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BEING AND THOUGHT IN HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC: FROM TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM TO HEGEL'S METAPHYSICS

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Abstract: *BEING AND THOUGHT IN HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC: FROM TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM TO HEGEL'S METAPHYSICS.* The aim of this article is to produce a portrait of the relationship between being and thought in Hegel's Science of Logic, in conjunction with understanding this relationship as a necessary key in order to frame its ambitions as either transcendental or ontological in scope. In a transcendental thesis, the categories are determinative functions of the form of self-consciousness as thought, while in the latter they are forms of thought but also of being. Our thesis assumes the fact that the first movement of the system is not the dialectical movement of being into nothingness and vice versa as becoming, but rather a transcendental deduction contained within the privileged relationship between logic and ontology without which the system cannot move as a metaphysical deduction. We have also found fecund to our endeavor the framing of the earlier mentioned problem in the larger history of German idealism, especially Kant, proposing a destructuring of the portrait of the identity of being and thought as it appears in the critical system around three main actors: the-thing-in-itself, the categories and their deduction.

Keywords: Hegel, Kant, Being, Thought, Metaphysics, Ontology, Logic, Deduction, Categories, Transcendental, Idealism.

INTRODUCTION

One of the defining ambitions of German idealism was the grounding of knowledge. The privileged lecture key, in our opinion, for the engagement with the aforementioned problem remains that of the identity of thought and being, or more precisely, of logic and ontology. The ambition of Hegel's Logic, of producing a *morphology of thought*¹ from the indeterminate and unmediated being, through its own immanent movement, includes from the very beginning (as a architectonical consequence of the Hegelian project itself), the *transcendental wound*² of a particular instantiation of the identity of being and thought.

¹ In the etymological sense, the *logos* of *morphē*, the science of the forms of thought.

² As *critical debt* created in method in the moment of an epistemological assumption.

The Logic's architectonic is specific insofar as its method is defined by not beginning with the claim of having any presupposed initial access to one, more precisely the architectonical exigency is more clearly described as the one of a radical presuppositionless beginning, therefore understanding itself as a supposition without presupposition. The Logic cannot investigate itself as an object, assuming from the outset its own internal coherence as a condition of possibility of the investigation method, in other words, it is impossible to approach the object with a method that must be its own consequence, it is impossible to clearly see my own eyes with the sight that they themselves produce, if what I want to see is a clear depiction of the structure of my sight.

It is also wrong to read such an architectonical attitude towards method as the requirement of an approach to a specific *something* towards the Logic aims to move towards, in the context in which the purpose would again represent herein another presupposition that would parasitize the project of an presuppositionless stance, to this extent the Logic is a "presuppositionless philosophy [that] is radically nonteleological"³.

We therefore have an architectonic that is structured around the tyranny of an object (understood as the morphology of thought) that must produce its own method, tyranny responsible for the production of the concept's immanent movement towards its own complexity (without teleology) with the condition that that system must begin (or more precisely to *start its movement*, that ultimately proves itself to be circular, where the very idea of a beginning architectonically paralyzes into a circular movement the diameter of which is of complexity and not of discursive history of the concept) from an apodictic ground in its presuppositionless, that is, more precisely, from the undifferentiated and indeterminate being of thought.

This initial contact between thought and being is explicitly what we have in mind when beginning this effort as an engagement with the transcendental wound of this specific instantiation of the relationship between Logic and Ontology that starts with the immanent movement of the thought of pure being with which the Logic intends beginning. This obscurity, of what we consider being the first true movement of the Logic and not the dialectical collapse of pure being into nothingness as becoming and *vice versa*, is what produces two distinct versions through which we can address its system.

