one's positive and negative emotions (in this case, also for the relative preference) so that to not disturb people around. The absolute preference for the level 3 of moral judgment (group cohesion morality) only tended

to correlate negatively with the preference for the goal to adjust the expression of one's own negative emotions (in this case, also for the relative preference) so to not disturb people around.

The preference for the altruistic goal to adjust the expression of one's own negative emotions so to not disturb people around had the correlations with the highest significance level with the global moral competence index, with moral competence index for workers' dilemma, with the absolute and relative preference for the morality of simple exchange (level 2 of moral judgment), and with the relative preference for the morality of law (level 4 of moral judgment). The preference for the altruist goal to adjust one's positive and negative emotions to please important people in one's personal life had a correlation with the highest significance level with the relative preference for the morality of law (level 4 of moral judgment).

3. *The relationship between moral competence and the egocentric regulation goals for emotions and their expression (QERG items 21, 22, 25, for emotions, items 32, 33, 35, for their expression)*

The moral competence index for workers' dilemma correlated negatively, as expected, only with the preference for the egocentric instrumental goal of changing the expression of the negative emotions so that to help the achievement of the personal goals, and tended to correlate negatively with the preference for the goal of letting the expression of the positive emotions as it is. In contrast, the global moral competence index and the moral competence index for the doctor's dilemma correlated negatively, as expected, only with the preference for the goal of letting negative emotions as they are. The global moral competence index tended to correlate negatively also with the goal of changing the expression of the negative emotions so that to help the achievement of the personal goals.

4. *The relationship between moral orientation and the egocentric regulation goals for emotions and their expression (QERG items 21, 22, 25, for emotions, items 32, 33, 35, for their expression)*

Of the lower levels of moral orientation, the absolute and the relative preference for the level 2 of moral judgment (morality of simple exchange) correlated the most and the highest positively, as expected, with the preference for egocentric regulation goals for emotions and their expression: with the preference for the goal of letting negative emotions as they are, for the goal of letting the expression of one's own emotions (both positive and negative) as it is (as a tendency only), and for the goal of changing the negative emotions so that to not impede the achievement of the personal goals (only as a tendency for the relative preference). Unexpectedly, the preference for the level 2 of moral judgment tended to correlate negatively with the goal of letting the positive

emotions as they are, indicating an interest for changing rather the positive emotions than the negative emotions, and a possible problem with the regulation of the positive emotions. It also correlated negatively, unexpectedly, with the egocentric instrumental goal of changing the negative emotions so that to not impede the achievement of the personal goals. The absolute preference for the level 1 of moral judgment (force as criterion of moral judgment) tended to correlate positively, as expected, with the preference for the goal of letting the expression of the negative emotions as it is. Instead, unexpectedly, like in the case of the level 2 of moral judgment, the absolute preference for the level 1 of moral judgment correlated negatively with the egocentric instrumental goal of changing the negative emotions so that to not impede the achievement of the personal goals (only as a tendency for the relative preference), and also, as a tendency, with the goal of changing the negative emotions so that to help the achievement of personal goals. These results suggest that those preferring these levels of moral judgment tend to not see in emotion regulation a means in order to secure the achievement of their personal goals, as it was predicted initially. The preference for the level 3 of moral judgment did not have any significant correlations with the preference for the egocentric emotion regulation goals, maybe because of its transitive status between the lower and the higher levels of moral judgment.

Of the higher levels of moral orientation, the absolute and the relative preference for the level 6 of moral judgment (universal moral principles as the main moral criterion for moral judgment) correlated the most and the highest negatively, as expected, with the preference for the egocentric regulation goals for emotions and their expression: with the goal of letting the expression of the negative emotions as it is (only for the relative preference), with the goal of changing the positive emotions so that to not impede the achievement of personal goals (only for the absolute preference). Unexpectedly, the relative preference for the level 6 of moral judgment tended to correlate positively with the goal of changing the negative emotions so that to not impede the achievement of personal goals. The relative preference for the level 4 of moral judgment (law morality) also correlated unexpectedly positively with the preference for the goal of changing the negative emotions so that to help the achievement of personal goals. The preference for the level 5 of moral judgment (social contract morality) tended to correlate positively, unexpectedly as well, with the preference for the goal of changing the positive emotions so that to help the achievement of personal goals. The latest results indicate that the emotion regulation is used instrumentally rather for personal altruistic purposes than for egocentric purposes. They are in agreement with the above-mentioned data that indicate that the preference for some lower levels of moral judgment tends to be positively associated with the desire to not regulate one's own emotions and their expression, especially in the case of the negative ones.

5. *The relationship between moral competence and the autonomous regulation goals for emotions and their expression (QERG items 16, 19, for emotions, and items 27, 30, for their expression)*

The predictions in this case were not supported by data. The only exception is the tendency of a positive correlation, i.e., in the predicted direction, between the moral competence index for doctor's dilemma and the preference for the goal to change the negative emotions in accordance with one's self-image.

6. *The relationship between moral orientation and the autonomous regulation goals for emotions and their expression (QERG items 16, 19, for emotions, and items 27, 30, for their expression)*

Of the higher levels of moral orientation, the preference for the level 4 and level 5 were associated positively, as predicted, the most with the preference for autonomous regulation goals for emotions and their expression, although, in their case, the association was rather weak. So, the absolute and relative preference for the level 5 of moral judgment (social contract morality) correlated positively with the preference for the goal of changing one's own negative emotions (as a tendency) and their expression in accordance with what one thinks is suited for the perceived context (for the absolute preference). The relative preference for the level 4 of moral judgment (law morality) correlated positively with the preference for the goal of changing one's own negative emotions in accordance with what one thinks is suited for the perceived context (as a tendency), and for the goal of changing the negative emotions in accordance with one's self-image. Unexpectedly, the absolute and relative preference for this kind of moral judgment correlated negatively with the preference for the goal of changing the expression of one's own positive emotions in accordance with one's self-image. Finally, the relative preference for the moral judgment of level 6 (moral judgment based on universal moral principles) only tended to correlate positively, as predicted, with the goal of changing one's own negative emotions in accordance with one's self-image.

In this case too, *the absolute and relative preference for the level 2 of moral judgment* (morality of simple exchange) was associated the most with the discussed autonomous goals. As predicted, as a relative preference, it *correlated negatively with the preference for the goal of changing one's own negative emotions in accordance with what one thinks is suited for the perceived context (a correlation with the highest significance level)*, but it correlated negatively also as an absolute preference with the preference for the goal of changing the expression of the negative emotions in the same way (for the relative preference, only as a tendency). As an absolute preference, it also tended to correlated negatively with the preference for the goal of changing one's own negative emotions in accordance

with one's self-image. On the other hand, unexpectedly, the relative preference for the level 2 of moral judgment tended to correlate positively with the preference for the goals of changing one's own positive emotions and their expression in accordance with one's self-image. This result indicates again that the goal of changing one's own emotions and their expression in accordance with one's self-image may have an ambiguous meaning from a moral point a view.

The relative preference for the moral judgment of level 3 (group cohesion morality) correlated negatively, too, as predicted, with the preference for the goal of changing one's own positive emotions in accordance with one's self-image, but the absolute preference for this kind of moral orientation only tended to correlate negatively with the preference for the same type of emotion regulation goal in the case of the negative emotions. The relative preference for the level 1 of moral judgment (force morality) only tended to correlate negatively, as predicted, with the preference for the goal of changing one's own negative emotions in accordance with what one thinks is suited for the perceived context.

7. The relationship between moral competence and the cognitive emotion regulation goals (QERG items 23, and 24)

The obtained results did not support the hypothesis of a positive association between the moral competence and the preference for the cognitive emotion regulation goals. On the contrary, the moral competence index for the workers' dilemma tended to correlate negatively with the goal of understanding one's own positive and negative emotions, and the moral competence index for the doctor's dilemma tended to correlate negatively with the goal of understanding one's own negative emotions.

8. The relationship between moral orientation and the cognitive emotion regulation goals (QERG items 23, and 24)

In this case, too, the predictions were only partially supported by data. The preference for the level 1 of moral judgment correlated negatively indeed, as predicted, with the preference for the goal of understanding one's own negative emotions, and, as a tendency, with the preference for the goal of understanding one's own positive emotions. The preference for the level 2 of moral judgment, another lower level, tended to correlate also negatively with the preference for the goal of understanding one's own negative emotions. On the other hand, *the preference for the goals of understanding one's negative and positive emotions correlated also negatively, and not positively, as expected, with the absolute preference for the level 5 of moral orientation (social contract morality). In the case of the goal of understanding one's own positive emotions this correlation had the highest significance level.*

For the goal of not wanting to separate between desirable and undesirable emotions, the preference for it also correlated positively, contrary to what was predicted, with the preference for the moral judgment of level 2, and for the moral judgment of level 3, and tended to correlate positively with the relative preference for the level 2 of moral judgment. In contrast, the preference for this cognitive emotion regulation goal tended to correlate negatively, unexpectedly, too, with the relative preference for the level 5, and, respectively, for the level 6 of moral orientation.

These presented data suggest that cognitive emotion regulation goals are not particularly important for those with higher or lower levels of moral competence, or moral orientation. Such goals are rather avoided by those with higher or lower levels of moral competence or moral orientation. In the same time, they are in contradiction with the results obtained regarding the relationship between the preference for these cognitive goals and the egocentric or altruistic reasons for hiding the truth, presented above. Future studies should investigate the reason for which this contradiction occurred.

9. The relationship between moral competence and the heteronomous regulation goals for emotions and their expression (QREG items 18, 20, for emotions, 29, 31, for their expression)

Global moral competence index only tended to correlate negatively, as expected, with the preference for the goal of adjusting one's own negative emotions to the way most people would feel in a similar context. This correlation was mainly due to the negative correlation between the moral competence index in the doctor's dilemma and the preference for this emotion regulation goal. The moral competence index in the doctor's dilemma correlated also negatively, as predicted, with the preference for the goal of adjusting the expression of one's own positive emotions to the way most people would express them in a similar context.

In contrast, contrary to what was predicted, the global moral competence index tended to correlate positively with the preference for the goal of adjusting one's own negative emotions to other people's image on the own person. It is a tendency explained by the unexpected positive correlation of the moral competence index in the doctor's dilemma with this type of emotion regulation goal, and by the tendency toward a positive correlation between of the moral competence index in the workers' dilemma with it. In the same time, the moral competence index in the workers' dilemma correlated also positively, contrary to what was predicted, with the preference for the goal of adjusting one's own negative emotions to other people's image on the own person. It correlated positively, too, with the preference for the goal of adjusting the expression of one's own positive emotions to other people's image on the own person. The moral competence index in the doctor's dilemma tended to correlate also positively the preference for the goal of adjusting

the expression of one's own negative emotions to other people's image on the own person.