The first version implies a transcendental attitude of the system in which the categories produced by the dialectical movement of pure being are determinative functions of the form of self-consciousness as thought (the Hegel of Robert Pippin or Fichte), while the latter presupposes a transcendental Hegel that is also ontological, in which the categories are both forms of thought as well as being (the Hegel of Stephen Houlgate or André Doz), thus employing a post-Kantian thesis of

³ Stephen Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel's Logic*, Purdue University Press, West Lafayette 2006, p. 51.

the identity of logic and being. We will call alongside Houlgate the first version *the transcendental thesis of the Logic* and the second *the ontological thesis* (which, obviously, we can already see, contains in itself the first thesis).

Therefore, this specific instantiation of the relation between logic and ontology can now be transformed, in relation to the Science of Logic, into the question regarding the legitimate sovereignty of its categories. More precisely, we consider that the interrogation of their applicability, towards determining whether they apply to being and thought or just to the latter, can serve us as *syntax*⁴ for the interrogation of the tension between being and thought, understood as the central thesis of the system's first movement and therefore as the entire legitimacy of its efforts. An analysis of Logic in all its complexity cannot be done without a clear and explicit idea of this initial movement.

We also consider that an approach to the above mentioned problem, although possible in its own terms, has much to gain if it is localized as a moment of the larger project and history of German idealism. More concretely, we consider that we can instantiate our problem as a corroboration between the problem of the legitimacy of categories with the manner in which the Hegelian position regarding the relationship between Logic and Ontology is related to, and to a certain extent is a consequence of, the Kantian position of transcendental idealism.

The Critique of Pure Reason, as opposed to the Logic, understands itself from the outset as a teleological endeavour whose purpose is to establish the possibility of metaphysics as a science. One can argue that critical epistemology does not at any point imply an explicit engagement with the relationship we are interested in, it rather just presupposing a critical constraint of knowledge claims to the register of possible experience.

However, although Kantian epistemology has the structure of limiting metaphysical claims to the authority of understanding, as categorical informing of experience, thus sacrificing to an extent the claims of reason in the name of a now proven pure informing undertaken by this transcendental activity, but of understanding only, we still consider that such a project implicitly and necessarily produces a clear thesis of the engagement between Logic and Ontology, or, in a terminology closer to Kant, of the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity, i.e. of the subject-object divide.

In order to interrogate the position in the critical system of the previously mentioned relationship, we consider that it is sufficient and legitimate to articulate the manner in which it initially emerges from the concept of the thing-in-itself, followed by the relationship of pure concepts with objective experience, and finally the manner in which the necessity of their transcendental activity is *deduced*⁵.

⁴ i.e. the rules of combination

⁵ In the specific sense of the term *Deduktion*, to which we will later return.

We thus consider that the first movement of the Logic is not the dialectical collapse of pure being into nothingness as becoming. Rather, we consider it to be the tension between being and thought, a tension that can be opened up and questioned by instantiating it in the form of the problem regarding the legitimate sovereignty of its pure concepts, a process corroborated with the manner in which the relationship moves towards its Hegelian terms in the scene of German idealism, a movement that, we consider, can be depicted through the contrast with the Kantian depiction of the identity of subjectivity and objectivity.

Such an effort therefore requires three moments. The first is addressed to the recovery of the Kantian thesis through addressing the three central terms it is a consequence of (the-thing-in-itself, categories and their deduction), followed by the phrasing of its shift towards the terms of the Logic, a movement at the end of which we hope to capture the framework of the tension between logic and ontology opened by the very idea of such a radically presuppositionless beginning understood as the immediate and indeterminate thought of being.

LOGIC AND ONTOLOGY IN KANT'S EPISTEMOLOGY

Our effort aims to begin with the bet according to which the Hegelian thesis of the relationship between being and thought can be opened up to questioning if we initially follow it as the process of its displacement from its Kantian tradition. The manner in which such a questioning can take place, we have argued, should be the engagement with Hegel's critique of the three main anchors on which the critical position regarding the identity of being and thought rests upon.