The data supported only partially the hypothesis regarding the relationship between moral competence and the preference for the heteronomous regulation goals for emotions and their expression. More data would be needed in order to clarify if some of the considered emotion regulation goals have an ambiguous heteronomous meaning or if moral competence has a heteronomous motivational component that is in contradiction with its theoretical conception. The latter interpretation would be in agreement with the data presented above regarding the weak positive relationship between the moral competence and the preference for autonomous emotion regulation goals. It would be also in agreement with the data obtained by Pohling et al. (2015), cited above, who showed that moral competence index has a positive correlation with the Compliance facet of Agreeableness.

10. *The relationship between moral orientation and the heteronomous regulation goals for emotions and their expression (QREG items 18, 20, for emotions, 29, 31, for their expression)*

The predictions regarding this relationship were supported partially by data, mainly regarding the expected positive relationship between the lower levels of moral orientation and the preference for the heteronomous regulation goals for emotions and their expression. Of these lower levels of moral orientation, the absolute and the *relative preference for the level 2 of moral judgment* (morality of simple exchange) *correlated the most and the highest positively*, as expected, with the preference for heteronomous regulation goals for emotions and their expression: *with the preference for the goal of adjusting one's own positive emotions to the way most of the people would feel in a similar context (with the highest significance for the relative preference)*, for the goal of adjusting one's own negative emotions to the way most people would feel in a similar context (as a tendency), and with the preference for the goal of adjusting one's own positive emotions to other people's image on the own person (as a tendency, too). The absolute preference for the level 1 of moral judgment (force morality) tended to correlate positively also, as expected, with the preference for one heteronomous regulation goal: to adjust the expression of one's own positive emotions or, respectively, negative emotions to other people's image on the own person. The absolute preference for the level 3 of moral judgment (group cohesion morality) also tended to correlate positively, as expected, with the preference for the goal of adjusting one's own positive emotions to the way most of the people would feel in a similar context.

Of the higher levels of moral orientation, the absolute and the relative preference for the level 5 of moral judgment (morality of social contract) correlated the most negatively, as expected, with the preference for heteronomous regulation

goals for emotions and their expression: with the preference for the goal of adjusting one's own positive emotions to the way most of the people would feel in a similar context (for the relative preference), and with the preference for the goal of adjusting the expression of one's own negative emotions to the way most of the people would express them in a similar context. The absolute preference for the level 6 of moral judgment (morality of universal principles) also tended to correlate negatively, as expected, with the preference for the goal of adjusting the expression of one's negative feelings to other people's image on the own person. On the other hand, the absolute preference for the level 5 of moral judgment tended to correlate positively, unexpectedly, with the preference for the goal of adjusting one's own positive emotions to other people's image on the own person. The preference for the level 4 of moral judgment (law morality) also tended to correlate positively, contrary to what was expected, with the preference for the goal of adjusting one's own positive emotions to other people's image on the own person (for the absolute preference), and with the goal of adjusting the expression of one's own negative emotions to the way most of the people would express them in a similar context (for the relative preference).

11. *The link between moral competence and the emotion regulation efficiency*

No relationship was found between the self-reported emotion regulation efficiency (items 37, 38) and moral competence. Moral competence index only tended to correlate positively, as predicted, with one's belief in the controllability of the positive emotions. This tendency was due mainly to the positive correlation between moral competence index for the workers' dilemma and one's belief in the controllability of the positive emotions. The only support for the prediction of a positive association between moral competence and the level of satisfaction with one's own emotions was found in the negative correlation of the moral competence index with the level of dissatisfaction with the deficient intensity of one's own negative emotions, and, respectively, with the level of dissatisfaction with the deficient expression of one's own negative emotions.

The predicted relationship between moral competence and emotion regulation efficiency was supported indirectly by the obtained associations between moral competence and the preferred dimensions on which one aims to change her/his emotions or their expression. They may indicate one's regulatory efforts and confidence in changing the emotions on those dimensions, but also one's regulatory needs. Moral competence index correlated positively, as expected, with the preference for the goal of changing the adequacy to the context of the positive emotions, and tended to correlate positively with the preference for the goal of decreasing the intensity of one's own positive and negative emotions. It is a result in agreement with the negative correlation between the moral competence index and the preference for the goal of letting negative emotions as they are.