We will therefore assume the first task of engaging with, alongside Hegel, the critique of the thing-in-itself as a *monstrous*⁶ product of pure abstraction. This will be followed by the critique of the Kantian metaphysical deduction that is understood as dogmatically containing a presupposition of elements belonging to formal logic that is critically inconsistent with the task of a pure transcendental logic. And, finally, the problem of the sovereignty of pure concepts that, in the Logic's system, as Hegel's *Encyclopaedia* stated, are understood as nothing more than the "definitions of the absolute"⁷.

The ambitions of this moment will, therefore, be achieved through the clarification of the manner in which these three movements of the critical system produce a thesis on the relation between subjectivity and objectivity, and the manner in which the Logic, adopting distinct position for each case, following the architectonical necessity of a "clean start", begins with a totally different thesis of the relationship.

⁶ In the etymological sense, as something that is unnatural.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 239

We propose the distance thus emerged between the two theses as a privileged framework in which we can then transform the question into one related to the sovereignty of pure concepts, the consequence of which, we hope, may be the legitimacy of the possibility of articulating a clear formula of the Logic's position regarding its ontological character as the first movement of the system, thus achieving the ambition of this effort.

Before approaching the initial problem of the thing-in-itself, we consider ourselves obligated to briefly articulate the idea of the project of transcendental philosophy, an idea in the lack of which the interrogation of the three aforementioned moments would be nothing more than the unclear elements of an omitted whole. Whereas, in the case of an architectonic such as the one found in the first critique, in which the whole makes no sense without the part and *vice-versa*, we require the positioning of these three problems in the idea of the whole. This process is also necessary for the clarity of our argument, according to which these problems are sufficient for the articulation of the Kantian thesis of the identity of being and thought, this also being the reason why we consider the Hegelian critique to be orbiting around them.

The Kantian bet argues for the thesis according to which, firstly, the possibility of metaphysics can be argued for in the form of a singular problem, more precisely, the one of adding, in a judgment, a predicate to a subject in which it is not contained through a synthesis that does not rest on experience, or, in other words, the possibility of a priori synthetic judgements. Such a possibility is provable if it is possible to decouple the experience of a Subject⁸ from the external cause *in itself* of its production, a decoupling that permits the informing of the first by a series of necessary structures of the Subject's ability to firstly be able to read it as experience.

If we can prove that what is informed (as a consequence of something that *is*) is distinct from that which produces the matter of informing (the something that *is*), and that the forms of this process belong to the structures of thought (and sensibility) of the Subject, and the necessity of their application can be proved, then the possibility of adding a predicate to a subject in the manner described above becomes necessarily possible and with it the possibility of metaphysics as a science.

To be clearer conceptually (and thus stylistically obscure): the necessary canon of the constitution of a critical metaphysics is articulated through a transcendental analytic that discovers thought as the morphology of an intellectual unity that is structured as a discursive unity of categorical determination of experience in a numerical identical consciousness (in its logical instantiation as apperception) that makes possible the legal phrasing of phenomena, as lawfulness experience, *i.e.* as a legislative and constitutive manner in which Logic and Ontology mathematically and dynamically engage one another.

⁸ Knowing Subject (as opposed to the logical subject).

A clear and comprehensive engagement with the critical system in its whole complexity is not in the horizon of the ambitions and possibilities of this effort, but rather sufficient only for the extraction of the idea of the identity of thought and being from the manner in which the aforementioned terms are engaged with the idea of the whole. It is therefore sufficient to observe the manner in which the aforementioned arguments presuppose firstly the idea of a decoupling between that which is informed and the cause in itself of the informed matter (*i.e.* the decoupling of *phenomena* from *noumena*), secondly, the functions of informing (pure intuitions and, what interests us, the pure concepts of understanding) and lastly, the problem of their application (*i.e.* their transcendental deduction).