The moral competence for the two dilemmas was, in general, differently associated with the level of satisfaction with one's own emotions. The most tendencies toward such an association were obtained for the workers' dilemma, but most of them were in the opposite direction than the expected one. Its moral competence index tended to correlate positively, not negatively, with the level of dissatisfaction with the excessive frequency of one's own negative emotions, and with the level of dissatisfaction with the deficient expression of one's own positive emotions. It only tended to correlate negatively, as predicted, with the level of dissatisfaction with the deficient expression of one's own negative emotions. The moral competence index for doctor's dilemma, instead, tended to correlate negatively, as predicted, with the level of dissatisfaction with the excessive duration of one's own negative emotions, and with the level of dissatisfaction with the deficient expression of one's own negative emotions. These results are agreement with the predicted negative correlation that was obtained between this index and the goal of letting one's own negative emotions as they are. They suggest that a morally competent answer in doctor's dilemma may involve more one's emotion regulation abilities than such an answer in workers' dilemma. *An indirect support for such an interpretation was found in the highly significant positive correlation of the moral competence index in the doctor's dilemma with the preference for the goal of changing the adequacy to the context of the positive emotions*, in its significant positive correlation with the preference for the goal of decreasing the intensity of one's own positive emotions, and in the tendency toward such a positive correlation for the goal of decreasing the intensity of one's own negative emotions. The regulatory effort seems to be focused on the positive emotions. Maybe that is why, the moral competence index in the doctor's dilemma correlated negatively, contrary to what was predicted, with the preference for the goal to make the one's own positive emotions less visible. If positive emotions are regulated, a regulation of their expression would be required in a lesser extent. In the same time, the moral competency index in workers' dilemma only tended slightly to correlate positively with the preference for the goal of decreasing the intensity of one's own negative emotions, and with the preference for the goal of preventing completely the occurrence of the positive emotions. These results suggest that, in workers' dilemma, a morally competent answer may be associated positively with an emotional overregulation or dysregulation, if the dissatisfaction with the excessive frequency of the negative emotions, with the deficient expression of the positive emotions, and the tendency to prevent completely the occurrence of the positive emotions are interpreted to be the consequence of such an overregulation or dysregulation.

12. *The link between moral orientation and the emotion regulation efficiency*

The preference for the *lower levels of the moral orientation* was negatively linked, contrary to what was predicted, with the level of satisfaction with one's own emotions and their expression on some of the investigated aspects: *the*

preference for the level 1 of moral judgment correlated negatively with the dissatisfaction with the excessive frequency of one's own positive and negative emotions (in this case, the correlation was highly significant), with the dissatisfaction with the excessive duration of one's own positive emotions, the preference for the level 2 of moral judgment correlated negatively with the dissatisfaction with the excessive frequency of one's own negative emotions, and the preference for the level 3 of moral judgment tended to correlate negatively with the dissatisfaction with the excessive frequency of one's own negative emotions. Also, the relative preference for the level 1 of moral judgment correlated negatively (highly significantly) with the dissatisfaction with the excessive intensity of one's own positive emotions, with the dissatisfaction with the excessive duration of one's own positive emotions, tended to correlate negatively with the dissatisfaction with the excessive frequency of one's own negative emotions, and with the dissatisfaction with excessive expression of one's own positive emotions. The relative preference for the level 3 of moral judgment tended to correlate negatively with the dissatisfaction with the deficient intensity of one's own positive emotions, too. These results cannot be put in a clear correspondence with one's desire to regulate their emotions, as only the preference for the level 2 of moral judgment tended to correlate positively with the goal of letting one's own negative emotions as they are (for the relative preference, the correspondent correlation was even statistically significant), but it also tended to correlate negatively with the goal of letting one's own positive emotions as they are. They can be put in correspondence instead with the obtained positive correlation of the preference for the level 1 of moral judgment with the belief in the controllability of the negative emotions (for the relative preference, there was only a tendency for such a correlation), which suggest that those preferring this level of moral judgment may have better abilities in regulation their negative emotions. It is a result in accordance with a similar finding from Faiciuc (2020a), where the preference for egocentric reasons for hiding the truth was associated negatively with the dysregulation of the negative emotions. The lower level of dissatisfaction with some aspects of one's own emotions and their expression of those preferring lower levels of moral judgment can be put in correspondence also with their preferred dimensions in regulating their emotions and the emotional expression. The results indicate that the preference for all the three lower levels of moral judgment correlated positively, contrary to what was expected, with the goal of wanting to eliminate completely the already occurred positive emotions (the correspondent correlation was highly significant in the case of the level 2 of moral judgment), that the preference for the level 2, and level 3 of moral judgment correlated also positively with the goal of wanting to eliminate completely the already occurred negative emotions (the correspondent correlation was highly significant in the case of the level 3 of moral judgment), and that the preference for the level 2 of moral judgment correlated positively with the goal of making the positive emotions less

visible. The preference for the level 1 of moral judgment tended to correlate also positively with the hedonic goal of wanting the change negative emotions into positive ones. These unexpected positive correlations may be indicative of the preference for a suppressive regulatory style in the case of those preferring lower levels of moral orientations. In the same time, they should be taken into consideration with caution, as linked with a response bias, because they disappear almost completely when the relative preference for the lower levels of moral judgment is associated with the preference for the above-mentioned emotion regulation goals. In this case, only a tendency for a positive correlation between the relative preference for the level 2 of moral judgment and the goal of wanting to eliminate completely the already occurred negative emotions was found. Future research should investigate the nature of such a response bias and its relationship with the emotion regulation goals. It may be that the unexpected positive correlations mentioned above are the consequence of the same response bias occurring for the answers of the two instruments. Such a response bias may be an agreement bias, maybe combined with an extreme response bias.

In the same time, the preference for the level 3 of moral judgment correlated positively, as expected, with the dissatisfaction with the deficient intensity of the negative emotions (a correlation that occurred for the relative preference for this level of moral judgment). The preference for the level 2 of moral judgment correlated also positively with the level of dissatisfaction with the deficient duration of the positive emotions (as a tendency), and of the negative emotions (a correlation that occurred also in the case of the relative preference for this level of moral judgment). The above-mentioned results regarding the level 2 of moral judgment are in agreement with the expected negative correlation that was obtained (as a tendency) between the preference for this level of moral judgment and the self-reported efficiency in the regulation of the expression of one's own positive emotions, as deficient positive emotions can lead to a deficiency in their expression. However, this result may be accidental or linked with a response bias, because this tendency for a negative association did not occur in the case of the relative preference for the level 2 of moral judgment. The correlations computed with the relative preference for the lower levels of moral judgment offer more support for the initial predictions, especially for the case of the level 3 of moral judgment. *The relative preference for the level 3 of moral judgment correlated positively*, as predicted, with some additional aspects of dissatisfaction with one's own emotions and their expression: *with the dissatisfaction with the excessive frequency of one's own positive emotions (highly significantly)*, but also with the dissatisfaction with the deficient frequency of one's negative and positive emotions, and, as a tendency, with the dissatisfaction with the excessive expression of one's positive and negative emotions. The relative preference for the level 2 of moral judgment correlated positively, as predicted, additionally with the dissatisfaction with the way the negative emotions are expressed, and tended to

correlate negatively with the dissatisfaction with the deficient intensity of one's own negative emotions. The relative preference for the level 1 of moral judgment only tended to correlate positively with the deficient intensity of the negative emotions. The dissatisfaction with the deficient intensity of the negative emotions seems to be a common complain for those preferring lower levels of moral judgments, which may be an additional sign for a more suppressive regulatory style for their negative emotions. It is a distinctive sign, because for those relatively preferring higher levels of moral judgment, as it will be seen below, the correspondent association is a negative one. The above-mentioned results suggest also that the relative preference for moral judgments of level 3 may be the associated positively the most with the emotional dysregulation. It is a conclusion in agreement by the predicted negative correlations obtained between the relative and absolute preference for the level 3 of moral judgment and the self-reported efficiency in the regulation of one's own emotions and their expression (see below).

The prediction regarding a lower self-reported efficiency in the regulation of one's own emotions and their expression for those preferring lower levels of the moral judgment was supported by data only in the case of the negative correlation of the preference of the level 3 of moral judgment with the self-reported efficiency in the regulation of the negative emotions (as a tendency, for the relative preference for this level of moral judgment), with the self-reported efficiency in the regulation of the expression of the negative (as a tendency, but, in the case of the relative preference, the correspondent correlation is statistically significant) and positive emotions (for the relative preference, the correspondent correlation occurs only as a tendency). It was also in agreement with the tendency toward a negative correlation of the preference for the level 2 of moral judgment with the self-reported efficiency in the regulation of the expression of the positive emotions. In contrast, the relative preference for the level 2 of moral judgment correlated positively, unexpectedly, with the self-reported efficiency in the regulation of the expression of the negative emotions. The relative preference for the level 1 of moral judgment correlated positively, also unexpectedly, with the self-reported efficiency in the regulation of the positive emotions (for the absolute preference, the correspondent correlation occurred as a tendency).

The initial prediction regarding a positive link between emotional dysregulation and the preference for the lower levels of moral judgment was supported also indirectly by some of the data regarding the preferred dimensions on which one aims to regulate her/his emotions and their expression. So, *the preference for the level 2 of moral judgment* correlated negatively, as expected, with the preference for the goal of adjusting the expression of one's own negative emotions to the perceived context (which occurred only as a tendency in the case of the relative preference for this level of moral judgment), and *tended to correlate also negatively with the preference for the goal of adjusting one's own negative emotions to the perceived context* (the correspondent correlation was, instead,

highly significant in the case of the relative preference for this level of moral judgment), indicating a preference for a less differentiated regulatory style for one's own negative emotions and their expression (which is concordant with the above-mentioned suppressive style). The absolute and relative preference for the level 1 of moral judgment tended to correlate negatively with the preference for the goal of wanting the decrease the duration of the negative feelings. Also, the relative preference for this kind of moral judgment tended to correlate negatively with the preference for the goal of totally preventing the occurrence of the positive emotions, and with the preference for the goal of adjusting one's own negative emotions to the perceived context. Additionally, the relative preference for the level 3 of moral judgment correlated negatively with the goal of changing one's own negative emotions into positive ones.

With some exceptions, the preference for the *higher levels of the moral orientation* was negatively linked, as predicted, with the level of satisfaction with one's own emotions and their expression on some of the investigated aspects. For *the absolute and relative preference for the level 6 of moral judgment*, no positive correlation or tendency toward such a correlation occurred in this respect. It *correlated negatively* with the dissatisfaction with the deficient intensity of the negative emotions (as a tendency, for the absolute preference, and significantly, for the relative preference), *with the dissatisfaction with the excessive frequency of the positive emotions* (as a tendency, for the relative preference, and *highly significantly, for the absolute preference*), *with the dissatisfaction with the deficient frequency of the positive emotions* (*highly significantly, for the relative preference*), and of the negative emotions (as a tendency, for the relative preference), with the dissatisfaction for the excessive duration of the positive emotions (no correlation occurred for the relative preference), with the dissatisfaction for the deficient duration of the negative emotions (as a tendency), with the dissatisfaction of the excessive expression of the positive emotions (no correlation occurred for the relative preference).