Transcendental idealism presupposes, therefore, a specific constitutive relationship between subjectivity and objectivity. Firstly, this is produced by a sensibility that informs the flux of unmediated (*i.e.* not conceptual) sensations into a spatio-temporal structure. In other words, sensibility produces an object, but with a transcendental *texture* of its own making. Then, the flux of ordered sensations casted into the pure texture of spatio-temporal intuitions, as an object, is thought by an understanding with a conceptual texture of (as) its own possible form. The pure functions of informing possible experience are thus proposed as pure concepts of thought. Pure thought, in other words, is the thought of the synthetic unity of phenomena determined, in this sense, transcendently and conceptually.

But, in the context in which the objects of knowledge are here *appearances*⁹ informed transcendently, then with necessity that which is known separates itself from that which initially caused the affecting that initiated the movement of the constitutive synthesis of the object and its thought. Such a stance inevitably produces the debt of a sensible or intellectual uninformed cause, *i.e.*, the cause of the phenomenon and its thought, but which resists the transcendental phrasing of the Subject in the context that this aforementioned phrasing is what we in fact call knowledge.

But what causes this movement is not, in Kant's case, part of the legitimate sovereignty of it; the cause of the movement is not one of its moments. The *noumenon* cannot be known, considering that it is the cause of an experience understood as transcendental information of a matter that is a consequence thereof. One can easily observe, even here, how the whole decoupling rests on the assumption of a consciousness (in its logical instantiation as apperception) that is orientated towards an object, as a dogmatic instantiation, Hegel would observe, of the identity of subject and object. With such an observation, we consider gaining for our effort the *noumenal* actor in its role played in the Kantian thesis of the identity of being and thought.

In the context in which the form of the opening of our problem presupposes the question regarding the sovereignty of pure concepts in the Science of Logic,

⁹ φαινόμενον – that which appears

and also their aforementioned role played in transcendental idealism, we consider equally necessary the approach to the problem of the legitimate territory of their use within transcendental Kantian logic. Thus, categories are pure functions of synthetic unity in thought that are found as an intellectual texture in any possible object of experience, because they are firstly what introduce objectivity in it. Corroborating such a definition with the decoupling mentioned previously, it is easy to deduce that they can only be applied to objects of intuition, any attempt to determine something else resulting in an understanding without an object.

The sovereignty of pure concepts and ultimately of any claim of (speculative) knowledge, are inevitably and necessarily reduced to the territory of possible experience. We thus win the possibility of pure thought, understood as the previously exposed manner of tying a possible predicate to a subject in judgement, but with the price of reducing its sovereignty to the phenomenal structure of possible experience. Metaphysics is won as a science through the transcendental argument, but the horizon of what is transcendent becomes simple dialectical collapse into scepticism.

The distinction between subjectivity and objectivity dissolves therefore into a construction according to which objectivity is the product of transcendental informing of the phenomena by subjective structures. Nevertheless, the idea of this process as a transcendental-determinative movement of a consciousness that still is dualistically oriented towards an object of knowledge still parasites the possibility of a radical overcoming of the tension between thought and being.

Therefore, considering the way in which both analysed terms move towards the Kantian thesis of this identity, and with what price, we consider it now legitimate to turn our attention to perhaps one of the most difficult and obscure yet, at the same time, most important components of transcendental philosophy, the problem of the necessary application of pure concepts to experience. To be able to contrast the problem of the deduction with the aforementioned problematic identity in its critical form, we thus consider necessary to orient our attention towards both of its formulations or, to be more precise, both its metaphysical and transcendental versions. The full ambitions of the deduction far exceed in complexity any possible claim of our effort of being able to engage with the full importance and consequences of their role in the critical apparatus. Nevertheless, what interests us and we consider to be achievable in the limits of this effort are the series of consequences that they bear for the problem of the identity of Logic and Ontology, at least in their relevance for the Logic's beginning. The first distinction that must be made, alongside Kant, is therefore the one between the two forms of deduction, respectively between the metaphysical and the transcendental version. The ambition of the metaphysical deduction is firstly to produce the table of pure concepts, while the transcendental version takes on the titanic task of proving the necessity of their application.