The absolute and relative preference for the level 5 of moral judgment correlated negatively with the dissatisfaction with the excessive frequency of the positive emotions (as a tendency, for the relative preference), with the dissatisfaction with the deficient frequency of the positive emotions (as a tendency only, and no correlation for the relative preference), with the dissatisfaction with the deficient duration of the positive emotions (only for the relative preference), with the dissatisfaction with the deficient expression of the positive emotions (only for the relative preference), with the dissatisfaction with the deficient expression of the positive emotions (as a tendency), with the dissatisfaction with the way positive (only for the relative preference) and negative (only as a tendency, and solely for the relative preference) emotions are expressed. But the absolute preference for the level 5 of moral judgment correlated also positively, unexpectedly, with the dissatisfaction with the excessive intensity of one's own positive emotions.

The absolute and relative preference for the level 4 of moral judgment correlated negatively with the dissatisfaction with the excessive intensity of the negative emotions (as a tendency, only for the absolute preference), with the dissatisfaction with the deficient intensity of the negative emotions (only for the relative preference), with the dissatisfaction with the excessive frequency of the positive emotions (as a tendency, only for the absolute preference), with dissatisfaction with the excessive duration of the positive emotions (as a tendency, only for the absolute preference), with the dissatisfaction with the excessive expression of the negative emotions. But *the absolute and relative preference for the level 4 of moral judgment correlated also positively with dissatisfaction with the deficient expression of the positive emotions (for the relative preference, the correlation was highly significant)*. The relative preference for this level of moral judgment tended to correlate positively, too, with the dissatisfaction with the deficient intensity of the positive emotions.

This pattern of results suggests a progressive increase of the level of satisfaction with one's own emotions and their expression with the progressive increase of the preferred level of higher moral judgment. This conclusion is supported also by the fact that only the relative preference for the highest level of moral judgment (level 6) correlated negatively with goal of letting the expression of the negative emotions as it is, indicating the highest regulatory motivation in this respect. It is also partially supported by a progression similar with the one described above regarding the number of dimensions considered as preferred emotion regulation targets that were positively associated with the preference for a higher level of moral judgment. So, the absolute and relative preference for the level 6 of moral judgment correlated positively, as predicted, with the preference for the goal of totally preventing the occurrence of the positive emotions (as a tendency), for the goal to completely eliminate the undesirable positive emotions (only for the absolute preference), for the goal to completely eliminate the undesirable negative emotions (only for the absolute preference, as a tendency), and for the goal of making the positive emotions less visible (only for the absolute preference). There were no unexpected negative correlations in this case. The absolute and relative preference for the level 5 of moral judgment correlated positively, as predicted, with the preference for the goal of totally preventing the occurrence of the positive emotions (only for the absolute preference), for the goal to completely eliminate the undesirable positive emotions (as a tendency, and only for the absolute preference), for the goal of changing the adequacy to the context of the negative emotions (as a tendency, and only for the absolute preference), for the goal of making the positive emotions less visible (as a tendency, and only for the absolute preference), and for the goal of adjusting the expression of the negative emotions to the context (only for the relative preference). But the relative preference for the level 5 of the moral judgment correlated also negatively, unexpectedly, with the goal to completely eliminate the undesirable positive

emotions, suggesting that the preference for this level of moral judgment may be positively associated with a less suppressive regulatory style. Finally, the absolute and relative preference for the level 4 of moral judgment correlated positively, as predicted, with the preference for the goal to completely eliminate the undesirable negative emotions (only for the absolute preference), for the goal of making the positive emotions less visible (as a tendency, and only for the absolute preference), for the goal of adjusting the positive emotions to the context (as a tendency and only for the relative preference), and for the goal of adjusting the negative emotions to the context (as a tendency, and only for the relative preference). The positive associations between the absolute preference for the three higher levels of moral judgment and the preference for the goal to completely eliminate undesirable positive emotions should be taken into consideration with caution, as mentioned above for the correspondent associations with the absolute preference for the lower levels of moral judgment. In this case, too, those associations disappeared when the relative preference for the higher levels of moral judgment was considered, suggesting that, in this case also, a response bias of the type mentioned above may have been involved.

The results regarding the link between the self-reported efficiency and the preference for the higher level of the moral judgment were not the predicted ones. On the contrary, a tendency toward a negative correlation between the absolute and relative preference for the level 6 of moral judgment and the self-reported efficiency in the regulation of the positive emotions occurred, when a positive correlation was predicted. This result, if not accidental, may seem in contradiction with the above-mentioned data that indicate that those preferring this level of moral judgment may have the highest level of satisfaction with their emotions, inclusively with their positive ones. But for the case of the positive emotions, when the relative preference is considered, the data indicate that those preferring the level 5 of moral judgment have higher levels of satisfaction with them than those preferring the level 6 of moral judgment. This result is in agreement with fact that only those absolutely or relatively preferring the level 5 of moral judgment believe or, respectively, tend to believe that positive emotions are controllable. Moreover, it may be that their satisfaction with their positive emotions is the result of unconscious regulatory processes, and not of their conscious regulatory efforts that were assessed predominantly with QERG.

Although the absolute and relative preference for the level 4 of moral judgment correlated or, respectively, tended to correlate positively with the belief in the controllability of the negative emotions, as predicted, the result is apparently in contradiction with the self-reported level of satisfaction with one's own negative emotions, with the self-reported efficiency in their regulation, and with the self-reported motivation to change them. If it is not an accidental result, it is a case that indicates that the belief in controllability of an emotion is not directly linked with one's efficiency in controlling it.