The key to the metaphysical deduction is Kant's observation that:

The same understanding, and indeed by means of the very same actions through which it brings the logical form of judgment into concepts by means of the analytical unity, also brings a transcendental content into its representations by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition in general.¹⁰

In short, this argument allows the critical system, through the observation according to which there must exist a common root of the synthetic unity found in judgements and the unity of a particular representation proposed to understanding by intuition, to argue for the possibility of the derivation of pure concepts of transcendental understanding from the forms of judgements. In other words, it becomes possible to derive the table of categories from the one of judgments, a derivation with which the metaphysical variant of the deduction is completed with the articulation of the twelve functions of pure thought. What is important to note here is the role and influence played by formal logic. But since the idea of a category and its sovereignty inevitably carries with it the problem of the identity of being and thought, the fact that this argument raises the problem of a type of influence coming from formal logic towards the morphology and transcendental activity of thought represents the central nervous point relevant to our problem from the engagement with the deduction in its metaphysical variant.

The transcendental deduction, on the other hand, is perhaps the most obscure section of the system of speculative reason. It appears as an emergence of the fact that knowledge is composed of phenomena whose categorical determination must be proved as a condition of possibility for experience. Although the transcendental deduction has two distinct versions, more or less contradictory in places, they both presuppose the argument according to which the key for the deduction is the explicit influence of apperception around which the necessary application of pure concepts can be proved. In short, transcendental consciousness, in its logical instantiation as apperception, imposes "in a cascade" through faculties towards representation a series of syntheses (apperception, imagination and apprehension) necessary as a consequence of its own original synthetic unity. From this cascading influence exerted by the logical subject as original synthetic unity, we can derive that the form of experience of such an "I think" type of Subject must be necessary categorically informed.

Important to our task here is, on the one hand, the idea according to which the necessity of a deduction in its transcendental variant stems out of the portrait of a knowledge based on phenomenalization, as well as the fact that this is achieved through an argument which involves the movement of conciseness in the form of syntheses through faculties towards representation, of its original-synthetic logic form. The very form of apperception and its "cascading" through faculties is what makes the transcendental deduction possible.

¹⁰ KrV, A79/B105

The ambition of this moment of our effort was not, therefore, the one of a systematic engagement with the problem of the thing-in-itself and of the pure concepts of understanding, but only sufficient for the extraction of the series of consequences that they maintain towards the larger problem of the implicit thesis of the identity of Logic and Ontology that that Critique of Pure Reason contains. We have, therefore, argued that such a thesis necessarily emerges from the three components, and we can also argue for the fact that is not by chance that we can find, inside the Logic's system, a treatment and a displacement of exactly these problems. This moment was, therefore, understood as an inevitable consequence of the displacement of this thesis within the Logic that necessarily produced the obligation to confront the three actors of the Critique, which of course, Hegel does, directing our efforts to confront the Logic's position within the broader horizon of German idealism, through its contrast with transcendental idealism.

The arguments obtained assume, first of all, regarding the thing-in-itself, the fact that this decoupling occurs in the context of a determinative consciousness orientated towards a representation of intuition, and secondly, regarding pure concepts, the fact that the very sovereignty of the categories is limited to a very precise domain, the one of possible experience and nothing else. Thirdly, that from their deduction, in its metaphysical form, through their derivation, formal logic is indirectly connected to the morphology of the transcendental activity of thought through the table of judgements. And lastly, that in its transcendental form, we can find in the deduction a relationship between the necessity of the application of pure concepts to experience and the original synthetic unity in its cascading as synthesis through faculties.

The Kantian thesis of the identity between being and thought thus emerges with necessity from the portrait of an intellectual unity that has the form of a synthetic and discursive unity of categorical determination of knowledge in an apperceptive instantiation of consciousness, which makes possible the legal phrasing of experience as a legislative and constitutive mathematical and dynamical engagement of Logic and Ontology (*i.e.* transcendental and conceptual). Therefore, the kind of pre-critical metaphysical duality is in a sense overcome by transcendental philosophy, because within it the dichotomy between subjectivity and objectivity dissolves, to a certain point, into the movement of the production of objectivity precisely through the transcendental informing of the object of thought by the Subject. However, transcendental logic still carries in it the shadow of formal logic, as its identity thesis of being and thought gets detained, in a sense, inside the portrait of an object-oriented consciousness.

BEING AND THOUGHT IN THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC

Our thesis thus presupposes the fact that the Science of Logic is an ontological logic. We consider that the legitimacy of such a thesis must inevitably

be founded upon the problem of the identity of thought and being. The form that the question requires, in order to and move, is that of the sovereignty of pure concepts. In the context in which they are the promised products of the Logic, the horizon of the claims of its entire system depend on their understanding as pure forms of self-conscious thought or of both it and being. In the first case, the ambitions of the system are the ones of a transcendental logic; in the latter, the ones of a post-Kantian metaphysics as an ontological logic. Having the portrait of the problem in its transcendental and Kantian formula now at hand to be able to, by contrast, articulate the movements the thesis suffers within the framework of German idealism, we consider ourselves justified to now turn our attention to the arguments and movements of the beginning of the Logic.

The project of the Logic in its first movement is, in a sense, the complete and radical lack of one. Through the object itself that is directed towards (i.e., the λόγος), its architectonic must be necessarily orphaned of τέλος. The vector that would make the movement to a determined τέλος possible belongs as a movement to the inner structure of λόγος itself, therefore it cannot precede it. The system thus can only begin with a radical form of the Cartesian *dubito*, with the hope that the architectonical tyranny of the object itself will produce the method. The Logic is not “applying” the dialectical method to its objects, but discovers it through their own immanent movement. The Hegelian bet, therefore, lays in the possibility of beginning from an apodictic ground that presupposes nothing following its movement towards complexity through its own immanent structures. However, although comparable, the Hegelian *dubito* goes in a sense even further than Descartes’: “Hegel’s conclusion, however, is not «I think, therefore I am» but rather «thinking, therefore is»”¹¹. The Hegelian doubt is therefore even more radical, because it directly connects *dubito* and *sum*, short-circuiting over *ego*, thus managing the release of the first movement of the system from the inevitable dualistic opposition of subject and object.

Such a ground can be nothing else than the thought of pure and indeterminate being, the being of Parmenides that conceived it “with the pure enthusiasm of thought which has for the first time apprehended itself in its absolute abstraction: only being is”¹², which automatically and immanently triggers the dialectical collapse into nothingness and vice versa as Becoming, that itself further collapses into *Dasein*, Infinity, Being-for-Self etc.

The architectonic of such a system cannot even be considered as beginning from a certain point in the context in which its whole movement, through the immanent structure of the categories phrased, can only lead from where it started, that is, from being. Its architectonic is a circular process, to be more precise, of its

¹¹ Stephen Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel’s Logic*, Purdue University Press, West Lafayette 2006, p. 31

¹² G.W.F. Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, trans. George di Giovanni, Cambridge University Press, New York 2010, p. 60

enlargement through the immanent dialectic tension of its object. Its diameter is thus not the discursive movement towards a *τέλος*, but rather towards the maximum complexity of its concepts.

However, we can talk about a first movement of the system. Our thesis argues that this is not becoming, but rather it is the product of the *cogito sum* formula, of the thinking of pure being. The first movement is thus the one that makes such a *dubito* possible and donates ontological legitimacy to all the pure structures of thought articulated within the Logic. More precisely, the first movement of the Logic is nothing else but the one of the identity of being and thought which constitutes the possibility of *cogito sum*, and ultimately donating the ontological character of the categories to the entire architectonic. If this thesis is valid, then the necessary consequence is that the Logic's categories are at the same time and inseparably categories of thought as well as modes of being: "Indeed, it means that being is in itself intelligible logical form and that thought is the direct awareness of such intelligible being"¹³.