Despite the numerous unexpected results, globally speaking, the data suggest that the general level of satisfaction with one's own emotions and their expression may be higher for those preferring higher levels of moral judgment than the one of those preferring lower levels of moral judgment. They also indicate that the emotion regulation profile may be different depending on the preferred level of moral judgment. As a novelty, they also underline the importance of the regulation goals for the positive emotions both for those preferring lower levels and higher levels of moral judgment, but from a different perspective in each case. So, the different profiles regarding the regulation of one's own emotions and their expression that are associated with different levels of moral orientation/judgment or competence may vary also depending on the emotional valence and maybe on the meaning of the regulated emotions. It is notable the fact that some of the regulatory goals for one's own emotions and their expression were shared by those preferring higher levels of moral orientation and those preferring lower levels of moral orientation. Future studies on larger samples, with improved instruments, should investigate more the obtained associations and their stability. They should be viewed only as starting points for further empirical studies.

The fact that the emotion regulation profile for the two dilemmas is different is also notable. It is a result that may be liked with the different emotion regulation demands imposed by their different content. In the workers' dilemma, helping some workers is pitted against breaking some rules or laws, and not against the harm made to another person. In contrast, in the doctor's dilemma, it is unclear the moral benefit in alleviating the suffering of a person through assisted suicide (as it also means to take her/his life), and, in the same time, this help is pitted against a possible harm caused to the doctor who assists the suicide. So, apart from the stronger conflict with a social norm that may have a more powerful social backup than the broken law/rule from the workers' dilemma, the emotional conflict may more intense in the doctor's dilemma than in the workers' dilemma, especially regarding the positive emotion of compassion. Future investigations should clarify how these differences are linked with the obtained emotion regulation profile.

Given the correlations between the MCT scores and the C5 scores obtained in Faiciuc (2020a), a general analysis will be made regarding the correspondence of the associations with the QERG items of the two above-mentioned instruments (MCT and C5).

In Faiciuc (2020a), the relative preference for the moral reasons of level 6 tended to correlate positively with the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth, and correlated positively with the avoidance reasons for hiding the truth. Moral competence index also correlated positively with the relative preference for the moral reasons of level 6, with the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth, and with the avoidance reasons for hiding the truth. In Faiciuc (2016a, 2020a), moral competence index correlated positively also with the altruistic reasons for hiding the truth of level 4. Both those preferring the level 6 of moral judgment and those

preferring altruistic reasons for hiding the truth were generally satisfied with their emotions. *Those with a higher moral competence index stand out through their tendency to prefer the goal through which the intensity of the negative emotions is downregulated and through their preference for the goal to adjust the positive emotions to the context.* Such preferences did not occur for those relatively preferring moral arguments of the highest kind (level 6), nor for those preferring altruistic reasons for hiding the truth, and neither for those preferring avoidance reasons for hiding the truth. Those preferring altruistic reasons for hiding the truth of level 4 shared with them only the preference for the goal to decrease the intensity of the unwanted positive emotions, their focus being instead on the adjustment of the expression of the negative emotions to the context. It is an important result, which supports the initial hypothesis that moral competence, as measured with MCT, in comparison with moral orientation, is specifically linked with one's desire and ability to control one's own emotions. Maybe the obtained result could be linked, also, with a higher ability to be aware of one's emotion regulation process, of its goals, with a higher introspective and goal monitoring ability. This result is also in agreement with the data regarding the positive association of emotion regulation with empathy and perspective taking obtained by Eisenberg et al. (1994), although empathy and perspective taking are only indirectly linked with the moral competence, as noted also by Decety and Batson (2009; they note that "empathy-induced altruism does not necessarily produce moral behavior", as "an altruistic desire to benefit another may lead me to unfairly put that person's needs and interests in front of the parallel needs and interests of others.", p. 122) and empirically supported by Batson, Klein, Highberger, and Shaw (1995). *The shared preferred goal of those with higher moral competence index with those preferring altruistic reasons for hiding the truth, particularly of level 4, and with those preferring avoidance reasons for hiding the truth was to adjust the expression of one's own emotions so that to not disturb the people around: the expression of the positive emotions with those preferring altruistic reasons for hiding the truth, and the expression of the negative emotions for those preferring reasons for hiding the truth of level 4, and avoidance reasons for hiding the truth.*

Also in Faiciuc (2020a), the relative preference for the moral arguments of level 1 correlated positively with the relative preference for the reasons of hiding the truth of level 1, whereas the relative preference for the moral arguments of level 2 correlated positively with the relative preference for the reasons of hiding the truth of level 2, with the score of the cluster for egocentric reasons for hiding the truth, and with the approach reasons for hiding the truth. *In the present study, those preferring relatively the moral arguments of level 2, the reasons of hiding the truth of level 2, the egocentric reasons for hiding the truth, and the approach reasons for hiding the truth shared the preference for the self-reported regulative goal to let their negative emotions the way they are (for the preference for the reasons of hiding the truth of level 2, only as a tendency), and the reluctance to*

prefer the goal to adjust the expression of their negative emotions so that to not disturb the people around (for the approach reasons of hiding the truth, only as a very slight tendency: $p = .106$, but using the bootstrap method, $p = -.291$, $p = .089$, $N = 23$, with a 95% CI: $[-.796, .254]$). The last result is in agreement with the above-mentioned data regarding the shared goal for those with higher moral competence, orientation, and preference for altruistic and avoidance reasons of hiding the truth. *Those preferring the moral arguments of level 1, and the reasons of hiding the truth of level 1 shared also the reluctance to prefer the goal to adjust the expression of their positive emotions so that to not disturb the people around. Those preferring relatively the moral arguments of level 2 shared with those preferring egocentric reasons for hiding the truth the satisfaction with their efficiency in the regulation of the expression of their negative emotions.*