We consider, alongside Houlgate, that beyond this point, the project of the Logic can be considered a metaphysical deduction, because it tasks itself with the derivation of the structures of pure thought, only this time through the immanent movement of pure being, not through deriving them from the structures of judgments. In a sense, this derivation is not even a "process" applied to the concept, but its own movement (as complexity) towards itself.

With the understanding of the Logic's project as a form of metaphysical deduction, we can introduce the observation according to which the very way we opened up the problem of the identity of being and thought encapsulated in *cogito sum*, can be translated into the problem of the inclusion of a transcendental deduction in the system's first movement. The question regarding the sovereignty of the categories, if it's transcendental or ontological, requires nothing less than a transcendental deduction, because the question implies nothing more than a clarification to what, and with what necessity, the pure categories of thinking apply.

Can one therefore speak of a transcendental deduction contained in the Logic? Stephen Houlgate proposes two arguments that can produce a version of such a deduction:

„First, we are aware of being for no other reason than that we think; thought is thus the «condition» of our awareness of being. This is Hegel's quasi-Kantian principle. Second, thought is minimally the awareness or intuition of being itself. This is Hegel's quasi - Spinozan principle. These two principles dovetail in the single principle that the structure of being is the structure of the thought of being and cause Hegel to collapse ontology and logic into the new science of ontological logic.”¹⁴

¹³ Stephen Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel's Logic*, Purdue University Press, West Lafayette 2006, 117.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 130

Therefore, the transcendental deduction is itself the thesis of identity of being and thought as the first movement of the Logic, thesis that collapses the dualist doctrine of the subject/object divide, which would firstly produce the necessity of a deduction. In a sense, therefore, the Logic does not even require a deduction, in the context in which a formulation of one has no other effect than the collapse of the question into itself. In other words, formulating a transcendental deduction would only produce a thesis of the identity of being and thought that no longer requires a deduction. The answer itself disarms the legitimacy of the question, or more precisely the terms in which it is put.

The Science of Logic thus begins with the idea of a „liberation from the opposition of consciousness”¹⁵ in thought. Such a movement begins within the framework of German idealism with the Kantian thesis of the objective informing of experience by the transcendental structures of the Subject, which thus short-circuits the clinical divide of subjectivity and objectivity. But even with all this, from the perspective of the Logic, the Kantian system still dogmatically assumes a consciousness that is orientated and thus “considers” a distinct object of knowledge.

We have considered useful to our effort the historical framing of the Logic’s movements previously described through their contrast with the thesis in its Kantian version. We thus stopped at three issues that we argued were sufficient for its articulation, the noumenon, the pure concepts, and their deductions. We have understood the problem of the *noumenon* as an inevitable decoupling stemming from the dualism of a thought that is still directed (as judgement) towards an object. The Hegelian critique of the critical censorship of the thing-in-itself presupposes that it is the product of Kant himself not being critical enough, keeping it as a residue that is a consequence of an abstraction that dogmatically fragments into the presupposition of thought understood as a relationship to one of its objects. In Houlgate’s words: “in Hegel’s view, the concept of the “thing in itself” results from an act of abstraction that preserves the idea that all thought relates to objects and that does not in any way suspend or abstract from that conviction”¹⁶.

Thus, the abstraction of the thing-in-itself is nothing more than “[the product] of thought that has progressed to pure abstraction, [the product] of the empty I that makes this empty identity of itself into an object for itself.”¹⁷, that is, as a product of a consciousness that, even when facing itself, cannot decouple from its structure of being the thought (judgement) of an object. Thus the camera inevitably takes a picture of its own lens, concluding that the complete darkness of the picture must be the light’s limit in its lens. Thus the infinite obstacle of the *noumenon* is nothing else than the light’s limit in a lens concluded by a camera surprised that in the attempt to photograph its own lens the picture remains empty. The problem is here,

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 117

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 133

¹⁷ G.W.F. Hegel, *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline*, trans. Klaus Brinkmann and Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Cambridge University Press, New York 2010, p. 89.

of course, the separation which is thought in the lens, which is a residual and dogmatic product of thought, understood as a relation to an object: „Hegel [...] states explicitly that Kant's point of view remains confined within consciousness and its opposition”¹⁸.

Regarding the categories, we argued that the importance of our problem is the idea of the clear territoriality that, as a canon of all possible experience, must necessarily limit themselves to. It is thus clear how this thesis moves within the Logic through the fact that the identity of thought and being donates, throughout its whole structure as a cascading force, an ontological character to its pure concepts. They are not informing being, but rather are products of the intelligible logical form of being: „thinking in its immanent determinations and the true nature of things are one and the same content”¹⁹.

The last point of interest for the historical displacement of the thesis, we have argued, revolves around the two types of deduction. The Science of Logic can be thus considered a particular form of a metaphysical deduction. Although it also considers the derivation of pure concepts of thought, the proposed manner differs entirely; Hegel proposes the concepts own immanent dialectic movement for their derivation. To this extent, the Logic almost understands itself as a work without an author. Its bet is a surrendering to the object's own life, where the author's voice is mere passivity in front of the immanent and autonomous movement of the concept towards its own complexity.

The deduction in its Kantian form instead implies their derivation starting from the observation that the same function that produces unity in judgments produces unity in intuitions. In other words, it is possible to derive the table of pure concepts from judgments. Hegel criticizes such a project, arguing, similar to the critique of the thing-in-itself, that such a thesis is not sufficiently critical. Using the table of judgments, by a “back door”, we introduce within transcendental logic the contents of formal logic. As in the Hegelian architectonic, the contents of the Logic cannot simply be initially presupposed, and to no degree its content wants to be the one of formal logic; such a thesis can only be understood as a dogmatic baggage to be overcome. The transcendental deduction, instead, as we have argued before, collapses into itself, because the forcing of one dissolves the very legitimacy of the question itself.

The engagement with the movements of these problems served towards the portrayal of the historical movement of the thesis. The three problems produce the Kantian thesis of the identity between Logic and Ontology. Not accidentally, we can find within the Logic an explicit engagement with all three, because, we consider, what Hegel actually moved are not the individual actors but the actual

¹⁸ Stephen Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel's Logic*, Purdue University Press, West Lafayette 2006, p. 135.

¹⁹ G.W.F. Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, trans. George di Giovanni, Cambridge University Press, New York 2010, p. 25.

front of the dualism of being and thought. If the movement at the level of each actor implies the collapse of all consequences of considering (logical) consciousness as the thought of an object, then necessary the movement from the Kantian to the Hegelian thesis can be described as a radicalization of a movement that already took place within the framework of transcendental idealism, more precisely the dissolving of the dichotomous portrait of the subject and the object alongside the transcendental wound that is inevitable to a consciousness constituted as separation.

With this observation, we consider our question concluded. The categories of the Logic are at the same time the concepts of self-aware thought and also being, because the first movement of the system, as *cogito sum*, is the identity of thought and being, i.e., not the identity of subjective idealism, but of the thesis of a being whose structures are logical and intelligible form. In other words, being exhibits „a logical form or structure that is intelligible to thought and is the same as the structure of our basic categories. Indeed, it means that being is in itself intelligible logical form and that thought is the direct awareness of such intelligible being”²⁰.

The Science of Logic is thus an ontological logic. Its first movement is the identity of thought and being as a condition for the possibility of thinking pure being as *cogito sum*. This identity donates throughout the Logic’s body the ontological character of the categories. Being is the intelligible logical form whose modes are identical with the fundamental concepts of thought: „For Hegel, pure thought is indeed the intellectual intuition of being”²¹.

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²⁰ Stephen Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel’s Logic*, Purdue University Press, West Lafayette 2006, p. 117.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 125