Future studies should investigate the stability of the results of this pilot research (that is why they were not explained here in depth), which may have been accidental, given the small, and rather demographically homogenous sample of participants that completed all the instruments. Such future studies should extend the set of the instruments through which the relationship between the moral aspects of one's life and the various aspects of one's emotion regulation, particularly one's emotion regulation goals, is investigated. The QERG instrument can be improved, based on the results obtained in the present research, by including more items (e.g., upregulation goals), and by changing their formulation (in those cases in which it is ambiguous). The future research should be extended also with experimental studies in order to explore the causal relationships of the associated variables from the present paper, and to overcome the major issue of their self-reported assessment. These experimental studies should take into account the cautionary note of Higgins (1996), in the general case, and of de Hooze, Zeelenberg and Breugelmans (2011), in the case of the prosocial and pro-self goals, that the "situational activation of a goal only affects behavior of people for whom that goal is not already chronically activated" (de Hooze et al., 2011, p. 199). The future investigations should explore as well the relationship between the explicit, conscious, emotion regulation, which was investigated here through the self-reported emotion regulation goals, and the implicit, unconscious, emotion regulation (e.g., Braunstein, Gross & Ochsner, 2017; De Klerk, 2017; Hopp, Troy & Mauss, 2011; Williams, Bargh, Nocera, & Gray 2009). The implicit emotion regulation could explain some of the obtained results, especially those regarding the unexpected associations of one's level of satisfaction concerning the various aspects of her/his emotions with her/his self-reported level of efficiency in their regulation, as well as with the self-reported conscious efforts and goals for regulated them. One's moral profile may be associated also with a characteristic implicit emotion regulation, not only with a characteristic explicit emotion regulation. One's implicit theories on emotion may be related to the implicit emotion regulation. They may have an influence on one's emotion regulation goals. As Livingstone (2012) suggests, entity emotion theorists

would tend to have performance emotion regulation goals, whereas incremental emotion theorists would tend to have learning emotion regulation goals. Future studies should also take into account the role played by the cultural aspect in shaping one's emotion regulation goals, as suggested by the data obtained by Tsai, Knutson & Fung (2006). They indicated that individualistic cultural contexts promote the goal of having high arousal positive emotional states, whereas collectivistic cultural contexts promote the goal of having low-arousal positive emotional states. Likewise, Eid and Diener (2001) documented that, in collectivistic cultures, guilt is valued more, and pride less, whereas, in the individualistic ones, pride is valued more, and guilt less. Furthermore, Tamir and Mauss (2011) cite data indicating that cultures may differ also regarding the level of intensity with which emotions are allowed to be experienced, as European-American participants report valuing emotions more than Asian-American participants. It is possible that having at an individual level the correspondent values linked with the two kinds of cultural contexts, no matter the cultural context, to have the same influence, as indicated by the studies of Myyrya et al. (2010), and Pohling et al. (2015). Also the data obtained in the present research can be put in correspondence to the cited data regarding cultural differences, as they suggest that people preferring egocentric goals/values in hiding the truth (linked with individualist cultures) have a different emotion regulation profile than those preferring altruistic reasons for hiding the truth. They seem to be in general more dissatisfied with their emotions, but, in the same time, some of them want to regulate them less in comparison with those preferring altruistic reasons for hiding the truth.

Larger and more heterogenous samples in the future research would allow also the analysis of the role played by gender, level of education, or other relevant demographic variables in the relationship between one's moral life and the emotion regulation goals, as well as more complex data analysis procedures.

Although the self-reported measures might represent a limitation of the present research, especially regarding the assessment of the tendency to hide the truth, past studies have shown that self-report tools may be suitable for the deception assessment, as the self-reported answers have been shown to agree with the real-life dishonesty (see Halevy et al., 2013; Makowski et al., 2021).

In spite of the many limitations of the presented investigation, its results still indicate, in the first place, that there is a relationship between one's moral life and the way she/he regulates consciously her/his emotions and their expression. In other words, they indicate that it is possible to establish a profile of preferred emotion regulation goals associated with certain moral behaviors, values, and judgments, that there are some shared emotion regulations goals for those with a certain moral profile assessed with instruments investigating different aspects of

the moral life, and that the positive and negative valence of the emotions is important in this respect. Besides the theoretical importance, such emotion regulation profiles and shared emotion regulation goals could be pragmatically useful from a psychotherapeutic point of view (e.g., to adjust the therapeutic goals regarding emotion regulation to one's moral profile), and also from a psychometric point of view: the preferred emotion regulation goals could be used to assess indirectly one's moral life, with a lower influence of the social desirability bias in the respondents' answers. Finally, also from a psychometric point of view, the presented results can be useful in the investigation of the convergent validity of the instruments included in the present research..

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